Jan 142015
 

UPDATED 16/1/2015

Despite directors receiving official admonishments, detailed instructions and threats about the practice of allowing a company to trade whilst insolvent (see, for example, ASIC Regulatory Guide 217), the curse of insolvent trading seems to be growing.

So, in an attempt to reel it in – or perhaps (for the cynical) to reduce the number of reported cases – the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is putting the onus on liquidators to provide “better” information in their statutory reports.

Background

Where liquidators of insolvent companies become aware that a past or present director or other officer of a company may have committed an offence, they are required to make a formal report to ASIC. Several years ago ASIC came up with a form and guidelines spelling out the information it wanted from liquidators before it would take their allegations of offences any further. This change came with the introduction of an electronic means of lodging reports, but also occurred after ASIC had become fed-up with receiving offence reports considered by its investigators to be almost worthless.

The latest version of this offence report form was released on 18 December 2014. The changes that have been drawn to the attention of liquidators by ASIC concern allegations of insolvent trading. The previous version of the form (July 2008) asked little of liquidators regarding this subject: about all it wanted was a “Yes” or “No” on the availability of documentary evidence. But the new version requires far more.

In the insolvency profession the ASIC form is known as EX01. More technically it is Schedule B of Regulatory Guide 16: Report to ASIC under s422, s438D or s533 of the Corporations Act 2001 or for statistical purposes. (Note: This reporting requirement applies not only to liquidators but also to receivers or managing controllers and voluntary administrators. However for simplicity all these classes of external administrators are referred to collectively in this article as liquidators.)

ex01-embossed

Possible Misconduct – EX01

In EX01 reporting of “insolvent trading” is carried out in the section headed Possible Misconduct.

Here, ASIC asks the liquidator “Are you reporting possible misconduct?”

If the answer is “Yes”, the liquidator is invited to examine Schedule D of ASIC Regulatory Guide 16 to learn “what is likely to constitute a breach of the relevant section, and the evidence needed to prove such a breach”. Schedule D contains over 6,500 words.

There is also a warning “that ASIC may ask you to provide a supplementary report addressing in detail the possible misconduct reported and we may later require further evidence or statements from you for Court purposes”. A description of what is required in the ASIC supplementary report is set out in Schedule C: Supplementary report by receiver or managing controller under s422(2), by voluntary administrator under s438D(2), or by liquidator under s533(2). Schedule C contains about 3,000 words. Liquidators of “assetless companies” are eligible under Regulatory Guide 109 to apply for funding from ASIC for reasonable remuneration and costs in preparing a supplementary report (ASIC form EX03).

If, after considering what is involved in answering “Yes”, the liquidator still thinks the misconduct is worth reporting, or filing a complaint, he or she is directed to the section headed “Criminal Offences”.

Possible Misconduct – Criminal Offences – Insolvent Trading – EX01

Preliminary details of an allegation of insolvent trading – an offence under section 588G(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 – are sought by ASIC in the usual tick-the-box manner.

First the liquidator reports the alleged offence by ticking “Yes” to the following statement:

“In your opinion, one or more directors failed to prevent the company incurring a debt or debts at a time when the director suspected that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result, and the failure to prevent the company incurring the debt(s) was dishonest.”

Having ticked that box, the liquidator is asked “Do you have documentary evidence or other to support your opinion?” and “Are you aware of documentary evidence in the possession of another person that supports this allegation?”

Up to this section the revised form is practically the same as the previous version.

But in the new version, if the liquidator reports a case of insolvent trading and has, or knows of, documentary evidence supporting this conclusion, the liquidator must provide more information by answering several extra questions.

These extra questions concern the period of insolvency, the methods and records used to determine the date of insolvency, the amount of debts incurred, and the reasonable grounds for the director had to suspect insolvency. (The actual questions are set out verbatim below, but the heading are mine.) They are the type of questions that a liquidator, especially one with sufficient funds, ought to consider as a matter of course before reaching an opinion regarding the existence (or non-existence) of insolvent trading.

Effects of changes to insolvent trading sections of EX01

Prior to the recent changes, if ASIC saw a completed EX01 form in which the liquidator had alleged a breach of the insolvent trading laws, and had also answered “yes” to questions about the possession or existence of documentary evidence “or other” to support that opinion, ASIC would have then needed to consider whether to investigate. Its task would likely have entailed obtaining, or trying to obtain, from the liquidator the extra information that is now set out in the latest version of EX01. So, as far as the extra demands in the form are concerned, ASIC would probably argue that liquidators are no greater imposed upon now than they were before.

But regardless of the information ASIC has or could readily obtain, it often decides not to investigate complaints of alleged offences. For many years this inaction has deeply frustrated a lot of liquidators. Many feel that completing an EX01 form is a waste of their time and also, where there are still funds in the insolvent company, a waste of creditors’ money. Unless the revised EX01 results in greater tangible action by ASIC (increased investigations and prosecutions and not just more detailed statistics), making the form more demanding will aggravate these feelings.

It might even see an increase in the non-reporting of insolvent trading offences (see the new question “Reasons for not reporting insolvent trading”), or in “no” being the liquidator’s response when it really should be “yes”.


