liquidator – ░░░ INSOLVENCY INTERFACE

Australian Building Systems case: nuanced ATO view of decision

Capital Gains Tax, CGT, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Insolvency practices, Priority Debts, Tax debts, Tax liabilities, Taxation Issues Comments Off

Feb 072016

On 6 January 2016 the ATO issued a Decision Impact Statement concerning the High Court judgment in the Australian Building Systems case.

[See my previous post for a discussion of the High Court’s majority decision: Australian Building Systems case: plenty of common sense in the dissenting judgment by Justice Michelle Gordon]

It seems that although the ATO accepts the High Court’s majority decision (as, of course, it must), it’s interpretation of the decision is nuanced, and suggests that it has no intention of giving up on the retention obligation.

Australian Building Systems case: plenty of common sense in the dissenting judgment by Justice Michelle Gordon

Capital Gains Tax, Corporate Insolvency, court decisions, Insolvency Law, Priority Debts, Tax debts, Taxation Issues Comments Off

Dec 172015

(Judgment of December 2015)

By a majority of three to two the High Court dismissed the Australian Taxation Office’s appeal in the Australian Building Systems case: Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (In Liquidation); Commissioner of Taxation v Muller and Dunn as Liquidators of Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2015] HCA 48 (10 December 2015) .

This test case – run by the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) – began in 2013 and has previously been before the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal. It was supposed to settle a far-reaching, long-standing argument that ARITA and the ATO had been having since 2009.

Argument about when obligation arises

The primary argument in this case – framed here as an issue for liquidators in general – has been whether the “retention obligation” placed on liquidators by section 254(1)(d) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 arises prior to the issue of a tax assessment or only after the issue of an assessment.
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Factors considered in court review of provisional liquidator’s remuneration

Corporate Insolvency, court decisions, External administrators, Insolvency Law, law reports Comments Off

Feb 172015

What information should a liquidator supply to the court to have his or her remuneration approved? On the other side, those opposed to the amount of remuneration must “settle on particular aspects of the liquidators’ conduct which can be queried”. This judgment from Western Australia on 11 February 2015 considers some issues.

Judgment – Remuneration of Provisional Liquidator – WA

Judges Gavel

RE PNP PACIFIC PTY LTD; EX PARTE STRICKLAND & HURT as Liquidators of PNP PACIFIC PTY LTD [2015] WASC 49 (11 February 2015)

CORAM : MASTER SANDERSON > HEARD : 6 NOVEMBER 2014 > DELIVERED : 6 NOVEMBER 2014 > PUBLISHED : 11 FEBRUARY 2015 > FILE NO/S : COR 147 of 2014

MATTER : Application for approval of liquidators’ remuneration pursuant to s 504 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) > EX PARTE > KIMBERLEY ANDREW STRICKLAND as Liquidator of PNP PACIFIC PTY LTD First-named Plaintiff > DAVID ASHLEY NORMAN HURT as Liquidator of PNP PACIFIC PTY LTD > Second-named Plaintiff.

Catchwords: Liquidation – Application for approval of remuneration – Turns on own facts. Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 449E (7)

________________________________________________________________

1 MASTER SANDERSON: This was the plaintiffs’ application for approval of remuneration. The application was issued on 6 August 2014. It was supported by an affidavit of the second-named plaintiff, David Ashley Norman Hurt, sworn 29 May 2014, and a further affidavit of Mr Hurt, sworn 6 August 2014. Mr Sean Damian O’Reilly, a secured creditor of the company, appeared and opposed the making of the order for remuneration. I granted Mr O’Reilly leave to file any affidavit in opposition to the liquidator’s remuneration claim by 16 September 2014.

2 The matter came back before the court on 6 November 2014. The plaintiffs were represented, but Mr O’Reilly did not appear. I indicated to counsel for the plaintiffs no affidavit from Mr O’Reilly had been received and I would make orders approving the remuneration in terms of the originating process. I indicated I would give written reasons for my decision. On 16 December 2014 I read short oral reasons into the transcript and published these reasons both to the plaintiffs’ solicitors and to Mr O’Reilly. Regrettably, due to an administrative oversight, I did not take into account an affidavit of Mr O’Reilly which had been filed on 7 October 2014. I have now had the opportunity to consider that affidavit and have concluded that even with the benefit of Mr O’Reilly’s affidavit, the plaintiffs’ application should be approved. These reasons deal shortly with why, in these rather unusual circumstances, I would approve the plaintiffs’ remuneration.

