Directors need “a questioning mind” concerning financial statements

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Jun 292011
 

The Federal Court judge who decided in favour of the Australian Security and Investments Commission (ASIC) in its case against 8 directors and officers of Centro Properties Limited, Centro Property Trust and Centro Retail Trust regarding the 2006/07 consolidated financial statements, has provided an important summary of the law about a director’s duty in relation to the content of financial statements.

 The following are extracts from the judgement of Middleton, J on 27 June 2011 in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717:

 “The central question in the proceeding has been whether directors of substantial publicly listed entities are required to apply their own minds to, and carry out a careful review of, the proposed financial statements and the proposed directors’ report, to determine that the information they contain is consistent with the director’s knowledge of the company’s affairs, and that they do not omit material matters known to them or material matters that should be known to them.

A director is an essential component of corporate governance.  Each director is placed at the apex of the structure of direction and management of a company.  The higher the office that is held by a person, the greater the responsibility that falls upon him or her.  The role of a director is significant as their actions may have a profound effect on the community, and not just shareholders, employees and creditors.

This proceeding involves taking responsibility for documents effectively signed-off by, approved, or adopted by the directors.  What is required is that such documents, before they are adopted by the directors, be read, understood and focussed upon by each director with the knowledge each director has or should have by virtue of his or her position as a director.  I do not consider this requirement overburdens a director, or as argued before me, would cause the boardrooms of Australia to empty overnight.  Directors are generally well remunerated and hold positions of prestige, and the office of director will continue to attract competent, diligence and intelligent people. 

The case law indicates that there is a core, irreducible requirement of directors to be involved in the management of the company and to take all reasonable steps to be in a position to guide and monitor.  There is a responsibility to read, understand and focus upon the contents of those reports which the law imposes a responsibility upon each director to approve or adopt.

All directors must carefully read and understand financial statements before they form the opinions which are to be expressed in the declaration required by s 295(4).  Such a reading and understanding would require the director to consider whether the financial statements were consistent with his or her own knowledge of the company’s financial position.  This accumulated knowledge arises from a number of responsibilities a director has in carrying out the role and function of a director.  These include the following: a director should acquire at least a rudimentary understanding of the business of the corporation and become familiar with the fundamentals of the business in which the corporation is engaged; a director should keep informed about the activities of the corporation; whilst not required to have a detailed awareness of day-to-day activities, a director should monitor the corporate affairs and policies; a director should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation by a regular review and understanding of financial statements; a director, whilst not an auditor, should still have a questioning mind.

A board should be established which enjoys the varied wisdom, experience and expertise of persons drawn from different commercial backgrounds.  Even so, a director, whatever his or her background, has a duty greater than that of simply representing a particular field of experience or expertise.  A director is not relieved of the duty to pay attention to the company’s affairs which might reasonably be expected to attract inquiry, even outside the area of the director’s expertise.

The words of Pollock J in the case of Francis v United Jersey Bank (1981) 432 A 2d 814, quoted with approval by Clarke and Sheller JJA in Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438, make it clear that more than a mere ‘going through the paces’ is required for directors.  As Pollock J noted, a director is not an ornament, but an essential component of corporate governance. 

Nothing I decide in this case should indicate that directors are required to have infinite knowledge or ability.  Directors are entitled to delegate to others the preparation of books and accounts and the carrying on of the day-to-day affairs of the company.  What each director is expected to do is to take a diligent and intelligent interest in the information available to him or her, to understand that information, and apply an enquiring mind to the responsibilities placed upon him or her.  Such a responsibility arises in this proceeding in adopting and approving the financial statements.  Because of their nature and importance, the directors must understand and focus upon the content of financial statements, and if necessary, make further enquiries if matters revealed in these financial statements call for such enquiries. 

No less is required by the objective duty of skill, competence and diligence in the understanding of the financial statements that are to be disclosed to the public as adopted and approved by the directors.