Extra questions about insolvent trading – new EX01

Period insolvency commenced

Indicate the period, which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts as and when they became due and payable:

◻ At appointment ◻ 1 – 3 months prior to appointment ◻ 4 – 9 months prior to appointment ◻ 10 – 15 months prior to appointment ◻ 16 – 24 months prior to appointment ◻ Over 2 years prior to appointment

Method/s of determining date of insolvency

How did you determine the date on which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts as and when they became due and payable? (tick one or more):

◻ Cash flow analysis ◻ Trading history analysis ◻ Balance sheet analysis ◻ Informed by director(s) ◻Other, please specify __________________

Records used to determine date of insolvency

Which of the following records, in your possession, did you use to determine the date on which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts? (tick one or more):

◻ Cash flow (actual / forecasts / budgets) ◻ Banking records ◻ Aged debtors’ list ◻ Aged creditors’ list ◻ Profit & loss statements ◻ Balance sheets ◻ Other, please specify _______________

Grounds for director to suspect insolvency

If you believe the director had reasonable grounds to suspect the company was insolvent or would become insolvent by incurring the debt (or a reasonable person in a like position would have reason to suspect), please identify on which of the following indicators of insolvency you have based your belief (tick one or more):

◻ Financial statements that disclose a history of serious shortage of working capital, unprofitable trading ◻ Poor or deteriorating cash flow or evidence of dishonoured payments ◻ Difficulties paying debts when they fell due (e.g. evidenced by letters of demand, recovery proceedings, increasing age of accounts payable) ◻ Non-payment of statutory debts (e.g. PAYGW, SGC, GST) ◻ Poor or deteriorating working capital ◻ Increasing difficulties collecting debts ◻ Overdraft and/or other finance facilities at their limit ◻ Evidence of creditors attempting to obtain payment of outstanding debts ◻ Other, please specify ________________

Approximate debt after insolvency

Estimate the approximate amount of debts incurred after the date (in your opinion) of insolvency:

◻ $0 – $250,000 ◻ $250,001 – less than $1 million ◻ $1 million to $5 million ◻ Over $5 million ◻ Unable to determine

Aged list of creditors

Do you have an aged creditors’ list as at (tick one or more):

◻ Date of insolvency ◻ Date of appointment

Dishonesty by director

If the director/directors was dishonest in failing to prevent the company from incurring the debt, indicate what evidence you have available to support this (tick one or more):

◻ Evidence showing that the director/directors had an opportunity to prevent the company from incurring the debt and did not. Such evidence could include: • documents evidencing discussions with the directors, employees and creditors concerning the circumstances surrounding the incurring of particular debts; • correspondence or other documents relating to the circumstances surrounding the incurring of the debt. ◻ Evidence showing that the failure was dishonest (i.e., the director/directors incurred the debt with the knowledge that it would produce adverse consequences, the failure was intentional, wilful or deliberate, and it included an element of deceit or fraud). Such evidence could include: • documents evidencing discussions with the directors, employees and creditors concerning the circumstances surrounding the incurring of particular debts; • correspondence or other documents relating to the circumstances surrounding the incurring of the debt.

Reasons for not reporting insolvent trading

If you did not report insolvent trading (s588(1)-(2) or s588(3)), was it because, in your opinion:

◻ The books and records are insufficient to establish insolvent trading ◻ The company did not incur debts at a time when it was unable to pay its debts (e.g., it ceased to trade) ◻ The directors had reasons to expect the company could pay its debts as they fell due and payable (eg. they obtained independent advice) ◻ Other, please specify ________________

Whether creditor/s are seeking compensation for insolvent trading

Has a creditor commenced, or indicated that they intend to commence, action to recover compensation for loss resulting from insolvent trading?

◻ Yes ◻ No

Possible Misconduct – Breaches of civil obligations – Insolvent Trading – EX01

Insolvent trading may also be a breach of civil penalty sections 588G(1)-(2) of the Act. The revised form EX01 also seeks details of allegations of this nature, by asking about the period of insolvency, the methods and records used to determine the date of insolvency, the amount of debts incurred, and the reasonable grounds for the director had to suspect insolvency. The questions are practically the same as those asked when a criminal offence is alleged (see above). In the previous version of EX01 only three brief questions were posed, which concerned the availability of evidence and the perceived legitimacy of a director’s defence.

Dec 092014
 

Under the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 the insolvency practitioners association and the accountants associations are to be granted the right to formally refer registered liquidators who they suspect are guilty of misconduct to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to consider using its disciplinary powers.

Disciplinary-action The following table sets out the proposed legislation by using extracts from the Bill and related official material.

SUBJECT: DISCIPLINE OF REGISTERED LIQUIDATORS:
POWER OF INDUSTRY BODY TO GIVE INDUSTRY NOTICE

SELECTED EXTRACTS FROM THE DRAFT BILL, PROPOSED RULES, ETC.
SOURCE OF TEXT
Subdivision G of Division 40 provides that an industry body will be able to provide information about potential breaches of the law by a liquidator, and also be able to expect a response from ASIC on the outcome of that information provision.
The following industry bodies are proposed to be prescribed bodies:
• Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association;
• CPA Australia;
• Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia; and
• Institute of Public Accountants.
Insolvency Practice Rules Proposal Paper,
page 19, para 110
An industry body (prescribed in the Insolvency Practice Rules) may lodge a notice (an industry notice) stating that the body reasonably suspects that there are grounds for ASIC to take disciplinary action against a registered liquidator. The industry body must identify the registered liquidator and include the information and copies of any documents upon which the suspicion is grounded.

ASIC must consider the information and documents included in the industry notice and take action as follows:

• if ASIC decides to take no action ASIC, must give the industry body a notice within 45 business days after the industry notice is lodged;
• however, such a notice does not preclude ASIC from taking action based wholly or partly on the basis of information in the industry notice of the following kind:
– suspending or cancelling the registration of the registered liquidator;
– giving the registered liquidator a show cause notice; or
– imposing a condition on the registered liquidator;
• if ASIC does take action based wholly or partly on the information included in an industry notice, ASIC must give the industry body notice of that fact.

An industry notice is not a legislative instrument.

An industry body is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process for giving an industry notice if the body acted in good faith and the suspicion that the body holds in relation to the subject of the notice is a reasonable suspicion.

A person who makes a decision in good faith as a result of which an industry body gives an industry notice is not civilly, criminally or under any administrative process for making the decision.

A person who gives information or a document in good faith which is included, or a copy of which is included, in an industry notice is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process for giving the information or document.

Explanatory Material, pages 140-141,
paras 6.67 to 6.70
An industry body (which will be prescribed in the Insolvency Practice Rules) may give ASIC an ‘industry notice’ stating that the industry body reasonably suspects that there are grounds for ASIC to take disciplinary action in relation to a registered liquidator.