3 The way in which the remuneration of liquidators, provisional liquidators and other company administrators is to be determined was set out by the Full Court of this court in Venetian Pty Ltd v Conlan (1998) 20 WAR 96. It is worth setting out again the regime mandated by the court. It is as follows (103 104):

Ordinarily, to commence the proceedings, the provisional liquidator will provide the court with a statement of account reflecting in appropriate itemised form, details of the work done, the identity of the persons who did the work, the time taken for doing the work, and the remuneration claimed accordingly. The statement of account should also reflect in appropriately itemised form the expenses incurred by the provisional liquidator, accompanied where necessary by voucher proof. Sufficient detail should be provided to enable the court to determine whether the disbursements were reasonably incurred and that the amounts claimed are reasonable.

The statement of account should be verified by affidavit. When the remuneration claimed involves work carried out by the provisional liquidator and his staff, the verifying affidavit need state merely that the work described in the statement of account was done by the provisional liquidator or under his personal supervision, and that from personal knowledge or from the records kept by the provisional liquidator or his firm, or from some other appropriate source, he believes that the information contained in the statement of account is correct. When disbursements are claimed, the affidavit should verify that they were incurred and, if necessary, why they needed to be incurred.

In Re Solfire Pty Ltd (In liq) (No 2), Shepherdson J said (at 1,164):

‘In my view, when a provisional liquidator seeks to have his remuneration determined by the court he should provide a document not dissimilar in form to the bill of costs in taxable form provided by a solicitor to his client … He should identify the person or persons and the grade or grades of the person or persons engaged in the particular task concerning the provisional liquidation, he should identify that task and dates on which time was spent on it, the amount of time spent on it and he should identify the relevant rate, according to the grade of the person or persons performing the work. I also consider that he should require the person performing the work to keep reasonably detailed diary notes and time sheets which documents should be open to inspection by persons entitled to see them.’

In our opinion, however, it is, with respect, unnecessary to lay down an absolute rule, in such detailed terms, concerning the statement of account to be provided by a provisional liquidator. It may well be that in a particular case information particularised as suggested by Shepherdson J would be appropriate. In other cases less detailed information may be required. Every case depends on its own circumstances. But the overriding principle remains: sufficient information must be provided to the court to enable it to perform its function under s 473(2).

If the Master were to be satisfied that the statement of account was sufficiently detailed to enable the remuneration to be determined, but there were objections to the account, special directions should be given in regard to the mode in which the account is to be taken or vouched. The procedure set out in O 45 should as far as possible be adopted. If, for example, the objector challenges whether a particular item of work was in fact done, or whether the person alleged to have done the work spent the time alleged in doing it, it may be necessary for the provisional liquidator to call direct evidence establishing the correctness of the allegations made: see generally Gava v Grljusich (unreported, Supreme Court, WA, Full Court, Library No 970492, 19 September 1997).

Notice should be given of the points on which the provisional liquidator will be crossexamined (if crossexamination is allowed). The notice of objection should be supported by affidavit. Crossexamination of the provisional liquidator and the objecting party may then occur. But care should be taken to follow the admonition of Sir Robert Megarry VC in Computer Machinery Co Ltd v Drescher (at 1386), namely: ‘It would not be right to allow anything resembling a trial of the action to take place in the guise of an argument on costs’.

4 What is anticipated by this regime is a twostage process. The practice is grown up of liquidators swearing an affidavit and attaching to that affidavit copies of the timesheets used to calculate remuneration. In addition, the liquidator will provide a brief description of the role of each person for whom a charge has been made, and the rate at which the time has been charged. I then consider the timesheets and all related material and form a prima facie view as to whether the charge is reasonable.

5 In this case the approach taken by the liquidators was slightly different. They produced a remuneration report pursuant to s 449E(7) of the Act. A copy of that report is annexure DH11 to the first affidavit of Mr Hurt. The remuneration was approved at a meeting of creditors held on 23 April 2012. The liquidators then undertook further work and prepared a further remuneration request report which appears as annexure DH13 to Mr Hurt’s affidavit. It is this report seeking an amount of $25,419 which formed the basis of this application. The report was not approved by a meeting of directors.

6 The first report itself begins by setting out a ‘Schedule of Hourly Rates and General Guide to Staff Experience’. For instance, under the classification ‘Director’ there appears a heading ‘Description’. It reads as follows:

Chartered accountant (or equivalent) and degree qualified with 9+ years (approximately) of experience. Able to autonomously lead complex insolvency appointments.

