Feb 252017
 

Melb Uni
Researchers at Melbourne University have issued their third and final report on investigations into insolvency fraud committed through the use of phoenix companies.

The 162 page report, issued on 24 February 2017, is titled Phoenix Activity: Recommendations On Detection, Disruption And Enforcement.

In the Executive Summary the authors state:

Harmful phoenix activity, left unchecked, has the capacity to undermine Australia’s revenue base and the competitive ‘level playing field’. It is wrong that legitimate business operators, paying taxes, wages and other debts, might be driven out of business by those engaging in harmful phoenix activity. Minimising business distrust caused by harmful phoenix activity can lower the cost of finance and make it more widely available. If less tax revenue is fraudulently avoided, the economy and society as a whole benefit. If fewer employee entitlements are lost as a result of harmful phoenix activity, there is likely to be less reliance on the Fair Entitlements Guarantee, freeing up government resources for other purposes.

What was described in earlier reports as “fraudulent phoenix activity” is described in the final report as “harmful phoenix activity”.

CLICK HERE to read and/or download a copy of the report.

The authors are Professor Helen Anderson, Professor Ian Ramsay, Professor Michelle Welsh and research fellow Mr Jasper Hedges.

Their Phoenix Project (“Phoenix Activity: Regulating Fraudulent Use of the Corporate Form”) “seeks to enhance Australia’s economic stability by determining the best methods of addressing fraudulent use of the corporate form without unduly inhibiting its proper use”. The project was launched in 3 years ago.

Analysis and highlights of the report will be posted here in due course.


Insolvency practitioners granted more time to prepare for law reforms

 Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Law reform proposals, Regulation  Comments Off on Insolvency practitioners granted more time to prepare for law reforms
Aug 242016
 

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) and The Minister for Revenue and Financial Services, the Hon Kelly O’Dwyer MP, announced on 23 August 2016 that many of the changes to insolvency law that were to be implemented under the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 have been postponed from March 2017 to September 2017.


ARITA Announcement

ARITA logo

IPs get more time to prepare for Insolvency Law Reform Act

In a major win by ARITA, the Minister for Revenue and Financial Services has agreed to delay the commencement of a portion of the Insolvency Law Reform Act (ILRA).

This decision will avoid the situation where the profession simply would not have enough time to become compliant with the Act by the scheduled commencement date of 1 March 2017.

We understand that while Parts 1 and 2 of the two new Insolvency Practice Schedules (for Corporations and Bankruptcy) will still commence on 1 March 2017, these parts of the legislation are largely concerned with registration and discipline, and can be easily implemented by the profession.

The Minister has agreed to delay Part 3 of the new Insolvency Practice Schedules which relate to the general rules for the conduct of external administrations and bankruptcies. These provisions will not commence until 1 September 2017.

We also understand that parts of Schedule 3 of the ILRA (very specific provisions dealing with matters such as termination of a DOCA and the relation back day) will also still commence on 1 March 2017.

The Government’s caretaker period during the lengthy election stopped all work on the all-important Insolvency Practice Rules, which is likely to push out their formalisation until December 2016.

This would have meant there was no way firms could adjust their IT systems or complete the necessary extensive staff retraining before the scheduled commencement. This extension simply provides a more reasonable time period for compliance.

These issues were first flagged with Government, agencies and regulators by ARITA prior to the election, and have been the subject of sustained action on our part to drive for a more acceptable commencement time frame.


Minister’s Announcement

Kelly-ODwyer-MP
The Minister for Revenue and Financial Services, the Hon Kelly O’Dwyer MP today announced that the industry is being given more time to implement the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 reforms.

This major reform will increase confidence in Australia’s insolvency regime by:

  • improving practitioner registration and disciplinary processes;
  • providing new regulatory powers to ASIC;
  • increasing practitioner insurance requirements;
  • introducing new review and audit processes; and
  • addressing conflicted remuneration and ensuring that offences and penalties are appropriate and proportionate.