ASIC is required to notify the industry body whether or not it has decided to take action in relation to the matters in the industry notice.

An industry body is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process if the body acted in good faith and its suspicion in relation to the subject of the notice is a reasonable suspicion.

A person who makes a decision in good faith as a result of which an industry body gives a notice is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process. Similarly, a person who in good faith provides information or gives a document which is included in an industry notice, or a copy of which is included, is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process.

Explanatory Material, Comparison of key features
of new law and current law, page 125
Notice by industry bodies of possible grounds for disciplinary action

Industry body may lodge notice
(1) An industry body may lodge with ASIC a notice in the approved form (an industry notice):
(a) stating that the body reasonably suspects that there are grounds for ASIC:
(i) to suspend the registration of a registered liquidator under section 40-25; or
(ii) to cancel the registration of a registered liquidator under section 40-30; or
(iii) to give a registered liquidator a notice under section 40-40 (a show-cause notice); or
(iv) to impose a condition on a registered liquidator under another provision of this Schedule; and
(b) identifying the registered liquidator; and
(c) including the information and copies of any documents upon which the suspicion is founded.

ASIC must consider information and documents
(2) ASIC must consider the information and the copies of any documents included with the industry notice.

ASIC must give notice if no action to be taken
(3) If, after such consideration, ASIC decides to take no action in relation to the matters raised by the industry notice, ASIC must give the industry body written notice of that fact.

45 business days to consider and decide
(4) The consideration of the information and the copies of any documents included with the industry notice must be completed and, if ASIC decides to take no action, a notice under subsection (3) given, within 45 business days after the industry notice is lodged.

ASIC not precluded from taking action
(5) ASIC is not precluded from:
(a) suspending the registration of a registered liquidator under section 40-25; or
(b) cancelling the registration of a registered liquidator under section 40-30; or
(c) giving a registered liquidator a notice under section 40-40 (a show-cause notice); or
(d) imposing a condition on a registered liquidator under another provision of this Schedule; and
wholly or partly on the basis of information or a copy of a document included with the industry notice, merely because ASIC has given a notice under subsection (3) in relation to the matters raised by the industry notice.

Notice to industry body if ASIC takes action
(6) If ASIC does take action of the kind mentioned in subsection (5) wholly or partly on the basis of information or a copy of a document included with the industry notice, ASIC must give the industry body notice of that fact.

Notices are not legislative instruments
(7) A notice under subsection (3) or (6) is not a legislative instrument.

No liability for notice given in good faith etc.

(1) An industry body is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process for giving a notice under subsection 40-100(1) if:
(a) the body acted in good faith in giving the notice; and
(b) the suspicion that is the subject of the notice is a reasonable suspicion.

(2) A person who, in good faith, makes a decision as a result of which the industry body gives a notice under subsection 40-100(1) is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process for making the decision.

(3) A person who, in good faith, gives information or a document to an industry body that is included, or a copy of which is included, in a notice under subsection 40-100(1) is not liable civilly, criminally or under any administrative process for giving the information or document.

Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 Exposure Draft,
Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations),
sections 40-100 and 40-105,
pages 186 & 187

Corporate insolvency laws: the shape of things to come

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Law reform proposals, Regulation, Standards  Comments Off on Corporate insolvency laws: the shape of things to come
Nov 282014
 

The exposure draft of Australia’s Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014  has, in its 240 pages dealing with corporate insolvency,  so many proposed changes in the form of amended, repealed, omitted, added and substituted words, items, definitions and sections, and so many additional parts, divisions, subdivisions, schedules and transitional provisions, that only an expert with tremendous devotion to the task would be able to understand what it all means and see what the new law governing corporate insolvencies is going to look like. The rest of us will probably have to wait until this Bill is passed and a compilation of the Corporations Act 2001 that takes into account all these changes is prepared.

Even then it appears we’ll see quite a mishmash of insolvency laws scattered throughout the Corporations Act and its Rules and Regulations. Perhaps our corporate insolvency laws need a real clean up, like gathering all existing provisions together and moving the lot (with amendments and additions) out of the Corporations Act and into a new, specific Act, such as a Corporate Insolvency Act. But that’s a discussion for another day.

However, one of the changes proposed by the Insolvency Law Reform Bill will take us a little in this direction. Several rules that are currently scattered throughout the Corporations Act will be encompassed in a new Division 4 – which is to be called the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations).  It will be added to Part 5.9 (Miscellaneous) of Chapter 5 (External Administration) of the Corporations Act 2001. The table below shows the layout of this new Division and points to the pages of the Bill’s Exposure Draft where the text of the laws is set out. I hope it’s of some help to those trying to understand the proposed changes.

 

Division 4—Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations)

Part

Division

Exposure Draft – pages

1-Introduction 1-Introduction 151 to 152
5-Definitions 153 to 158
2-Registering and disciplining practitioners 10-Introduction 158 to 159
15-Register of liquidators 159 to 160
20-Registering liquidators 160 to 168
25-Insurance 169
30-Annual liquidator returns 170
35-Notice requirements 171 to 172
40-Disciplinary and other action 172 to 189
45-Court oversight of registered liquidators 189 to 190
50-Committees under this Part 190 to 195
3-General rules relating to external administrations 55-Introduction 195
60-Remuneration and other benefits received by external administrators 196 to 208
65-Funds handling 208 to 215
70-Information 216 to 234
75-Meetings 235 to 244
80-Committees of inspection 244 to 256
85-Directions by creditors 256 to 257
90-Review of the external administration of a company 257 to 269
4-Other matters 95-Introduction 270
100-Other matters 270 to 271
105-The Insolvency Practice Rules *** 271 to 272. (Note: To be made by the Minister.)

*** The Bill’s Exposure Draft mentions  the Insolvency Practice Rules many times, stating how and where they may be used to clarify, interpret, amplify, refine and flesh out the insolvency laws. A separate document – a 27 page Proposals Paper for Insolvency Practice Rules – has been released for comment (closing date 19/12/2014). The part of the Paper that applies to Corporate Insolvency is pages 16 to 27.