7 The hourly rate specified is $510. There then follow a number of categories down to the final category of ‘Clerical’. Such persons are charged at $110 an hour. There is then a heading ‘Liquidators’ Disbursements’ which sets out the way in which disbursements are charged. For instance, ‘Printing’ is charged at 30 cents per page. There then follows a heading ‘Remuneration Methods’ and it is said that the liquidators have charged on a time cost basis. There is a further subheading ‘Other Creditor Information on Remuneration’. Reference is made to a number of publications providing some guide as to the way in which liquidators charge generally.

8 The main part of the report appears under the heading ‘Schedule of Liquidator’s Anticipated Tasks and Estimated Remuneration for the Period 5 April 2012 to Finalisation of the Liquidation’. The total shown is $40,230, and it was this amount that was approved.

9 The second report was in a slightly different form. Once again, the hourly rates of staff were set out and it is said charging was based on a time cost method. There then appears a heading ‘Tasks Undertaken by the Liquidators and Time Costs for the Period 5 April 2012 to 30 June 2013’. By way of example as to how these matters are set out, appearing below is the first of a number of discrete boxes setting out what was done in relation to particular matters.

Task area	General description	Includes
Assets 9.9 hours $2,804 $311 per hour	Stock, Plant and Equipment	reviewing asset listings; correspondence and liaison with auctioneers and potential buyers; obtaining valuations; and tasks associated with realising assets.
	Debtors	reviewing the trade debtor position.
	Other assets	tasks associated with realising other assets.
	Funds in CS Legal trust account	tasks associated with realising funds in CS Legal Trust account; correspondence and liaison with solicitors; tasks associated with obtaining court order.

10 There is a final heading ‘Summary of the Liquidators’ Time Costs for the Period 5 April 2012 to 30 June 2013 by Personnel Level and Task’. By way of example, Mr Hurt is described as ‘Associate Director’. His hourly rate is $467. He is said to have spent 6.7 hours working on the liquidation at a total cost of $3,129. That dollar figure is then broken down further. For instance, under ‘Assets’, as set out above, Mr Hurt is said to have incurred an amount of $94 by way of costs.

11 As with every single case I have looked at over the past almost 17 years since Venetian was decided, I was satisfied, prima facie, the charges claimed were justified. It is difficult to see how in any circumstance a different conclusion can ever be reached. All a liquidator can ever do is set out in broad detail what was done in the course of the liquidation and the hourly rate charged. There is no way I could, by looking at the broad description of the work done by Mr Hurt and his hourly rate, assess whether or not the charge is reasonable. Really, the first stage of this two stage process is a waste of time. Of course, if it were the case the material before the court was manifestly inadequate because there were no timesheets, the hourly rate was not specified, or the individuals who did the work were not identified, then the claim would fail. But that is a wholly different thing from requiring a preliminary assessment of the entitlement to remuneration.

12 In any event, having undertaken in this case a preliminary assessment of the material, I was satisfied, prima facie, the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. It was then a matter of considering the affidavit of Mr O’Reilly. It is somewhat difficult to distil from the affidavit the nature of Mr O’Reilly’s complaint. It would appear to amount to Mr O’Reilly being dissatisfied with the time invested by the plaintiffs in the liquidation. At par 51 of his affidavit he says:

My professional opinion is that the amount of hours that could be substantiated in this matter is less than 50 hours.

13 In a following paragraph he goes on to offer a breakdown of how long various tasks would take. For instance, ‘Creditors’ is suggested to take four hours. Mr O’Reilly also complains about the charges of liquidators generally without reference to this particular liquidation. Mr O’Reilly was also not satisfied there was a need for investigation of the company’s affairs. If an investigation was actually undertaken, he says it was not comprehensive.

14 The difficulty with Mr O’Reilly’s affidavit is its generality. It does not settle on particular aspects of the liquidators’ conduct which can be queried. To refer again to the Venetian decision, Mr O’Reilly does not challenge whether a particular item of work was done or whether a particular person specified actually did the work. Based upon the general affidavit filed by Mr O’Reilly, there was no way I could have directed the liquidator to file further affidavit material. That would have required each and every one of the persons who were associated with the liquidation to swear an affidavit saying what they did, when they did it and why they did it. It is that sort of exercise which, on any approach to a review of remuneration, is to be avoided.

15 Accordingly, I was not satisfied the affidavit of Mr O’Reilly gave rise to any matter about which the liquidators had to provide further information. I am satisfied the approval of that remuneration was proper and appropriate. I made orders accordingly.