“The reforms also ensure that our insolvency processes are modern and efficient – reducing costs, improving timeliness of administrations and improving returns to creditors,” Minister O’Dwyer said.

“Most importantly, the changes will enhance the ability of creditors to terminate underperforming practitioners.

“Given the scale of these reforms industry is being given time to upskill and to update their software systems and business processes before commencement.

“The reforms to insolvency administration processes, to enhance efficiency, improve communication and increase competition, are now scheduled to commence on 1 September 2017.

“We will not defer commencement of those reforms directed at promoting competency and professionalism in the insolvency industry. The practitioner registration and discipline provisions, and enhancements to the ASIC’s powers will commence on 1 March 2017, as planned.

“The Insolvency Law Reform Act represents the Government’s first tranche of insolvency reforms, directed at improving the integrity and efficiency of Australia’s insolvency laws.

“The Government’s second tranche of insolvency reforms will enhance business rescue and support entrepreneurship, and are being progressed as part of the Government’s National Innovation and Science Agenda,” Minister O’Dwyer said.


END OF POST

Dec 042015
 

The Senate Economics References Committee has criticised the contempt that some directors show for company laws, the “mild” consequences of non-compliance and the low likelihood that unlawful conduct will be detected.

In its report “Insolvency in the Australian construction industry: I just want to be paid” – published 3 December 2015 – the Senate Committee states:

The committee considers that the estimates of the incidence of illegal phoenix activity detailed in this report suggest that construction industry is being beset by a growing culture among some company directors of disregard for the corporations law. This view is reinforced by the anecdotal evidence received by the committee which indicates that phoenixing is considered by some in the industry as merely the way business is done in order to make a profit.

The committee is particularly concerned at evidence that a culture has developed in sections of the industry in which some company directors consider compliance with the corporations law to be optional, because the consequences of non-compliance are so mild and the likelihood that unlawful conduct will be detected is so low.

This culture is reflected in the number of external administrator reports indicating possible breaches of civil and criminal misconduct by company directors in the construction industry. Over three thousand possible cases of civil misconduct and nearly 250 possible criminal offences under the Corporations Act 2001 were reported in a single year in the construction industry. This is a matter for serious concern. It suggests an industry in which company directors’ contempt for the rule of law is becoming all too common.

[from Executive summary, Phoenixing (page xix) and paragraph 5.100 (page 87)]
Continue reading »

Aug 132015
 

What reasons are given for the failure and insolvency of non-corporate businesses, i.e., those owned by individuals as sole traders or in partnership? Is there any alignment between the reasons given for non-corporate business failures and the reasons given for corporate failures? And where a non-corporate (aka personal) business  insolvency has been brought about by the phoenix scheme of a corporate customer or client, is this made known to the regulator for statistical purposes?

This article is an extension of the discussion in my post  “Confusing causes of corporate insolvency”. Continue reading »

Jun 192015
 

(19/6/2015) A lively public hearing before the Senate Committee looking into insolvency in the Australian construction industry has been told by several speakers that sub-contractors should be protected by requiring head contractors to place money in trust funds. The Committee also heard about debt collection methods, outlaw bikie gangs and new allegations concerning events leading up to the collapse of Walton Construction in October 2013.

Those appearing before the Committee on 12 June 2015 included Mr Dave Noonan, National Secretary of the Construction and General Division, Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU), representatives of the Subcontractors Alliance, Project Resources, Masonry Contractors Association of NSW, EcoClassic Group Pty Ltd and Erincole Building Services Pty Ltd.

MORE TO COME: At the close of the day Senator Cameron said: “Chair, there might be other issues once we have a look at the Hansard. We might need to get some of this group back again further on. This inquiry is going to run for a bit of time yet, so we will need to have a look, see what you said and come back.”

The official Hansard transcript of the hearing on 12 June 2015 was recently published on the Parliament’s website. A PDF copy of the 56 page transcript may be downloaded from that site by clicking here.