Note:  There is an official Explanatory Material to the exposure draft of the Bill. It is 228 pages long, but only 115 pages concern  changes to corporate insolvency laws!

________________________ END OF POST ____________________________

2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Personal Bankruptcy, Regulation  Comments Off on 2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws
Nov 172014
 

On 7 November 2014  an exposure draft of the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (ILRB 2014) was released by the Australian Treasury for comment.

The Treasury Crest

Summaries:

The Treasury’s summary/promotion of the legislation is as follows:

“The draft Bill comprises a package of proposals to amend and streamline the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and the Corporations Act 2001. The proposed amendments will:

•remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
•enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
•promote market competition on price and quality;
•boost confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners; and
•remove unnecessary costs from the insolvency industry resulting in around $55.4 million per annum in compliance cost savings.”

The Explanatory Material issued with the Bill opens with this outline:

“The Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (Bill) amends the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Bankruptcy Act) to create common rules that would:
• remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
• align and modernise the registration and disciplinary frameworks that apply to registered liquidators and registered trustees;
• align and modernise a range of specific rules relating to the handling of personal bankruptcies and corporate external administrations;
• enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
• promote market competition on price and quality;
• improve the powers available to the corporate regulator to regulate the corporate insolvency market and the ability for both regulators to communicate in relation to insolvency practitioners operating in both the personal and corporate insolvency markets; and
• improve overall confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners.”

 Links to government material:

The draft Bill (ILRB 2014) in PDF format

The Explanatory Material in PDF format

The Insolvency Practice Rules – Proposals Paper in PDF format

Coversheet for a submission by post

The Treasury website page

Previous Bill and background material:

The first version of ILRB 2014 appeared on 19/12/2012 as Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2012, but it never became law. However, the 2012 Explanatory Memorandum and  the 2012 Exposure Draft  contains valuable background information related to the current Bill. (Sixteen submissions were made for this 2012 consultation.)

Further background information regarding ILRB 2014 is available in the June 2011 Treasury Options Paper titled “A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia”. (Thirty three submissions were made for this consultation.)

The 2011 options paper was followed in December 2011 by a Proposals Paper with the same title. (Twenty nine submissions were made for this consultation.)

Submissions regarding ILRB 2014:

Closing date for submissions: Friday, 19 December 2014.

Email submissions are to be done online at:

http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/Submission-Form?parent={34029467-07BE-46D9-AA9E-86DAC3715DFF}

Address for written submissions:

Manager
Corporations and Scheme Unit
Financial System and Services Division
The Treasury
Langton Crescent
PARKES ACT 2600

 For enquiries call Peter Levy at The Treasury on (02) 6263 3976.

Further posts on this site:

Further posts will be made on this blog site in the coming days with details of some of the proposed changes to corporate insolvency laws.

 


 

ASIC publishes an overview of statistics and offences reported by liquidators

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Statistics, Offences, Regulation  Comments Off on ASIC publishes an overview of statistics and offences reported by liquidators
Sep 302014
 

In the 2013–14 financial year, 7,218 reports alleging misconduct were lodged with ASIC by external administrators.

That’s one statistic contained in “Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports (July 2013 to June 2014)”, a report by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The report (Report 412) is the latest data from ASIC on liquidations and other forms of external administrations.

ASIC Media Release

The following is from ASIC’s media release of 29 September 2014:

Report 412 Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports (July 2013 to June 2014) (REP 412) is ASIC’s sixth report and provides information on the nature of corporate insolvencies, supplementing the monthly and quarterly statistics that ASIC publishes on its website.

The report summarises information from 10,073 reports received during the 2013–14 financial year and includes ASIC’s response to reports of alleged misconduct from external administrators.

Commissioner John Price acknowledged the work of external administrators in carrying out their investigations and reporting to ASIC.

‘External administrators’ reports are a critical source of intelligence for ASIC. In addition to providing more detailed qualitative data, the information obtained from reports helps ASIC focus its regulatory efforts. It also helps us assess whether enforcement action is warranted, or if a director banning action should be pursued.

‘We encourage external administrators to provide these reports and any allegations of misconduct in a timely manner to assist in our supervision of insolvency and corporate governance issues,’ Mr Price said.

Profile of insolvent companies

REP 412 includes information about the profile of companies placed into external administration, including:
•industry types
•employee numbers
•causes of company failure
•estimated number and value of a company’s unsecured creditor debts, and
•estimated dividends to unsecured creditors.

Table 1 summarises key data from the report.

REP 412 shows small to medium size corporate insolvencies again dominated external administrators’ reports. Of note, 86% had assets of $100,000 or less, 81% had less than 20 employees and 43% had liabilities of $250,000 (or less).

97% of creditors in this group received between 0–11 cents in the dollar, reflecting the asset/liability profile of small to medium size corporate insolvencies.

Allegations of misconduct

REP 412 details how often external administrators report alleged misconduct by company officers and the types of alleged misconduct most frequently reported.

In the 2013–14 financial year, 7,218 reports alleging misconduct were lodged with ASIC by external administrators.

ASIC asked external administrators to prepare 802 supplementary reports where external administrators alleged company officer misconduct. This accounted for 11.1% of all reports, which alleged misconduct, lodged in the financial year.

Supplementary reports are typically detailed, free-format reports, which set out the results of the external administrator’s inquiries and the evidence they have to support alleged offences. Generally, ASIC can determine whether to commence a formal investigation on the basis of a supplementary report. While only a portion of the offences reported may result in a formal investigation or surveillance, ASIC uses the information for broader intelligence and targeting purposes.
In both the 2012–13 and 2013–14 financial years, after assessment, ASIC referred 25% and 19% of these cases respectively for investigation or surveillance.