___________________________________________________________________

Tax Office loses to liquidators in test case regarding tax obligations

Capital Gains Tax, CGT, Corporate Insolvency, court decisions, Insolvency Law, Tax debts, Tax liabilities, Taxation Issues Comments Off

Oct 102014

The Federal Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal by the Australian Taxation Office against a court ruling that where a tax assessment has not been issued liquidators have no obligation under s 254(1)(d) of the Income Tax Assessment Act to retain from the proceeds of sale an amount sufficient to pay an apparent Capital Gains Tax liability . (Judgment dated 8/10/2014, Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCAFC 133.)

The liquidators of Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd entered into a contract of sale of real property in Creastmead, Qld. The ATO argued that a tax liability for the capital gain arising from the sale arose when the sale occurred, and, accordingly, on receipt of the proceeds of sale, the liquidators were obliged under s 254(1)(d) to retain from the proceeds of sale an amount sufficient to pay that tax liability regardless of whether a tax assessment had been issued.

A couple of years ago the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) (then the IPAA) and the ATO decided to run a test case on the obligations of liquidators upon the occurrence of a CGT event.

Justice-Blind-Scales

The decision in the first instance by Justice Logan of the Federal Court (in March 2013) has been confirmed by Justices Edmonds, Collier and Davies. Davies J summed up the decision as follows (paragraphs 34 and 35):

“Section 254(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“ITAA36”) applies to liquidators because liquidators are deemed to be “trustees” for the purposes of the taxation laws: see definition of “trustee” in s 6(1) of the ITAA36. As the consequence, a liquidator is “answerable as taxpayer” in respect of income, profits or capital gains derived by the liquidator in his or her representative capacity (s 254(1)(a)), and is required to lodge returns of such income, profits or capital gains and liable to “be assessed thereon”, but in his or her representative capacity only (s 254(1)(b)). Section 254(1)(d) then requires the liquidator to retain “out of any money” which comes to the liquidator in his or her representative capacity, sufficient money to pay tax that “is or will become due” in respect of such “income, profits or gains”, and s 254(1)(e) makes the liquidator personally liable for the tax payable to the extent of the amount retained, or which “should have been retained”. On its proper construction, it seems to me that the section contemplates that in the circumstances where the section is engaged, a post appointment tax liability, if any, will be assessed to the liquidator in his or her representative capacity, rather than to the company. That said, the analysis serves in my view to confirm that any personal liability falling upon the liquidator arises only if, and where, an assessment has issued, and there is an amount of tax that “is or will become due” in the sense of “assessed as owing”. For the reasons expressed by Edmonds J, the Commissioner’s construction of the phrase “is or will become due” as it is used in s 254(1)(d) is to be rejected. In my view the primary judge was correct to hold that the reasoning in Bluebottle UK Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] HCA 54; (2007) 232 CLR 598 in respect of the proper construction of s 255 of the ITAA36 applies equally to the proper construction of s 254, and that s 254(1)(d) is to be read as referring to an amount of tax that has been assessed. “

Interestingly, the appeal judges did not comment on Justice Logan’s cautionary advice to liquidators at the first hearing, which was:

“… Even though, for the reasons given, s 254 does not require retention upon the mere happening of a CGT event, that does not mean that a liquidator is obliged immediately to distribute the resultant gain or part thereof as a dividend to creditors in the course of the winding up. A prudent liquidator, like a prudent trustee of a trust estate or executor of a will, would be entitled to retain the gain for a time against other expenses which might arise in the course of the administration. Further, in relation to income tax, the liquidator would at the very least be entitled to retain the gain until the income tax position in respect of the tax year in which the CGT event had occurred had become certain by the issuing of an assessment or other advice from the Commissioner that, for example, no tax was payable in respect of that income year….” __________________________________________________________________________________

For my other posts on this topic see: “Post-appointment income tax debts of liquidator” 10 October 2010 “Decision only partly resolves tax puzzle for liquidators” 7 March 2014 “ATO appeals against decision in Australian Building Sysytems case” 19 March 2014

ATO appeals against decision in Australian Building Systems case

Capital Gains Tax, CGT, Corporate Insolvency, court decisions, Insolvency Law, Practitioners Association (IPAA), Priority Debts, Returns, Tax debts, Tax liabilities, Taxation Issues Comments Off

Mar 192014

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) reported yesterday that the Australian Taxation Office is appealing against the decision in the test case on the obligations of liquidators upon the occurrence of a Capital Gains Tax (CGT) event.