Senate Committee told about phoenix activity in construction industry

 Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Official Inquiries, Regulation, White collar crime  Comments Off on Senate Committee told about phoenix activity in construction industry
May 292015
 

Parliament website
The Senate Committee established to inquire into “Insolvency in the Australian construction industry” – which is code for illegal phoenix activity in the construction industry – has received written submissions from industry bodies, unions, contractors associations, superannuation funds, insolvency practitioners, the ATO and the ASIC. A total of 18 submissions were received and are available for download from the Parliament of Australia website. Below is a screenshot of the list of submissions.

Submissions to committee

Mar 252015
 

The Final Report on the review of Australia’s Personal Property Securities Act (PPSA) was tabled before Parliament on 18 March 2015.  (It was written by Bruce Whittaker, Partner, Ashurst.)

PPSA-final-report-cover

Cover of report

Extracts from Executive Summary

…. The Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (referred to in this report as the Act) has improved consistency in Australia’s secured transactions laws, but submissions emphasised that the Act and the Register are far too complex and that their meaning is often unclear, and that the resultant uncertainty has not allowed the Act to reach its potential…. …. Much can be done to improve the Act. The Act is significantly longer than the corresponding legislation in other jurisdictions, and while some of that additional length is attributable to constitutional or other machinery provisions, much of it flows from the very prescriptive nature of some of the drafting, and from the inclusion of additional provisions that may be of only marginal benefit…. …. There is no one single step that by itself will produce a major improvement to the Act. Rather, improvement needs to come from the making of many small changes…. …. The reforms introduced by the Act will only realise their objectives if the people that it affects are aware of it, and understand how it affects them. Government went to considerable efforts to raise awareness of the Act around the time that the Act was passed, but general awareness of the Act appears to have remained low, and the complexity and unfamiliarity of the content of the Act have meant that many do not know how to work with it….

Recommendations

There are 394 recommendations in the Final Report.  They appear in a table  in Annexure E, beginning at page 502 of the report.  DOWNLOAD: The full report is available for download at this AG department website.

Non-compliance with the Act

As someone who believes that our laws must be drafted using plain writing skills, and as one of those who felt strongly and said from the start that the  Personal Properties Securities Act 2009 was far too complex and confusing for the vast majority of people to understand (and hence, badly written), the Report’s comments to this effect are worth repeating here.  They appear under the heading  “3.2.3  Causes of non-compliance with the Act”:

The lack of awareness and understanding of the Act among users is also the primary reason why businesses are failing to comply with it. A person who is not aware of the existence of the Act, or of the fact that it could apply to them, is most unlikely to be operating in a manner that is consistent with the rules set out in the Act, particularly as those rules are very different in some critical respects to the laws that preceded them. Similarly, even people who are aware of the Act and of the fact that it affects them are often failing to comply with its rules because they do not understand those rules properly. One submission from the rural sector observed, for example, that the Act:

has not achieved a clear and appropriate outcome for small business; rather it has created a raft of uncertainty, misrepresentation and total confusion for all small business operators in Rural Australia.

The extracts from submissions that are set out above in Section 3.1.2 all make the same point: that the Act and the Register are far too complex. This was a consistent theme across the submissions as a whole.

The Act deals with a complex area of the law – one that traverses our entire economy, and that manifests itself in different sectors of the economy in very many different ways. The area does not lend itself to one simple set of rules, and the Act will always be complex. The submissions demonstrated, however, that the Act is more complex than it needs to be. In my view, a number of factors have contributed to this outcome.

First, as noted earlier, many of the concepts and much of the terminology in the Act have been adopted from overseas models. Those models were not created in a legal vacuum, but were founded in and based on the substance of the legal systems for which they were developed. In particular, while Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States was regarded as revolutionary in the way that it created a standard set of rules for all types of security interests, it was also very much a creature of the state of law and commercial practice in the United States at the time it was developed. Clearly, the economic structures and legal systems in Australia in the early 21st century are very different to those that prevailed in the United States in the middle of the previous century. As a result, terminology and concepts that made sense and were relevant for Article 9 as part of United States law will not necessarily make the same sense, or have the same relevance, in the Act as a component of current Australian law.