No one suggests that a director should not personally read and consider the financial statements before that director approves or adopts such financial statements.  A reading of the financial statements by the directors is not merely undertaken for the purposes of correcting typographical or grammatical errors or even immaterial errors of arithmetic.  The reading of financial statements by a director is for a higher and more important purpose: to ensure, as far as possible and reasonable, that the information included therein is accurate.  The scrutiny by the directors of the financial statements involves understanding their content.  The director should then bring the information known or available to him or her in the normal discharge of the director’s responsibilities to the task of focussing upon the financial statements.  These are the minimal steps a person in the position of any director would and should take before participating in the approval or adoption of the financial statements and their own directors’ reports.

The omissions in the financial statements the subject of this proceeding were matters that could have been seen as apparent without difficulty upon a focussing by each director, and upon a careful and diligent consideration of the financial statements.  As I have said, the directors were intelligent and experienced men in the corporate world.  Despite the efforts of the legal representatives for the directors in contending otherwise, the basic concepts and financial literacy required by the directors to be in a position to properly question the apparent errors in the financial statements were not complicated.”

The full judgement in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717 may be accessed HERE.

Is Bureau of Statistics missing insolvency crimes?

 Insolvency Statistics, Offences, Standards, White collar crime  Comments Off on Is Bureau of Statistics missing insolvency crimes?
Jun 022011
 

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has just published the latest edition of Australian and New Zealand Standard Offence Classification (ANZSOC) with the aim of improving crime and justice statistics.  It is a detailed document , comprising 108 pages plus 66 pages of appendices and indexes. 

Crimes listed in the huge alphabetical and numerical indexes of categories of crimes include “Killing, unlawful, with intent” (0111),  “Tram fare evasion” (0829),  “Skateboard riding under the influence of alcohol” (0411) and “Fail to sound audible warning of intended blasting” (1629).

 I have searched in vain for any mention of bankruptcy offences or corporate insolvency offences.  The nearest categories I could find that might apply to corporate insolvency offences were “Breach of company code legislation (e.g. falsification of register, false advertising)” and “Fraudulent trade or commercial practices”.  Both are listed under Division 09 “Fraud, Deception and Related Offences”, in sub-division 093 “Deceptive business/government practices”.

It’s interesting to see the number of offences that warrant special mention, when none is given to, for example, a director’s breach of the law in failing to assist his or her company’s liquidator – which carries a maximum penalty of a fine of $2,750 and imprisonment for 6 months.  What does this say about society’s view of what is a crime, and the thoroughness of the way in which we collect and publish crime statistics?

To see the ANZSOC  document click here.

May 192011
 

A crucial instrument of insolvency administration is a properly prepared and sworn statement of affairs made out by the proprietors of the insolvent business enterprise. 

This fact was recently granted further recognition in Australia’s  bankruptcy (personal insolvency) laws when the Federal Government ramped up the penalty for bankrupts who fail to make out a statement of affairs. [S.54(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966]  

 The penalty was increased fivefold or 500%. 

In recommending the Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 – which was supported by  the Government and the Opposition –  the Attorney-General, Mr McClelland, said:

“Importantly, the bill also provides trustees with stronger powers to obtain a statement of affairs from a bankrupt who fails to file this as required. The statement of affairs is the most important information required by a trustee to commence administering the bankrupt’s estate. Failure to comply with the requirement to file a statement of affairs significantly frustrates the trustee’s ability to administer the estate in a timely way. Failure to provide a statement of affairs often results in a trustee expending additional time and expenses to identify a debtor’s assets, income and liability. This in turn can diminish a bankrupt’s estate and returns to creditors.” [Second reading speech]

Simultaneously the government  introduced a new power for the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to provide a statement of affairs [Section 77CA].  If the bankrupt fails again to comply after having had the obligation under Section 54 (1) brought to his or her attention by the Official Receiver, the bankrupt will have committed a further and more serious offence, the penalty for which is imprisonment for 12 months [Section 267B].

These laws  became effective on 1 December 2010.  To see the Official Receiver’s Practice Statement 10 titled “Filing of a Statement and issue of 77CA notices by the Official Receiver” CLICK HERE.