Hand objection

ARITA’s report is as follows:

CGT UNCERTAINTY by Kim Arnold, 18/3/2014

Further to our recent article on the decision in Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 116, the ATO have lodged an appeal. The grounds of the appeal are that:

the judge erred in concluding that the liquidators were not required under s254(1)(d) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 to retain proceeds from sale sufficient to pay any net capital gain arising from the sale; and

the judge erred in concluding that the obligation to retain monies sufficient to pay any tax in respect of the sale only arises when and if an assessment is issued.

The ATO’s view is that there is an obligation for the liquidators to retain proceeds from sale sufficient to meet any tax obligation and that an assessment is not required for that obligation to arise.

The issue of CGT priority and external administrator obligations on the sale of assets in insolvency administrations has been outstanding for many years and it seems that there will be no certainty for some time to come.

For my earlier post on this subject CLICK HERE.

Decision only partly resolves tax puzzle for liquidators

Capital Gains Tax, Case Reports, CGT, Corporate Insolvency, court decisions, Insolvency Law, Insolvency practices, law reports, Priority Debts, Returns, Tax debts, Tax liabilities, Taxation Issues Comments Off

Mar 072014

[UPDATE 19/3/2014: THE ATO HAS APPEALED AGAINST THE DECISION DISCUSSED IN THIS POST] [UPDATE 10/10/2014: THE ATO FAILED IN ITS APPEAL; THE DECISION OF LOGAN J WAS CONFIRMED.]

When the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (since renamed the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association, or ARITA) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) decided to run a test case on the obligations of liquidators upon the occurrence of a Capital Gains Tax (CGT) event, they probably knew they risked broadening the contentious issues. But they had to try settling a far-reaching and long-standing argument which ARITA and the ATO had been having since 2009. (1)

Unfortunately for ARITA and the ATO, the Court decided not to adjudicate in one important area, deeming it “unnecessary to answer in light of the conclusion reached …”

In running Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation ([2014] FCA 116), decisions were sought on the following questions:

– whether the liquidators (this was a joint appointment) are obliged by s 254 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 , prior to the issuing of a notice of assessment to Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (ABS), to retain monies so as to meet what may be a taxation liability in respect of the income year when the CGT event occurred; and

– whether the liquidators are obliged to pay to the Commissioner the whole of any tax due by ABS in priority to other creditors of that company notwithstanding ss 501, 555 and 556 of the Corporations Act.

Tax law gavel

On the first question the Court – Logan J presiding – concluded:

“ … that s 254 of the ITAA36 had no application to the liquidators. They were not, in the absence of any assessment, subject to any retention and payment obligation derived from that section…..” (para 25 of the judgment) and “s 254 does not require retention upon the mere happening of a CGT event …” (para 31).

As the ATO had argued that it was not necessary for there to be a notice of assessment before the retention obligation of S. 254 could arise, this decision was a victory for the liquidators.

But Logan J added the following cautionary advice:

“… Even though, for the reasons given, s 254 does not require retention upon the mere happening of a CGT event, that does not mean that a liquidator is obliged immediately to distribute the resultant gain or part thereof as a dividend to creditors in the course of the winding up. A prudent liquidator, like a prudent trustee of a trust estate or executor of a will, would be entitled to retain the gain for a time against other expenses which might arise in the course of the administration. Further, in relation to income tax, the liquidator would at the very least be entitled to retain the gain until the income tax position in respect of the tax year in which the CGT event had occurred had become certain by the issuing of an assessment or other advice from the Commissioner that, for example, no tax was payable in respect of that income year….” (para 31).

Caution-taxes

ATO back to the drawing board

The ATO will need to withdraw its exhaustive Draft Taxation Determinations TD 2012/D7 and TD 2012/D6 of September 2012 and try again to state the correct legal position. In those determinations the ATO took the view that

“a receiver who is an agent of the debtor is required by paragraph 254(1)(d) of the ITAA 1936 to retain from the sale proceeds that come to them in the capacity of agent sufficient money to pay tax which is or will become due as a result of disposing of a CGT asset”; and
“The phrase ‘tax which is or will become due’ in paragraph 254(1)(d) of the ITAA 1936 is not restricted to tax that has been assessed, and includes tax that will become due when an assessment is made. Consequently, the obligation to retain an amount under paragraph 254(1)(d) can arise in respect of tax that has not yet been assessed”.

An advisory note from ARITA?