ASIC considers a range of factors when deciding to investigate and take enforcement action and this is detailed in Information Sheet 151 ASIC’s approach to enforcement (INFO 151).

Future improvements: Reporting of alleged insolvent trading and other offences

To assist external administrators in their reporting obligations, ASIC anticipates releasing an amended report template for external administrators (Form EX01) in early-2015.

The amendments aim to capture more accurate information on alleged insolvent trading offences which might provide greater insight into the extent of insolvent trading and enable ASIC to focus our resources on matters that warrant further investigation.

The revised form is a further ASIC initiative to collect better information on corporate insolvencies in Australia. It complements recent enhancements to other forms to capture data in electronic format such as:
•industry statistics for external administration appointments from Form 505 (notice of appointment)
•key information from deeds of company arrangement from an enhanced Form 5047, and
•key financial data from Form 524 (presentation of accounts and statement).

ASIC expects to continue our work with industry to improve reporting including on other offences, such as alleged breaches of director duties.

The full Report 412 is available for download in PDF format from ASIC.

Aug 292014
 

Background

In the brief External Administration section of its Interim Report in July 2014 the Financial Systems Inquiry (FSI) aired criticisms of Australia’s external administration regime as it applies to small and medium companies (SMEs), and sought views from interested parties. (See my previous blog on this subject.) Specifically it asked for views on “the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the following policy options or other alternatives: 1. No change to current arrangements. 2. Implement the 2012 proposals to reduce the complexity and cost of external administration for SMEs.” Also, the FSI sought more information in response to the question, “Is there evidence that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail and, if so, what could be done to address this?” The following is ASIC’s response to these questions, taken from it’s second submission to the FSI  on 26/8/2014:


ASIC logo

 Response by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)

(Note: Headings added by author)

CLICK HERE to see copy of full ASIC second-round submission

The anticipated benefits of the 2012 insolvency law reform proposals

(Author’s note: These proposal are in the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2013 )

Para.468     ASIC welcomes the anticipated benefits of the Australian Government’s 2012 insolvency law reform proposals, which largely aim to harmonise and align the systems of corporate and personal insolvency by introducing: (a) a streamlined model for winding up or restructuring small- and medium-sized enterprises; and (b) a review of current external administration options for restructuring large and complex, financially distressed companies to consider whether Australia could adopt attributes of external administration processes in other jurisdictions to achieve better outcomes.

Para.469     However, we note that these proposals do not fully address the issue of perceived complexity in Australia’s insolvency regime, or the issue of the costs of the regime. The law reform proposals arose out of the 2010 Senate inquiry into the conduct of insolvency practitioners and ASIC’s involvement. The 2010 Senate Inquiry’s terms of reference reflected concerns about registered liquidator conduct and ASIC’s supervision of registered liquidators, rather than more fundamental policy issues.

Para.470      The vast majority of external administrations occur in the small- and medium-sized enterprise market. For these companies, the opportunity exists to consider how the winding up and restructuring processes might be further streamlined to reduce complexity and costs. Initiatives to reduce costs while appropriately remunerating registered liquidators for their work, increasing competition and ensuring consistency in external administration processes would also help maximise the potential return to creditors and help build confidence in the insolvency regime.

Alternative funding models and professional standards

Para.471     ASIC suggests that in considering how the external administration process can be streamlined for small- and medium-sized enterprises, consideration should be given to: (a) alternative funding models, as discussed in ASIC’s main submission to this inquiry and which are the subject of recommendations made by the Senate inquiry into the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The funding model affects, among other things, the supervision of registered liquidators and, potentially, their remuneration; and (b) professional standards and regulation, including those relating to investigation and reporting to creditors and to ASIC.

External administration regime and business failure

Para.472     ASIC is not aware of empirical evidence supporting the view that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail. If empirical evidence supporting the contention that viable companies unnecessarily enter external administration does exist, ASIC believes the Australian Government could consider legislative change that would address this, and that would achieve better outcomes for creditors.

Damage to entity value

Para.473     We are aware, however, of concerns in the market that unnecessary external administrations, which destroy entity value and result in significant cost, are the result of: (a) a lack of a ‘safe harbour’ from what are said to be stringent insolvent trading laws (which can make a director personally liable for a company’s debts); and (b) the positive obligation/duty on directors to appoint an external administrator if their company is insolvent, or might become insolvent.

Para.474     We acknowledge the possibility that the formal appointment of an external administrator can also reduce the value of a company’s business, and note that there is anecdotal evidence to support this view.

Voluntary administration as a ‘quasi liquidation’

Para.475     ASIC’s statistics on voluntary administration and deeds of company arrangement suggest that, for small companies, there is often not a viable business worth saving as many companies that enter voluntary administration end up in liquidation. This is supported by a recent review of 72 sample deeds of company arrangement (85% of which related to what might be described as small company insolvencies). The review found that 72% of these deeds were compromises akin to liquidation and involved no, or very limited, trading on of the business under the deed (although the dividend return paid to creditors was greater than that estimated if an immediate winding up of the company had occurred). In other words, the statistics show that companies often use the restructuring option of voluntary administration as a ‘quasi liquidation’.

Continuation of viable businesses

Para.476      The current insolvency legislation provides for the continuation of a viable business. Where there is a viable business of a company in liquidation, the liquidator has the ability to sell that business. Alternatively, the liquidator can appoint a voluntary administrator to facilitate the company’s restructuring with a view to its continued operation.

Reasons often cited as inhibiting corporate restructuring

Para.477     We note that four main reasons are often cited as inhibiting corporate restructuring in Australia: (a) the perceived stringency of our insolvent trading laws; (b) destruction of value by ipso facto clauses in contracts, which enable creditors to pursue enforcement action or enforce their contractual rights. This issue impacts on the extent of any moratorium on creditor claims during the period of a company’s restructuring; (c) a lack of formal ‘pre-pack sale’ regulation, which allows a sale of the business, or some company assets, to be negotiated prior to the appointment of an external administrator; and (d) the inability to bind third parties.