Budget 2011: Tax Office director penalty notices (DPN) extended and tightened

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May 112011
 

Under the heading “countering fraudulent phoenix activities by company directors”, the Australian Government has announced in the Budget that with effect from 1 July 2011:

  • the director penalty regime will be extended to superannuation guarantee amounts, making directors personally liable for their company’s failure to pay employee superannuation;
  • the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) will be given the power to commence recovery against directors under the director penalty regime, without providing a 21 day grace period, for certain unpaid company liabilities that remain unreported after three months of becoming due; and
  • in certain circumstances directors and associates of directors will be prevented from obtaining credits for withheld amounts in their individual tax returns where the company has failed to pay withheld amounts to the ATO.

The Budget paper describes fraudulent  phoenix activity as:

“… which involves a company intentionally accumulating debts to improve cash flow or wealth and then liquidating to avoid paying the debt. The business is then continued as another corporate entity, controlled by the same person or group and free of their previous debts and liabilities.”

This measure is estimated to result in an additional $260 million in revenue in fiscal balance terms over the forward estimates period. There is a related increase in ATO departmental expenses of $22.1 million over the same period. In underlying cash terms, the estimated increase in receipts is $245 million over the forward estimates period.

See http://www.budget.gov.au/2011-12/content/bp2/html/bp2_revenue-07.htm

Apr 122011
 

“When ITSA (the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia)  identifies criminal behaviour such as this, it will investigate the matter and pursue the offender to the full extent of the law”.   So said Mr Jeff Hanley, Assistant National Manager of ITSA’s Enforcement unit in a media release commenting on the case of Mr Peter David Wilson of Sea Lake, Victoria.

While ITSA may well pursue offenders to the full extent of the law, the sentence in the Wilson case again raises the question of whether, generally speaking, the judiciary in Australia  regards bankruptcy offences as relatively trivial.

Mr Wilson’s crime was that he signed a Statement of Income declaring his annual income to be significantly less than he earned. In support of this false Statement of Income he provided an Australian Taxation Office Notice of Assessment which, enquiries revealed, he had altered to show a taxable income that was less than it actually was.

As required by the Bankruptcy Act, Mr Wilson had been making fortnightly income contributions.  But he fell behind in the payments. When requested by his Trustee to complete an Annual Statement of Income Mr Wilson “saw a way of not having to make the contributions by falsely lowering his annual income to his Trustee”.

“This offender deliberately fabricated documents to avoid disclosing his true income and therefore pay less by way of a return to his creditors” said Mr Hanley.

“In a Record of Interview with ITSA Investigators, Wilson made full and frank admissions about his offending – stating he intentionally altered the document so as to reduce his income for the purposes of not having to pay compulsory income contributions.”

The penalty? Mr Wilson pleaded guilty and was released on a $1000 recognisance to be of good behaviour for 12 months. A further condition imposed was that Wilson continue to make fortnightly payments in reduction of his debt to ITSA.

Of course, we do not know all the facts nor the character and circumstances of Mr Wilson at the time he appeared before the court.

But one wonders whether light sentences such as this would have any detterent effect at all on other would-be offenders with  fraudulent intent.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Author: P Keenan 12/4/2011.   Disclaimer: The material published on this blog is general in nature. It is made available on the understanding that the Author is not thereby engaged in rendering professional advice.  Before relying on the material in any important matter, users should carefully evaluate its accuracy, currency, completeness and relevance for their purposes, and should obtain any appropriate professional advice relevant to their particular circumstances.
Feb 232011
 

Figures just released by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) show that 644 grants totalling over $8.6 million have been paid to liquidators out of the Federal Government’s Assetless Administration Fund (AA Fund) between 19/12/2007 (the first payment) and 21/2/2011.

Creation of the AAFund was announced in October 2005 and officially launched on 22 February 2006.

Liquidators of companies with few or no assets may apply to ASIC for grants to finance preliminary investigations by them into the failure.  Where ASIC is satisfied that enforcement action may result from a liquidator’s investigation and report, it may approve a grant.

Liquidators can seek funding to carry out an investigation and report in circumstances where they believe director bannings may be appropriate; or for other matters; such as where the liquidator believes there is or may be evidence of possible offences or other misconduct in relation to the Corporations Act 2001.

The largest single payment to date is $442,000 in 2009, to a liquidator who received  $739,000 in total in that year .  Most payments have been $8,250.