Secondly, it appears that the architects of the Act may have tried too hard to be helpful. The Act is far longer than its Canadian and New Zealand counterparts, even allowing for the additional provisions that were included to accommodate constitutional and other machinery requirements. The developers of the Act appear to have endeavoured to produce a “best of breed” piece of personal property securities legislation, by picking out the best elements of the offshore models and then adding additional detail in an effort to explain more clearly exactly what is required. Rather than helping Australian businesses, however, this had the effect of creating very specific and detailed operational requirements. It limited flexibility and required changes to operating practices in order to align them with the structures required by the new rules.

The third main factor that has led to this situation, in my view, is that the development of the Act appears to have been approached as a design process, too divorced from the realities of the marketplace that it was designed for. While Government did provide the business and legal community with opportunities to comment on drafts of the legislation, the sense of many of those who were involved in the consultation process was that input from the business and legal community was not sufficiently incorporated into the policy design and the detailed drafting. As a result, there is a misalignment in some areas between the policy and drafting of the Act on the one hand, and the operating realities of the Australian business environment on the other. This has created confusion and uncertainty, rather than clarity and certainty.

This is not intended to reflect adversely on the individuals involved in the actual drafting of the Act, or those who instructed them. Rather, it is a reflection of the magnitude and complexity of the task.

Whatever the reasons for the confusions and complexities in the Act, they have made the Act very hard to understand and to work with, not just for businesses but even for legal specialists as well. This is exacerbated by the fact that the complexities compound each other – unfamiliar terms and uncertain concepts are used in complex provisions, in a way that can make it even more difficult to determine how those complex provisions inter-relate with each other. The cumulative effect is that the Act can be very difficult to understand and to work with.

It is clear that much can and should be done to streamline the Act, and to align it more closely with the realities of the marketplace that it applies to. That is the subject of Chapters 4 to 9 of this report.

The big challenge for amendments to the Act that are made as a result of the Final Report is that they make the Act and its practical application much easier to understand.

Jan 142015
 

UPDATED 16/1/2015

Despite directors receiving official admonishments, detailed instructions and threats about the practice of allowing a company to trade whilst insolvent (see, for example, ASIC Regulatory Guide 217), the curse of insolvent trading seems to be growing.

So, in an attempt to reel it in – or perhaps (for the cynical) to reduce the number of reported cases – the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is putting the onus on liquidators to provide “better” information in their statutory reports.

Background

Where liquidators of insolvent companies become aware that a past or present director or other officer of a company may have committed an offence, they are required to make a formal report to ASIC. Several years ago ASIC came up with a form and guidelines spelling out the information it wanted from liquidators before it would take their allegations of offences any further. This change came with the introduction of an electronic means of lodging reports, but also occurred after ASIC had become fed-up with receiving offence reports considered by its investigators to be almost worthless.

The latest version of this offence report form was released on 18 December 2014. The changes that have been drawn to the attention of liquidators by ASIC concern allegations of insolvent trading. The previous version of the form (July 2008) asked little of liquidators regarding this subject: about all it wanted was a “Yes” or “No” on the availability of documentary evidence. But the new version requires far more.

In the insolvency profession the ASIC form is known as EX01. More technically it is Schedule B of Regulatory Guide 16: Report to ASIC under s422, s438D or s533 of the Corporations Act 2001 or for statistical purposes. (Note: This reporting requirement applies not only to liquidators but also to receivers or managing controllers and voluntary administrators. However for simplicity all these classes of external administrators are referred to collectively in this article as liquidators.)

ex01-embossed

Possible Misconduct – EX01

In EX01 reporting of “insolvent trading” is carried out in the section headed Possible Misconduct.

Here, ASIC asks the liquidator “Are you reporting possible misconduct?”