Para.478      In principle, we consider these matters worthy of further discussion and consultation noting they have proved contentious in the past.

US Chapter 11 style regime

Para.479     In terms of any legislative change, ASIC does not advocate a wholesale adoption of a US Chapter 11 style regime or other processes. However, we note that the US Chapter 11 regime, along with the administration regimes in the United Kingdom and Canada, might be worth examining to identify elements that could address the issues claimed to inhibit effective corporate restructuring in Australia.

Consider different laws for large and small companies

Para.480      We consider that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to the external administration or reorganisation of failed and distressed entities may not be appropriate. The framework for external administration needs to take account of the fact that issues affecting large proprietary and public companies differ from those affecting small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Para.481     Legislative changes to facilitate corporate rehabilitation might therefore consider the different characteristics of large and small companies, and policy settings may need to be specifically tailored for these sectors, in order to promote deregulation, facilitate efficient reallocation of resources and improve competition.


Jun 272014
 

Recommendation 17 of the Senate Economics References Committee final report (26/6/2014) on the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is:

“… that  ASIC,  in  collaboration  with  the Australian  Restructuring  Insolvency  and  Turnaround  Association  and accounting  bodies,  develop  a  self-rating  system,  or  similar  mechanism,  for statutory  reports  lodged  by  insolvency  practitioners  and  auditors  under  the Corporations  Act  2001  to  assist  ASIC  identify  reports  that  require  the  most urgent attention and investigation.” (Page 244, para. 15.66)

Source: Final report of Senate Economics References Committee on Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 26/6/2014 

Committee’s comments preceding this recommendation

Before making recommendation 17 the Senate Committee’s Report looks at “Reports from industry professionals”  including external administrators. It states as follows (note: I’ve removed its footnotes):

 

External administrators

15.55  The  Corporations  Act  also  places an obligation on liquidators, receivers and voluntary  administrators  (external  administrators)  to  report  suspected  breaches  of the  Corporations  Act  to  ASIC….

15.56  Reports  made  pursuant  to  these  sections  are  referred  to  as  statutory  reports and  are  an  important  source  of  information  about  possible  breaches  of  the  law….

15.57  Liquidators  also  have  the  discretion  to  lodge  further  reports  if,  in  their opinion, it is desirable to draw the matter to ASIC’s attention.

15.58  In 2012–13, external administrators lodged 9,788 reports with ASIC. Of this number,  initial  external  administrators  accounted  for  95  per  cent  or  9,254  reports. ASIC recorded  that 81 per cent of the initial reports  involved  companies with fewer than  20  employees.  The  construction  industry  was  subject  to  the  highest  number  of reports  accounting  for  just  over  24  per  cent.  Of  the  initial  external  administrators’ reports, receivers lodged one per cent under section 422; administrators lodged 3.8 per cent under section 438D; and 95 per cent of the reports were submitted by liquidators under section 533.

15.59  Importantly,  external  administrators  alleged  misconduct  in  more  than two-thirds of reports  (6,761)  involving an overall possible 16,562 breaches. Although this  number  accounts  for  an  average  of  between  two  and  three  breaches  per  report, almost  30  per  cent  of  reports  or  2,493  recorded  no  misconduct. ASIC  asked  the external administrator to prepare a supplementary section 422, section 438D or section 533  report  for  677  of  the  6,761  reports  that  identified  possible  misconduct. In its analysis of the statistics, ASIC explained  that its request for an additional report is  a  function  of  its  assessment  of  risk  based  on  a  number  of  factors,  including,  but not limited to:
*   the nature of the possible misconduct reported;
*   the amount of liabilities;
*   the deficiency suffered;
*   the availability of evidence;
*   prior misconduct; and
*   the advice of the external administrator that the reported possible misconduct warranted further investigation.

15.60  In  a 2007 report, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)  observed that given  the  large  number  of  statutory  reports  received  by  ASIC  each  year  that  allege offences  against  the  Corporations  Act,  it  was  appropriate  that  ASIC  had  systems  in place  to  prioritise  its  regulatory  action,  through  risk  scoring.  It  found  that  ASIC’s recording of statutory report information was accurate to  a high degree. The ANAO recognised  that  ASIC  could  use  a  wide  variety  of  possible  remedies  to  deal  with offences identified in statutory reports or other deficiencies that warranted some sort  of regulatory action. They ranged from warning letters to directors for the less serious offences  to  prosecution  and  potentially  imprisonment  for  more  serious  offences. It noted that where ASIC identified  that a statutory report raised  issues of regulatory significance,  it  sought  further  information  about  the  matter  from  the  external administrator.

15.61  According to  the ANAO  report, ASIC  did  not always obtain that additional information.  Based on its sample, it found that in 40 per cent of instances,  ASIC did not obtain additional information that it had requested. The ANAO concluded:

… the  small  number  of  statutory  reports  subject  to  regulatory  action  by ASIC  each  year  indicates  that  there  is  opportunity  for  greater  regulatory action on these reports.

15.62  Mr  David  Lombe,  President  of  the  Australian  Restructuring  Insolvency  and Turnaround Association  (ARITA)  was of the view that  ANAO’s  2007  findings  were still  relevant  and  applicable. He  noted  the  thousands  of  reports  lodged  with  ASIC each  year  but  not  acted  upon.  In  Mr  Lombe’s  view,  there  was  a  ‘general  perception within  the business community that, if you do certain things at a certain level, there will be no effective review’. He explained further:

“The difficulty that we have as official liquidators is that you get a matter off the  court  list  and  often  that  matter  has  no  funds  in  it,  so  there  are  no available assets. Often that is a process by which directors have deliberately done that—it has been a deliberate course of action. If you report the matter to ASIC and there is no assistance from that space, there is not much  you can do. If you felt really aggrieved by it or you felt that it was a matter that was  of  sufficient  importance,  you  may  be  able  to  persuade  a  firm  of solicitors to act on a pro bono basis, but that is very difficult. I found myself in  that  sort  of  situation  with  Babcock  &  Brown,  where  I  had  inadequate funds to be able to pursue a proper investigation. The only thing that was available to me was to ask creditors to fund me, which they did, which then allowed me to do a public examination, which brought out the conduct of directors and other stakeholders in that company. If you do not have funds in a matter, the courses are very limited.”