Click here to see the latest list of grant recipients.   (… to 9 May 2011)

Director concedes defeat

 ASIC, Offences, Regulation, White collar crime  Comments Off on Director concedes defeat
Feb 232011
 

It took almost 3 years, but insolvency fraud charges brought by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) against company director, Paul Michael Belousoff, concluded on 21 February 2011 with a guilty plea and the court ordering he serve a prison sentence.

Back in August 2005 two of Mr Belousoff’s companies – namely, Index Options (Australia) Pty Ltd and Bel Investments Pty Ltd – were placed into liquidation by order of the Court.

In 2006 Mr Belousoff was convicted in the Magistrates Court of offences brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) under section 475 and 530A of the Corporations Act (failure to submit a report as to affairsto the liquidator and failure to supply the liquidator with the books) in respect of both of his companies.  He was fined a total of $2,900.

In July 2006 the liquidator was granted an order by the Victorian Supreme Court  that the liquidator be  appointed as receiver of the Index Options Trust for the purpose of preserving its assets.  In his judgment Justice Whelan said:

 “It suffices to say that in my view the liquidator’s material establishes that Mr Belousoff was responsible for a serious failure to keep proper books and records and that there are grounds for serious concern that he was also responsible for the payment over of substantial funds of Index Options or the Index Options Trust in a most improvident manner.”

Later, in April 2008, Mr Belousoff was charged with eight counts of engaging in conduct that resulted in the fraudulent concealment or removal of company property and one count of fraudulently making a material omission in a report as to affairs.

These frauds came to the attention of ASIC through a liquidator’s report, which was prepared with funds provided to the liquidator from ASIC’s Assetless Administration Fund (AA Fund).

The liquidator, ASIC and the Commonwealth DPP claimed that after the liquidator was appointed,-  Mr Belousoff  fraudulently removed or concealed in excess of $1 million worth of property belonging to the two companies.

In September 2008 ASIC disqualified Mr Belousoff from managing corporations for five years because of his involvement with two failed companies.

On 31 January 2011 Mr Paul Belousoff pleaded guilty to all of the charges brought in April 2008. On 21 February 2011 the Court sentenced Mr Belousoff to a term of 11 months imprisonment, but that he be released after serving three months on the condition that he be of good behaviour for three years.

Trustee for Liquidation of Bernard Madoff’s company castigates J P Morgan Chase

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Feb 042011
 

Details were released today of the $US6 billion lawsuit brought in December 2010 against JPMorgan Chase (JPMC) by the Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC  (BLMIS).

The lawsuit, brought under the US Bankruptcy Code, the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) and other laws, seeks to recover fees, profits and damages.  JPMorgan Chase was the primary banker of Mr. Madoff’s firm.  The Trustee further alleges that the bank aided and abetted his fraud.

The Trustee, Irving H. Picard, has sued J P Morgan Chase & Co., J P Morgan Chase Bank NA, J P Morgan Securites LLC, and J P Morgan Securities Ltd.

Many of the words, phrases and concepts contained in the Causes of Action – of which there are 21 – will be familiar to Australian insolvency practitioners.

For example, claims are made for Preference Period Initial Transfers (“a preferential transfer avoidable by the Trustee”); Two Year Initial Transfers (“a fraudulent transfer avoidable by the Trustee”);  and Six Year Initial Transfers (“made by BLMIS with the intention to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors”). 

Also, it is alleged that “BLMIS did not receive fair consideration for the Six Year Initial Transfers. BLMIS was insolvent at the time it made each of the Six Year Initial Transfers or, in the alternative, BLMIS became insolvent as a result of each of the Six Year Initial Transfers”.

JPMorgan Chase strenuously denied the allegations, calling the suit meritless and “based on distortions of both the relevant facts and the governing law.”

“J.P. Morgan did not know about or in any way become a party to the fraud orchestrated by Bernard Madoff,” the bank said in a statement. “Madoff’s firm was not an important or significant customer in the context of J.P. Morgan’s commercial banking business.”

JPMorgan Chase says it will “defend itself vigorously against the unfounded claims brought by the trustee.”

In the Nature of the Action, the Trustee uses strong language and is severely critical of JPMC (see below). 