One can imagine that the decision and the words of caution by Logan J will eventually find their way into an advisory note or practice guide from ARITA to liquidators and other insolvency practitioners. But in getting there the Judge’s caution is bound to cause ARITA’s technical advisers and members considerable trouble.

ARITA’s initial interpretation

ARITA posted a summary of the judgment on its website on 23 February (“Liquidator succeeds in CGT dispute with ATO” by Michael Murray), and ended with a note that it will closely examine the decision and the Judge’s comments and will raise the matter at its next liaison meeting with the ATO.

ARITA’s interpretation included the following comment:

“ In the case in hand, no assessment had issued when the sale took place. This means that there is no personal liability for a liquidator if, once the assessment issues, there are insufficient funds to meet the liability. “

Kicking off the discussion

I would make a couple of preliminary observations regarding this comment.

First, the fact that no assessment had issued when the sale took place is unremarkable. Normally, a tax assessment is not made until after an event occurs. Ordinarily, the ATO would not even be aware that an event had occurred until it was disclosed in a return lodged by the taxpayer. (2)

Secondly, I agree that, based on this decision, there would be no personal liability under s. 254(1)(d) or (e) of the ITAA 1936 for the tax payable as the result of a profit, etc., if the money the liquidator had was expended and/or disbursed before a tax assessment was issued.

But there are other important issues to consider. If a tax return covering
a post-appointment period was lodged and/or a tax assessment was issued showing tax payable in respect of that period, this would give rise to a debt payable by the company; and that debt would, it seems to me, be entitled to priority payment under the Corporation Act, as are other costs
of the winding up.

Such a tax debt would probably be entitled to classification as an expense “properly incurred by a relevant authority” (e.g., a liquidator) (S. 556(1)(dd) of the Corporations Act). If so, it would have a higher priority than, for example, liquidator’s remuneration (S. 556(1)(de)) and employee entitlements (S. 556(1)(e) and (g)).

So … if, when the assessment issues “there are insufficient funds to meet the liability”, the liquidator may be deemed to have breached his or her duty to distribute the proceeds in accordance with the priorities established by law.

It seems to me that this very issue was the one being broached by Logan J in his caution at para 31 of the judgment when he said:

“ … in relation to income tax, the liquidator would at the very least be entitled to retain the gain until the income tax position in respect of the tax year in which the CGT event had occurred had become certain by the issuing of an assessment or other advice from the Commissioner that, for example, no tax was payable in respect of that income year….”.

_______________________________________________

NOTES:

(1) In October 2012 the ATO issued draft rulings on the subject; and in February 2013 the hearing of the test case began.

(2) In the case being examined here, the ATO was informed of the CGT event when the company sought a private ruling from the Commissioner on whether s.254(1)(d) applied.

_______________________________________________

For more on this topic see my article “Post-appointment income tax debts of liquidator” published on this site on 10 October 2010.

Liquidator likely to be banned for 5 years after Court inquiry

ASIC, Case Reports, Corporate Insolvency, court decisions, Ethics, Forms, Insolvency Law, Insolvency Laws, Insolvency practices, law reports, Records Management, Regulation, Standards Comments Off

Sep 032013

Melbourne liquidator Andrew Leonard Dunner is likely to be prohibited from being registered as a liquidator for 5 years, following a decision by the Federal Court in an action brought against him by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).

In a media release on 30 August 2013 ASIC said that:

“In handing down his reasons for judgment today, Justice Middleton found that Mr Dunner had failed to adequately investigate the circumstances and affairs of companies to which he was appointed and had inaccurately reported to ASIC and creditors.

“The Court also found that he had drawn remuneration in excess of $600,000 without appropriate approval or adequate supporting documentation. The Court considered it appropriate that he should repay that remuneration and have leave to apply to the Court for justification of an entitlement to recoup remuneration where appropriate. Justice Middleton found that Mr Dunner’s conduct indicated ‘…a systemic failure of administration and internal protocols, as well as (in a number of instances) extremely poor professional judgment. In this way, Mr Dunner has failed to satisfy the high standards of conduct required of his offices’.

“In finding that a banning period of 5 years was appropriate, Justice Middleton said:

‘Withdrawing a liquidator’s registration operates directly to protect the public from the work of the person. It also operates generally by deterring other liquidators from acting in a similar fashion. ASIC submitted – and I accept – that there is a compelling public interest in the maintenance of a system which recognises that registration as a liquidator is a privilege, the continuance of which is conditional upon diligent performance of its attendant duties.’

To see the ASIC media release, CLICK HERE.

To see Justice Middleton’s important 67 page report and judgment, CLICK HERE .