If the answer is “Yes”, the liquidator is invited to examine Schedule D of ASIC Regulatory Guide 16 to learn “what is likely to constitute a breach of the relevant section, and the evidence needed to prove such a breach”. Schedule D contains over 6,500 words.

There is also a warning “that ASIC may ask you to provide a supplementary report addressing in detail the possible misconduct reported and we may later require further evidence or statements from you for Court purposes”. A description of what is required in the ASIC supplementary report is set out in Schedule C: Supplementary report by receiver or managing controller under s422(2), by voluntary administrator under s438D(2), or by liquidator under s533(2). Schedule C contains about 3,000 words. Liquidators of “assetless companies” are eligible under Regulatory Guide 109 to apply for funding from ASIC for reasonable remuneration and costs in preparing a supplementary report (ASIC form EX03).

If, after considering what is involved in answering “Yes”, the liquidator still thinks the misconduct is worth reporting, or filing a complaint, he or she is directed to the section headed “Criminal Offences”.

Possible Misconduct – Criminal Offences – Insolvent Trading – EX01

Preliminary details of an allegation of insolvent trading – an offence under section 588G(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 – are sought by ASIC in the usual tick-the-box manner.

First the liquidator reports the alleged offence by ticking “Yes” to the following statement:

“In your opinion, one or more directors failed to prevent the company incurring a debt or debts at a time when the director suspected that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result, and the failure to prevent the company incurring the debt(s) was dishonest.”

Having ticked that box, the liquidator is asked “Do you have documentary evidence or other to support your opinion?” and “Are you aware of documentary evidence in the possession of another person that supports this allegation?”

Up to this section the revised form is practically the same as the previous version.

But in the new version, if the liquidator reports a case of insolvent trading and has, or knows of, documentary evidence supporting this conclusion, the liquidator must provide more information by answering several extra questions.

These extra questions concern the period of insolvency, the methods and records used to determine the date of insolvency, the amount of debts incurred, and the reasonable grounds for the director had to suspect insolvency. (The actual questions are set out verbatim below, but the heading are mine.) They are the type of questions that a liquidator, especially one with sufficient funds, ought to consider as a matter of course before reaching an opinion regarding the existence (or non-existence) of insolvent trading.

Effects of changes to insolvent trading sections of EX01

Prior to the recent changes, if ASIC saw a completed EX01 form in which the liquidator had alleged a breach of the insolvent trading laws, and had also answered “yes” to questions about the possession or existence of documentary evidence “or other” to support that opinion, ASIC would have then needed to consider whether to investigate. Its task would likely have entailed obtaining, or trying to obtain, from the liquidator the extra information that is now set out in the latest version of EX01. So, as far as the extra demands in the form are concerned, ASIC would probably argue that liquidators are no greater imposed upon now than they were before.

But regardless of the information ASIC has or could readily obtain, it often decides not to investigate complaints of alleged offences. For many years this inaction has deeply frustrated a lot of liquidators. Many feel that completing an EX01 form is a waste of their time and also, where there are still funds in the insolvent company, a waste of creditors’ money. Unless the revised EX01 results in greater tangible action by ASIC (increased investigations and prosecutions and not just more detailed statistics), making the form more demanding will aggravate these feelings.

It might even see an increase in the non-reporting of insolvent trading offences (see the new question “Reasons for not reporting insolvent trading”), or in “no” being the liquidator’s response when it really should be “yes”.