Full details of the lawsuit may be found at http://documents.nytimes.com/madoff-trustees-lawsuit-against-jpmorgan-chase?ref=business

__________________________________________________________

Irving H. Picard (“Trustee”), as trustee for the substantively consolidated liquidation of the business of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”) under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa, et seq. (“SIPA”), and the estate of Bernard L. Madoff, by and through his undersigned counsel, as and for his Complaint against JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. (collectively, “JPMC” or “Defendants”), states as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1.            The story has been told time and time again how Madoff duped the best and the brightest in the investment community. The Trustee’s investigation reveals a very different story—the story of financial institutions worldwide that were keen to the likely fraud, and decidedly turned a blind eye to it. While numerous financial institutions enabled Madoff’s fraud, JPMC was at the very center of that fraud, and thoroughly complicit in it.

 

2.            JPMC was BLMIS’s primary banker for over 20 years, and was responsible for knowing the business of its customers—in this case, a very large customer. JPMC is a sophisticated financial institution, and it was uniquely situated to see the likely fraud. Billions of dollars flowed through BLMIS’s account at JPMC, the so-called “703 Account,” but virtually none of it was used to buy or sell securities as it should have been had BLMIS been legitimate. But if those large transactions that did not jibe with any legitimate business purpose triggered any warnings, they were suppressed as the drive for fees and profits became a substitute for common sense, ethics and legal obligations. It is estimated that JPMC made at least half a billion dollars in fees and profits off the backs of BLMIS’s victims, and is responsible for at least $5.4 billion in damages for its role in allowing the Ponzi scheme to continue unabated for years, with an exact amount to be determined at trial.

 

3.            In addition to being BLMIS’s banker, JPMC also profited from the Ponzi scheme by selling structured products related to BLMIS feeder funds to its clients. Its due diligence revealed the likelihood of fraud at BLMIS, but JPMC was not concerned with the devastating effect of fraud on investors. Rather, it was concerned only with its own bottom line, and did nothing but a cost-benefit analysis in deciding to become part of Madoff’s fraud: “Based on overall estimated size of BLM strategy, . . . it would take [a] . . . fraud in the order of $3bn or more . . . for JPMC to be affected.” JPMC also relied on the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) to protect its profits: “JPMorgan’s investment in BLM . . . is treated as customer money . . . and therefore [is] covered by SIPC.” By the Fall of 2008, in the midst of a worldwide economic downturn, the cost-benefit analysis had changed. JPMC, no longer comfortable with the risk of fraud, decided to redeem its $276 million in investments in BLMIS feeder funds. JPMC also received an additional $145 million in fraudulent transfers from BLMIS in June 2006. The Trustee seeks the return of this money in this Action.

 

4.            JPMC allowed BLMIS to funnel billions of dollars through the 703 Account by disregarding its own anti-money laundering duties. From 1986 on, all of the money that Madoff stole from his customers passed through the 703 Account, where it was commingled and ultimately washed. JPMC had everything it needed to unmask the fraud. Not only did it have a clear view of suspicious 703 Account activity, but JPMC was provided with Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single Reports (“FOCUS Reports”) from BLMIS. The FOCUS Reports contained glaring irregularities that should have been probed by JPMC. For example, not only did BLMIS fail to report its loans from JPMC, it also failed to report any commission revenue. JPMC ignored these issues in BLMIS’s financial statements. Instead, JPMC lent legitimacy and cover to BLMIS’s operations, and allowed BLMIS to thrive as JPMC collected hundreds of millions of dollars in fees and profits and facilitated the largest financial fraud in history.

 

5.            In addition to the information JPMC obtained as BLMIS’s long-time banker, JPMC also performed due diligence on BLMIS beginning in 2006, using information it obtained from those responsible at JPMC for the 703 Account, as well as information provided by various BLMIS feeder funds. At some point between 2006 and the Fall of 2008, if not before, JPMC unquestionably knew that:

               a. BLMIS’s returns were consistently too good—even in down markets—to be true;

               b. Madoff would not allow transparency into his strategy;

               c. JPMC could not identify, and Madoff would not provide information on, his purported over-the-counter (“OTC”) counterparties;

               d. BLMIS’s auditor was a small, unknown firm;

               e. BLMIS had a conflict of interest as it was the clearing broker, sub-custodian, and sub-investment adviser;

               f. feeder fund administrators could not reconcile the numbers they got from BLMIS with any third party source to confirm their accuracy; and

               g. there was public speculation that Madoff operated a Ponzi scheme, or was engaged in other illegal activity, such as front-running.