15.63  By  way  of  example,  Mr  Lombe  expanded  on  his  concerns  citing  the requirement  to  lodge  a  section  533  report,  which  deals  with  offences  committed  by directors.  He explained that for the liquidator to understand what has happened,  he or she  needs  to

  ‘review the books and records, determine the transactions, try to find out what assets are there, look at insolvent trading and look at preference payments and all those sorts of things’.

  The liquidator is  required to file that report,  which  takes  time. So, according to Mr Lombe,  the reports involve both  time and money, and often  with official liquidations there are no assets at all and, if there are, creditors are effectively paying for the report.  He noted that thousands of  such reports  are lodged  with ASIC but  most  of  them  come  back  ‘no  further  action’.  In  his  view,  it  is  frustrating  for liquidators because they feel, ‘Why am I bothering to do it?’ Mr Lombe concluded that ‘you  can  understand  someone’s  frustration,  where  they  have  reported  offences  and nothing happens’.

15.64  When asked whether liquidators, in their  statutory  reports,  could assist ASIC to  distinguish  the  very  serious  breaches  from  the  less  so,  ARITA  indicated  that  it ‘might be a useful reform’. After considering the matter further, ARITA informed the committee that if it were consulted, it could assist ASIC to determine a risk scoring profile. It explained further, however:

“But we consider that the decision on how the information required by s533 is ‘risk-scored’ for action is ultimately one for the regulator and its decision and  methods  should  not  be  publicly  disclosed.  For  one  thing,  this  would appear to give the  ‘green light’ to the  commission of certain offences that are deemed not serious enough to warrant action by ASIC.”

15.65  ARITA  also  stated  that  ‘a  more  co-operative  approach  between  ASIC  and liquidators  should  also  be  pursued’.  The  committee  believes  that  ASIC  and  ARITA should  work  closely  together  to  develop  a  more  effective  and  efficient  reporting mechanism that would assist ASIC to identify the alleged  serious  breaches from the less so.”


“Nudges” may be used by ASIC to persuade company directors to comply

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Forms, Offences, Practitioners Association (IPAA), Regulation  Comments Off on “Nudges” may be used by ASIC to persuade company directors to comply
Jun 132014
 

A story by Michael Murray of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) brings news that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has commissioned the Queensland University Business School to investigate “approaches that can be used to improve director co-operation with liquidators and director compliance with their statutory and other obligations”.

ASIC appears to be looking for styles of approach that are more scientific and more savvy.

The news story suggests that an approach to be considered is that of the “pure nudge”, the “assisted nudge” and the “shove”.

A “nudge” is defined in a government paper entitled “Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving Regulatory Design” (see below) as a change to choice architecture which influences the decision of an individual without restricting, or raising the price of, the set of choices available”.  The paper says that “under certain conditions, some evidence suggests that nudge interventions can be cost-effective relative to more direct or traditional forms of government intervention; used alongside existing regulatory approaches; targeted in influence; and easy to implement.”

ASIC seems to be keen to try the “nudges” experiment. In its April 2014 submission to the Financial Systems Inquiry ASIC recommends that it should have a more flexible regulatory toolkit such as would enable it to intervene in the financial product and service supply chain by way of ‘shoves’ and ‘nudges’ to achieve regulatory outcomes that more effectively meet the needs of investors and consumers. It suggests that simple “nudges” are likely to achieve cost-effective results in many cases.

Nudge

ARITA’s news story of 6 June 2014 is headed “How Directors of Insolvent Companies [Should] Behave” and says:

“Liquidators will be aware that director compliance can be variable and that non-compliance can ultimately call for prosecution of the directors, adversely distracting liquidators from their duties and imposing costs on creditors. The behavioural economics approach seeks to influence and direct director behaviour in order to promote positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions in order to achieve compliance.

At a simple level, it could be applied to refine the form and content of letters sent by liquidators to directors stating their obligations. Improvement of the report as to the company’s financial position (the RATA) is another coalface example, ARITA research showing that it can be a daunting, unduly complex and difficult document for directors to complete: Peter Keenan, Terry Taylor Scholarship Report 2011. In some circumstances, small changes can give effect to significant behavioural changes.

ARITA sees this research as very worthwhile and it mirrors similar approaches being taken by the Australian government in other areas – see Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving Regulatory Design, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Department of Finance and Deregulation. Among many issues, that paper discusses the concepts of a “pure” nudge, an “assisted” nudge and ultimately a “shove”, in seeking regulatory compliance. Such approaches are used by revenue authorities in Australia and internationally. For example, in the UK, a change in the wording of letters sent to those owing income tax was claimed to have resulted in an extra £200 million in tax being collected on time.

ARITA also sees potential for research into the behaviour of directors at the pre-liquidation stage, that is, in managing a failing company that is heading towards collapse – what may usefully be used to prompt directors to take action or seek advice? to have a more real perception of the company’s financial position? to more positively react to possible insolvent trading liability and to the company’s creditors? and many other such issues.

We also see potential for this research to be applied in personal insolvency.

ARITA is monitoring the progress of this research and its outcomes. Any comments or questions? to Michael Murray, Legal Director, ARITA.