Extra questions about insolvent trading – new EX01

Period insolvency commenced

Indicate the period, which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts as and when they became due and payable:

◻ At appointment ◻ 1 – 3 months prior to appointment ◻ 4 – 9 months prior to appointment ◻ 10 – 15 months prior to appointment ◻ 16 – 24 months prior to appointment ◻ Over 2 years prior to appointment

Method/s of determining date of insolvency

How did you determine the date on which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts as and when they became due and payable? (tick one or more):

◻ Cash flow analysis ◻ Trading history analysis ◻ Balance sheet analysis ◻ Informed by director(s) ◻Other, please specify __________________

Records used to determine date of insolvency

Which of the following records, in your possession, did you use to determine the date on which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts? (tick one or more):

◻ Cash flow (actual / forecasts / budgets) ◻ Banking records ◻ Aged debtors’ list ◻ Aged creditors’ list ◻ Profit & loss statements ◻ Balance sheets ◻ Other, please specify _______________

Grounds for director to suspect insolvency

If you believe the director had reasonable grounds to suspect the company was insolvent or would become insolvent by incurring the debt (or a reasonable person in a like position would have reason to suspect), please identify on which of the following indicators of insolvency you have based your belief (tick one or more):

◻ Financial statements that disclose a history of serious shortage of working capital, unprofitable trading ◻ Poor or deteriorating cash flow or evidence of dishonoured payments ◻ Difficulties paying debts when they fell due (e.g. evidenced by letters of demand, recovery proceedings, increasing age of accounts payable) ◻ Non-payment of statutory debts (e.g. PAYGW, SGC, GST) ◻ Poor or deteriorating working capital ◻ Increasing difficulties collecting debts ◻ Overdraft and/or other finance facilities at their limit ◻ Evidence of creditors attempting to obtain payment of outstanding debts ◻ Other, please specify ________________

Approximate debt after insolvency

Estimate the approximate amount of debts incurred after the date (in your opinion) of insolvency:

◻ $0 – $250,000 ◻ $250,001 – less than $1 million ◻ $1 million to $5 million ◻ Over $5 million ◻ Unable to determine

Aged list of creditors

Do you have an aged creditors’ list as at (tick one or more):

◻ Date of insolvency ◻ Date of appointment

Dishonesty by director

If the director/directors was dishonest in failing to prevent the company from incurring the debt, indicate what evidence you have available to support this (tick one or more):

◻ Evidence showing that the director/directors had an opportunity to prevent the company from incurring the debt and did not. Such evidence could include: • documents evidencing discussions with the directors, employees and creditors concerning the circumstances surrounding the incurring of particular debts; • correspondence or other documents relating to the circumstances surrounding the incurring of the debt. ◻ Evidence showing that the failure was dishonest (i.e., the director/directors incurred the debt with the knowledge that it would produce adverse consequences, the failure was intentional, wilful or deliberate, and it included an element of deceit or fraud). Such evidence could include: • documents evidencing discussions with the directors, employees and creditors concerning the circumstances surrounding the incurring of particular debts; • correspondence or other documents relating to the circumstances surrounding the incurring of the debt.

Reasons for not reporting insolvent trading

If you did not report insolvent trading (s588(1)-(2) or s588(3)), was it because, in your opinion:

◻ The books and records are insufficient to establish insolvent trading ◻ The company did not incur debts at a time when it was unable to pay its debts (e.g., it ceased to trade) ◻ The directors had reasons to expect the company could pay its debts as they fell due and payable (eg. they obtained independent advice) ◻ Other, please specify ________________

Whether creditor/s are seeking compensation for insolvent trading

Has a creditor commenced, or indicated that they intend to commence, action to recover compensation for loss resulting from insolvent trading?

◻ Yes ◻ No

Possible Misconduct – Breaches of civil obligations – Insolvent Trading – EX01

Insolvent trading may also be a breach of civil penalty sections 588G(1)-(2) of the Act. The revised form EX01 also seeks details of allegations of this nature, by asking about the period of insolvency, the methods and records used to determine the date of insolvency, the amount of debts incurred, and the reasonable grounds for the director had to suspect insolvency. The questions are practically the same as those asked when a criminal offence is alleged (see above). In the previous version of EX01 only three brief questions were posed, which concerned the availability of evidence and the perceived legitimacy of a director’s defence.

2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Personal Bankruptcy, Regulation  Comments Off on 2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws
Nov 172014
 

On 7 November 2014  an exposure draft of the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (ILRB 2014) was released by the Australian Treasury for comment.