 

6.            JPMC looked the other way, ignoring the warning signs, even in the aftermath of other well-known frauds. In response to those who, prior to Madoff’s arrest, found it “[h]ard to believe that [fraud] would be going on over years with regulators [sic] blessing,” REDACTED Risk Officer of JPMC’s Investment Bank responded, “you will recall that Refco was also regulated by the same crowd you refer to below and there was noise about them for years before it was discovered to be rotten to the core.”

 

7.            JPMC’s due diligence team was further concerned about fraud at BLMIS in the wake of another well-known fraud, the Petters fraud. Some of these concerns centered on BLMIS’s small, unknown auditor, Friehling & Horowitz (“Friehling”):

 

The “DD” [due diligence] done by all counterparties seems suspect. Given the scale and duration of the Petters fraud it cannot be sufficient that there’s simply trust in an individual and there’s been a long operating history . . . . Let’s go see Friehling and Horowitz the next time we’re in NY . . . to see that the address isn’t a car wash at least.

 

8.            In or about September 2008, as JPMC was re-evaluating its hedge fund investments in the midst of the worldwide financial crisis, REDACTED [JPMC Employee 3], of JPMC’s London office, had a telephone call with individuals at Aurelia Finance, S.A. (“Aurelia Finance”), a Swiss company that purchased and distributed JPMC’s structured products. During the course of that call, the individuals at Aurelia Finance made references to “Colombian friends” and insisted that JPMC maintain its BLMIS-related hedge. That conversation triggered a concern that Colombian drug money was somehow involved in the BLMIS-Aurelia Finance relationship, which led to an internal investigation at JPMC of BLMIS and Aurelia Finance for money laundering. Significantly, it was only when its own money was at stake that JPMC decided to report BLMIS to a government authority.

 

9.            As reported in the French press, by the end of October 2008, JPMC admitted in a filing of suspicious activity made to the United Kingdom’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (“SOCA”) that it knew that Madoff was “too good to be true,” and a likely fraud:

 

(1) . . . [T]he investment performance achieved by [BLMIS’s] funds . . . is so consistently and significantly ahead of its peers year-on-year, even in the prevailing market conditions, as to appear too good to be true—meaning that it probably is; and

 

(2) the lack of transparency around Madoff Securities trading techniques, the implementation of its investment strategy, and the identity of its OTC option counterparties; and

 

(3) its unwillingness to provide helpful information.

 

None of this information was new to JPMC—it had known it for years. It was only in an effort to protect its own investments that JPMC finally decided to inform a government authority about BLMIS. JPMC further sought permission from SOCA to redeem its Aurelia Finance-related investments and admitted that “as a result [of these issues with BLMIS] JPMC[] has sent out redemption notices in respect of one fund, and is preparing similar notices for two more funds.”

 

10.          Incredibly, even when it admitted knowing that BLMIS was a likely fraud in October 2008, JPMC still did nothing to stop the fraud. It did not even put a restriction on the 703 Account. It was Madoff himself who ultimately proclaimed his fraud to the world in December 2008, and the thread of the relationships allowing the fraud to exist and fester began to be revealed as well. JPMC’s complicity in Madoff’s fraud, however, remained disguised, cloaked in the myth that Madoff acted alone and fooled JPMC. But that is the fable. What follows is the true story.

Decline in UK in number of dodgy directors being penalised

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Jan 192011
 

The UK government’s corporate insolvency regulator (the Insolvency Service) investigates too few cases of alleged misconduct by company directors.  

This is the view of the UK’s Association of Business Recovery Professionals (known as “R3”), which represents 97% of the UK’s Insolvency Practitioners.

 In a media release – “Public at risk from ‘dodgy directors’” – on 10 January 2011, R3 (which stands for rescue, recovery, renewal) says  its research shows that:

 “The number of directors disqualified by the government for misconduct, such as fraud, has failed to keep pace with an increased number of reports of potential misconduct.”