Case citation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Dunner [2013] FCA 872.

Case catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 423, 499, 536 – Duties of liquidator – Duties of receiver – Court inquiry into defendant’s conduct as liquidator and receiver – Failure by defendant to investigate circumstances of companies to which he was appointed – Drawing remuneration without approval or adequate supporting documentation – Inaccurate reporting to ASIC and creditors regarding external administrations – Repayment of remuneration drawn without approval – Unfitness to remain registered as liquidator – Duration of prohibition order.

Are Official Liquidators funding the Court Liquidation scheme?

Assetless companies, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency practices, Insolvency Statistics, Regulation Comments Off

May 142013

According to a recent study, the cost of being an official liquidator can be a bit rich.

“In respect of official liquidations generally, the survey showed that on an annual basis, insolvency practitioners are required to personally fund disbursements of $1.4 million and remuneration of $47.3 million in the conduct of their roles as Official Liquidators.”

This is one of findings in a research paper titled “An Analysis of Official Liquidations In Australia”, written by Amanda Phillips of Ferrier Hodgson, Sydney, and published on 13 May 2013 via the website of the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (IPAA).

More detail of the estimates on annual remuneration and disbursements for official liquidations generally is shown in this table:

	Charge made/cost incurred (million dollars)	Recovered from company assets (million dollars)	Funded by Official Liquidators (million dollars)
Remuneration	55.6	8.3	47.3
Disbursements	1.9	.5	1.4

Another finding is that “based on the data provided by survey respondents, the average cost to administer an official liquidation is $17,475 over an average period of 7 to 12 months.”

Ms Phillips surveyed members of the IPAA. The survey covered official liquidations which commenced during the period 1 July 2011 to 30 September 2011. The paper says that “Sixteen Official Liquidators provided data in relation to 90 matters, which represented 10% of the total national official liquidations that commenced during the period 1 July 2011 to 30 September 2011.”

In addition to remuneration the paper reports on aspects of official liquidation including the nature of a typical official liquidation, the duration of appointments, an industry analysis, the turnover & size, the dividends to unsecured creditors and funding for Official Liquidators.

Ms Phillips was the 2012 winner of a scholarship from the Terry Taylor Scholarship fund administered by the IPAA. Her 33 page paper is available in pdf format from the IPAA site by clicking HERE.

Reasons why court replaced special purpose liquidator of One.Tel

ASIC, Case Reports, Corporate Insolvency, court decisions, Insolvency Law, Insolvency Laws, law reports, Regulation Comments Off

Jun 292012

A NSW Supreme Court judge has replaced the special purpose liquidator of the collapsed telecommunications company One.Tel.

Registered Liquidator, Paul Weston, who has served as special purpose liquidator since December 2003, was removed from his role after judge Patricia Bergin found creditors, led by Optus, had lost confidence in Mr Weston’s capacity “to bring a dispassionate mind to bear in exercising his powers in the liquidation”. Mr Weston contended that the creditors’ loss of confidence in him was not enough to justify his removal. He contended that there must be some serious misconduct, conflict of interest or lack of independence.

Justice Bergin appointed another registered liquidator, Stephen Parbery, in Mr Weston’s place.

The application for removal of was Mr Weston was brought under section 503 of the Corporations Act 2001: “The Court may, on cause shown, remove a liquidator and appoint another liquidator.”

Issues considered in the case included:

The special liquidator’s relationship with the creditors’ Committee of Inspection.
The liquidator’s remuneration and expenses.

THE JUDGMENT ALSO CONTAINS A “BRIEF” HISTORY OF THE LONG BATTLE THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON BETWEEN THE PACKER/MURDOCH/RICH INTERESTS, THE SPECIAL LIQUIDATOR AND THE COMMITTEE OF INSPECTION.

Extracts from the court judgment, and a link to the full judgement of 19 June 2012, are given below.