Link: News story by Michael Murray of ARITA: “HOW DIRECTORS OF INSOLVENT COMPANIES [SHOULD] BEHAVE”
Link: Paper from Office of Best Practice Regulation in 2012 “INFLUENCING CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR: IMPROVING REGULATORY DESIGN”
Link: ASIC’s April 2014 submission to the Financial Systems Inquiry

Interim report issued by Senate Committee inquiring into ASIC’s performance

 ASIC, Australian Senate 2013-14, Corporate Insolvency, Official Inquiries, Regulation  Comments Off on Interim report issued by Senate Committee inquiring into ASIC’s performance
May 292014
 

The Senate Economics References Committee has tabled a short interim report outlining its reasons for seeking an extension of time to present its final report on its inquiry into the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The Committee was due to report by 30 May 2014 but has asked for an extension to 26 June 2014. In its interim report the Committee says, amongst other things:

“This is an important inquiry. The size and growth of Australia’s financial sector and the fact that millions of Australians are involved in it, not least because of compulsory superannuation, makes it essential that modern and adaptable regulations are in place and regulators such as ASIC are at the top of their game…. Many of the people who wrote to the committee recounted their experiences of receiving bad financial advice, of unknowingly being placed in high-risk investments, of having documents forged and signatures used improperly. They referred to serious financial losses and difficulties in having their complaints addressed. In their view, the regulatory framework and the regulator had failed to protect their interests…. The committee was well advanced in preparing its report, when on 16 May 2014, ASIC and the CBA advised the committee that there were inconsistences in the way in which the compensation arrangements for CFP clients had been applied. This revelation suggested that, for some time, the CBA had not kept either the committee or ASIC fully informed about the compensation process for clients affected by serious misconduct within CBA’s businesses (see attachments)…. The latest information that ASIC and the CBA provided to the committee in order to correct the record was sketchy and left many key questions unanswered…. Concerned that it may still not have a correct understanding of what has happened, the committee has sought additional information and clarification from both ASIC and the bank on this matter of central importance to the committee’s inquiry and report.”

Sources and links

Email of 28 May 2014 from Committee to all submitters and witnesses.

Copy of the interim report in pdf format.

Committee webpage with full details of its inquiry into ASIC


 

ASIC report seeks more ideas on reducing red tape

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Forms, Insolvency practices, Regulation  Comments Off on ASIC report seeks more ideas on reducing red tape
May 232014
 

Australia’s corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, estimates that 10 per cent of its 362 statutory forms could be removed, consolidated or streamlined in the name of reducing “red tape”.

This is revealed in Report 391 – ASIC’S deregulatory initiatives, published on 7 May 2014.

Removal

Those forms identified for possible removal include ones which ASIC says are “not required or used regularly by ASIC or the public”.  ASIC says that:

A number of the forms identified for removal are currently required to be provided to ASIC under the law, but provide information that might not be necessary for ASIC to hold. Subject to stakeholder comments, we may suggest that these forms be removed through legislative amendment.

Other forms are marked for removal on the basis that:

      •  the “information is available from the company”;
      • they are “obsolete“; and
      • they are “Administrative only”.

Forms that may no longer be required in corporate insolvency administration

Below I’ve listed the insolvency forms identified by ASIC for removal because the “information is not used by ASIC” *. (Per Table 1 of Appendix 1 of Report 391.)

  •  Form 540 – Statement in writing of posting of notices of appointment to settle list of contributories – Reg. 5.6.59(2)
  • Form 545 – Statement in writing of giving notice to persons placed on the list of contributories – Reg.5.6.62(5)
  • Form 555 – Notice of controller extending time to submit report as to affairs – S.429(4)
  • Form 558 – Court order extending time to provide report as to affairs – S.429(5)
  • Form 562 – Notice of liquidator extending time to submit report as to affairs – S.475(7)(b)
  • Form 911 – Verification or certification of a document – Reg. 1.0.16

* NOTE: The phrase “Information not used by ASIC” used in the Appendix appears to be an abbreviation of the phrase “information not required or used regularly by ASIC or the public”.

Forms that, if removed, could impair corporate insolvency administration

ASIC has marked other forms for possible removal because “the information is available from the company“. But liquidators of small companies – especially “phoenix” companies – frequently find it difficult or impossible to obtain information from the company. So removal of the following forms (or, more precisely, the requirement to lodge them with ASIC) may impair the efficient investigation of insolvent companies:

  • Form 909 – Notification of office at which registers are kept – Sections 100(1)(d), 172, 271, 1302(4) and 601CZC
  • Form  991 – Notification of location of books on computer – Sections 1301 and 1301(4) – inspection of books
  • Form 992 – Notification of change of location of books kept on computer – Sections 1301 and 1301(4) – inspection of books
  • Form 313 – Notification of address in Australia of information relating to financial records kept outside Australia – Section 289(2) – place where records are kept outside the jurisdiction. (See next heading.)

 Cloud computing

In recent years the uptake of cloud computing services by Australian businesses has increased dramatically. One common characteristics of cloud computing is that business books and records are held outside the Australian jurisdiction. Under section 289 of the Corporations Act 2001 “if financial records about particular matters are kept outside the (Australian) jurisdiction, sufficient written information about those matters must be kept in this jurisdiction to enable true and fair financial statements to be prepared (and) the company must give ASIC written notice in the prescribed form of the place where the information is kept”.

The proposed removal of Form 313 shows that this requirement is to be abolished.

Simplification and consolidation

Two form used in corporate insolvency administration are marked for simplification:

  • Form 529 Notice of meeting: Creditors to consider voluntary winding up
    Form 905A Notification of ceasing to act as or change of details of a liquidator.

Ideas and Comments

cut red tape

ASIC is seeking ideas and/or comments to be submitted to it by 18 June 2014.  These are to be sent to:

Ashly Hope, Strategic Policy Advisor
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
GPO Box 9827 Melbourne VIC 3001
Email: deregulation@asic.gov.au

 Sources and links:

ASIC Media Report 14-099MR “ASIC reports on red tape reduction and invites feedback”, 7 May 2014

Report 391 ASIC’s deregulatory initiatives published 7 May 2014.  ASIC says: “This report provides an overview of ASIC’s commitment to reduce compliance costs for our regulated population, including ongoing work and new initiatives.  It should be read by all businesses and individuals who are required to comply with laws and regulations administered by ASIC and those who have an interest in engaging with ASIC on our approach to deregulation.”