 “The percentage of reports taken forward by the Insolvency Service (i.e. disqualifications) has halved from 40% in 2003/4 to 20% in 2009/10.   Fraudulent activity is known to increase during tough economic times.  In 2009/10, insolvency practitioners submitted 7,030 reports on directors’ behaviour which they believed warranted further investigation. However, in that year, only 1,387 cases were concluded by the Insolvency Service.”

 R3’s President Steven Law commented:

“This mechanism is in place to protect the general public and other businesses from dishonest directors. Not punishing directors who are blameworthy sends out a dangerous message to others.”

 To read a copy R3’s media release, go to https://www.r3.org.uk/pressandpublic/default.asp?page=1&i=523&id=548#PressStory

 R3 has published a paper headed “Directors’ Disqualification: Room for improvement”.  It provides some interesting statistics, summarizes actual case studies – of  “cases when directors have not been disqualified despite the insolvency practitioner reporting obvious misconduct” –  and makes 5 recommendations.  A copy is available HERE.

Most reports of director misconduct are shelved

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Nov 042010
 

89% of the initial offence referral reports sent to Australia’s corporate regulator by liquidators and other external administrators end up consigned to oblivion.  Of the remaining 11%, approximately 66% receive a similar fate.

This data is revealed in the latest annual report by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), tabled in Parliament on 28 October 2010. 

Unfortunately ASIC’s annual report does not offer any explanation for the result, which is that the vast majority of offence allegations are dropped or rejected.

It would be instructive to know, for example, whether a lot of statutory reports of “misconduct and suspicious activity” are badly prepared, inadequate or unjustified; and/or whether ASIC regards a lot of the alleged misconduct and offences as minor or trivial.

The official ASIC analysis chart – “Statutory reports 2009-10” – is shown below, after my own description of what the chart means.  (This is my second post on this subject.)

What the ASIC chart means 

In the 2009/10 financial year ASIC received 9,074 reports from liquidators, administrators and receivers (external administrators).  Of these 6,509 (71.7%) contained allegations of “misconduct or suspicious activity”.

Normally ASIC does not act upon an external administrator’s allegations of misconduct or suspicious activity unless the allegations are supported by a detailed report by the external administrator.

ASIC refers to this detailed report as a supplementary report, since typically it supplements or expands upon an initial report by the external administrator.

Usually a supplementary report is put together at the request of ASIC.

In 2009/10 ASIC received 5,748 initial reports alleging misconduct or suspicious activity.  Presumably all of these were “analysed and assessed”.  Out of these 5,748 reports ASIC selected 11% (632) as worthy of further attention by way of a supplementary report. 

The end result for the other 89% of initial reports (5,116) was to be “recorded”.  This probably means that nothing worth mentioning was done about them.

The same fate befell 66% of the 761 supplementary reports alleging misconduct or suspicious activity.  Of the other 34%, ASIC referred 23% (175) “for compliance, investigation or surveillance” and referred 10% (76) “to assist existing investigation or surveillance”.  ASIC concluded that 1% of the reports (8) did not actually identify offences.

There is no data in the chart on how many reports by external administrators led to prosecutions for offences.

_________________________________________________________________

The ASIC chart

ASIC’s notes to chart

“Initial reports are electronic reports lodged under Schedule B of Regulatory Guide 16.  Generally, ASIC will determine whether to request a supplementary report on the basis of the initial report.  Supplementary reports are typically detailed free-format reports, which detail the results of the external administrator’s inquiries and the evidence to support the alleged offences.  Generally, ASIC can determine whether to commence a formal investigation on the basis of a supplementary report. “

 ASIC ‘s official summary

“Liquidators, administrators and receivers (external administrators) are required to report to ASIC if they suspect that company officers have been guilty of an offence or, in the case of liquidators, if the return to unsecured creditors may be less than 50 cents in the dollar. As part of our response to the GFC (Global Financial Crisis), ASIC committed to increasing action on reports alleging misconduct from insolvency practitioners, following a 25% increase in insolvency appointments in 2008-09.  This year, a significantly increased proportion of supplementary reports (33% compared with 24% in 2008-09) were referred for compliance, investigation or surveillance.  Fewer reports failed to identify any offence.”

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