The Treasury Crest

Summaries:

The Treasury’s summary/promotion of the legislation is as follows:

“The draft Bill comprises a package of proposals to amend and streamline the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and the Corporations Act 2001. The proposed amendments will:

•remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
•enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
•promote market competition on price and quality;
•boost confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners; and
•remove unnecessary costs from the insolvency industry resulting in around $55.4 million per annum in compliance cost savings.”

The Explanatory Material issued with the Bill opens with this outline:

“The Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (Bill) amends the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Bankruptcy Act) to create common rules that would:
• remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
• align and modernise the registration and disciplinary frameworks that apply to registered liquidators and registered trustees;
• align and modernise a range of specific rules relating to the handling of personal bankruptcies and corporate external administrations;
• enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
• promote market competition on price and quality;
• improve the powers available to the corporate regulator to regulate the corporate insolvency market and the ability for both regulators to communicate in relation to insolvency practitioners operating in both the personal and corporate insolvency markets; and
• improve overall confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners.”

 Links to government material:

The draft Bill (ILRB 2014) in PDF format

The Explanatory Material in PDF format

The Insolvency Practice Rules – Proposals Paper in PDF format

Coversheet for a submission by post

The Treasury website page

Previous Bill and background material:

The first version of ILRB 2014 appeared on 19/12/2012 as Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2012, but it never became law. However, the 2012 Explanatory Memorandum and  the 2012 Exposure Draft  contains valuable background information related to the current Bill. (Sixteen submissions were made for this 2012 consultation.)

Further background information regarding ILRB 2014 is available in the June 2011 Treasury Options Paper titled “A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia”. (Thirty three submissions were made for this consultation.)

The 2011 options paper was followed in December 2011 by a Proposals Paper with the same title. (Twenty nine submissions were made for this consultation.)

Submissions regarding ILRB 2014:

Closing date for submissions: Friday, 19 December 2014.

Email submissions are to be done online at:

http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/Submission-Form?parent={34029467-07BE-46D9-AA9E-86DAC3715DFF}

Address for written submissions:

Manager
Corporations and Scheme Unit
Financial System and Services Division
The Treasury
Langton Crescent
PARKES ACT 2600

 For enquiries call Peter Levy at The Treasury on (02) 6263 3976.

Further posts on this site:

Further posts will be made on this blog site in the coming days with details of some of the proposed changes to corporate insolvency laws.

 


 

Oct 222014
 

” Working at the coal face of insolvency and restructuring, our members have a unique view of the effectiveness of our legislative framework in restoring the economic value of underperforming businesses. For the optimum operation of markets, it’s vital that their expertise is utilised to ensure our legislative framework is the best that it can be.”

This statement from the Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association (ARITA) – the professional body to which most insolvency practitioners belong – accompanies publication (14-10-2014) of its discussion paper on dealing with corporate financial distress in Australia.

ARITA says that its discussion paper – “A Platform for Recovery” – identifies seven current issues in the insolvency regime and proposes law and practice reforms to remedy them.  The paper’s Executive Summary is as follows:

ARITA executive summary

The following are further statements made by ARITA on the launch its plans:

“As Australia’s insolvency and recovery professional body, we must have a clear and well-articulated policy position across the full gambit of issues that we cover, that all key stakeholders are aware of.  Our new discussion paper … identifies seven current issues in the insolvency regime and proposes law and practice reforms to remedy them.  The discussion paper does not go into the detail of specific legislative change, but concentrates on concepts and their merits …. The goal of the discussion paper is to stimulate active and informed discussion of the issues that are raised. This will inform ARITA’s final policy position …. A foundation of our thinking is that the current “one size fits all” approach to dealing with companies in financial distress is flawed.”

A copy of  A Platform for Recovery may be viewed and obtained at this location on the ARITA website.

ARITA is inviting contributions to the debate. To go to their discussion forum, go to ….   www.arita-forums.com.au