“In a court appointed liquidation (or a liquidation by the Court), a liquidator, as an officer of the Court, is a representative of the Court, entrusted with the reputation of the Court. It is expected that the liquidator will discharge the relevant functions and powers with impartiality and proper dispatch: Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Peter William Harvey [1980] VR 669. Albeit that it may be inappropriate to refer to the defendant as “an officer of the Court” in this particular liquidation, it is expected that he would discharge his relevant functions and powers with impartiality and proper dispatch.” (para 151)

“It is expected that the defendant will maintain an “even and impartial hand” in his dealings with those interested in the liquidation … It is expected that he will be independent in the sense that he will deal impartially and objectively in the interests of the creditors …”. (para 152)

“In City & Suburban Pty Ltd v Smith, Merkel J observed at 336 (excluding citations): Section 503 of the Law provides that the court may “on cause shown” remove a liquidator and appoint another liquidator. It has long been accepted that the section and its predecessors were not confined to situations where it is established that there is personal unfitness, impropriety or breach of duty on the part of the liquidator. Cause is shown for removal whenever the court is satisfied that it is for the better conduct of the liquidation or, put another way, it is for the general advantage of those interested in the assets of the company that a liquidator be removed.” (para 160)

“In the present case the acrimony which has arisen between the liquidator and the committee of inspection has not come about as a result of any unreasonable conduct on the part of the committee. Rather, it has come about because the liquidator has carried out his tasks in respect of the liquidation with some insensitivity to the angst of the members of the committee of inspection.” (para 162)

“In AMP Music Box Enterprises Ltd v Hoffman [2002] BCC 996, Neuberger J (as his Lordship then was) considered the power under s 180(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) to remove a liquidator “on cause shown” and said at 1001-1002:

On the other hand, if a liquidator has been generally effective and honest, the court must think carefully before deciding to remove him and replace him. It should not be seen to be easy to remove a liquidator merely because it can be shown that in one, or possibly more than one, respect his conduct has fallen short of ideal. So to hold would encourage applications under s 108(2) by creditors who have not had their preferred liquidator appointed, or who are for some other reason disgruntled. Once a liquidation has been conducted for a time, no doubt there can almost always be criticism of the conduct, in the sense that one can identify things that could have been done better, or things that could have been done earlier. It is all too easy for an insolvency practitioner, who has not been involved in a particular liquidation, to say, with the benefit of the wisdom of hindsight, how he could have done better. It would plainly be undesirable to encourage an application to remove a liquidator on such grounds. It would mean that any liquidator who was appointed, in circumstances where there was support for another possible liquidator, would spend much of his time looking over his shoulder, and there would be a risk of the court being flooded with applications of this sort. Further, the court has to bear in mind that in almost any case where it orders a liquidator to stand down, and replaces him with another liquidator, there will be undesirable consequences in terms of costs and in terms of delay.” (para 164)

“Conclusion

I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of this liquidation for the defendant to be removed as special purpose liquidator and for Mr Parbery to be appointed in his place. The defendant is to meet with Mr Parbery and provide him with any advice, documents or other assistance sought by Mr Parbery so that he may be in a position to pursue the remaining purposes of the special purpose liquidation in the most cost efficient manner.
I am conscious that ASIC’s review of the defendant’s remuneration and fees has effectively been put on hold pending the outcome of these proceedings. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to defer any ruling in relation to conducting an inquiry under s 536 of the Act until ASIC’s review has concluded. It may be that, having regard to the defendant’s removal and/or the outcome of ASIC’s review, the plaintiffs may no longer wish to press for such an inquiry.”

FULL JUDGMENT:

SingTel Optus Pty Limited & Ors v Weston [2012] NSWSC 674 (19 June 2012)

Click here to read and/or copy judgment.

Jury finds liquidator guilty of white collar crimes

Industry People, Insolvency practices, Offences, Prosecution of Liquidators, Regulation, White collar crime Comments Off

Sep 272011

On 26 September 2011 former liquidator Stuart Ariff was found guilty of various charges brought under the NSW Crimes Act and the Corporations Act. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has issued the following media release. (The photo of Mr Ariff is from The Australian.)

“Former liquidator Stuart Ariff was today found guilty by a jury in the New South Wales District Court on all 19 criminal charges brought by ASIC. The offences relate to Mr Ariff’s conduct while he was the liquidator of HR Cook Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (“HR Cook Investments”) during the period 9 June 2006 to 29 March 2009. Mr Ariff was found guilty on 13 charges under section 176A of the NSW Crimes Actconcerning the transfer of funds totalling $1.18 million with intent to defraud HR Cook Investments. Mr Ariff was also found guilty on six charges under section 1308(2) of the Corporations Act 2001of making false statements in documents lodged with ASIC recording receipts and payments relating to HR Cook Investments. The NSW Crimes Act charges each carry a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. The Corporations Act 2001 charges each carry a maximum fine of $22,000 or imprisonment for five years or both.

Mr Ariff’s conditional bail was revoked and he was remanded into custody. The matter will return to Parramatta District Court on 25 November 2011 for sentencing.

The matter was prosecuted by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.”

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