New ASIC guide on how to become, and behave as, a registered liquidator

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, External administration, Insolvency practices, Regulation  Comments Off on New ASIC guide on how to become, and behave as, a registered liquidator
Mar 022017
 

Registered Liquidators: Registration, disciplinary actions and insurance requirements.

ASIC Regulatory Guide RG258, Issued: 1 March 2017

Australian Securities and Investments Commission:

This guide is for individuals who are or wish to become registered liquidators under … the Corporations Act 2001 …. This guide explains how to apply for registration as a liquidator, including the requirements that must be met to become a registered liquidator. This guide also explains the renewal of registration process, the disciplinary and other actions a registered liquidator may be subject to and our policy on adequate and appropriate insurance.

CLICK HERE to read or download a copy of ASIC’s Regulatory Guide RG 258.

——————————————————

Contents of RG 258

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Feb 252017
 

Melb Uni
Researchers at Melbourne University have issued their third and final report on investigations into insolvency fraud committed through the use of phoenix companies.

The 162 page report, issued on 24 February 2017, is titled Phoenix Activity: Recommendations On Detection, Disruption And Enforcement.

In the Executive Summary the authors state:

Harmful phoenix activity, left unchecked, has the capacity to undermine Australia’s revenue base and the competitive ‘level playing field’. It is wrong that legitimate business operators, paying taxes, wages and other debts, might be driven out of business by those engaging in harmful phoenix activity. Minimising business distrust caused by harmful phoenix activity can lower the cost of finance and make it more widely available. If less tax revenue is fraudulently avoided, the economy and society as a whole benefit. If fewer employee entitlements are lost as a result of harmful phoenix activity, there is likely to be less reliance on the Fair Entitlements Guarantee, freeing up government resources for other purposes.

What was described in earlier reports as “fraudulent phoenix activity” is described in the final report as “harmful phoenix activity”.

CLICK HERE to read and/or download a copy of the report.

The authors are Professor Helen Anderson, Professor Ian Ramsay, Professor Michelle Welsh and research fellow Mr Jasper Hedges.

Their Phoenix Project (“Phoenix Activity: Regulating Fraudulent Use of the Corporate Form”) “seeks to enhance Australia’s economic stability by determining the best methods of addressing fraudulent use of the corporate form without unduly inhibiting its proper use”. The project was launched in 3 years ago.

Analysis and highlights of the report will be posted here in due course.


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Regulating insolvency practitioners: what ASIC aims to achieve in 2016-17

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, External administrators, Regulation  Comments Off on Regulating insolvency practitioners: what ASIC aims to achieve in 2016-17
Dec 202016
 

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has a business plan to guide its regulation of insolvency practitioners. In 2016-17 two new projects have been added to the ongoing ones. Here is ASIC’s summary of the plan as published recently on its website …

2016-17 ASIC Business Plan Summary by Sector: Insolvency Practitioners

ASIC Key Projects

ASIC Focus

Stakeholder engagement
Communicating with industry and individual firms to reinforce and articulate standards and expectations (ongoing project)
⚬ Communicating with stakeholders (e.g. through media releases, journal articles, ad-hoc bulletins, regular newsletters), including in relation to surveillance outcomes, to reinforce and articulate standards and expectations

⚬ Releasing key communications, such as:
– Annual report on supervision of registered liquidators
– Monthly insolvency statistics
– Annual report on insolvency statistics

⚬ Engaging with stakeholders, including meeting with individual firms and industry bodies (such as the Australian Restructuring, Insolvency and Turnaround Association (ARITA), Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand, CPA Australia, and Australian Financial Security Authority, and other government agencies such as the Australian Taxation Office, Department of Employment and Fair Work Ombudsman

⚬ Participating in and contributing to the Phoenix Taskforce and the Serious Financial Crime Taskforce

Information for registered liquidators and other stakeholders (new project) ⚬ Working closely with industry to further develop guidance and lift standards of conduct

⚬ Reviewing existing ASIC guidance to reflect law reform and improving existing creditor and other stakeholder information published by ASIC

⚬ Reviewing and improving what information registered liquidators currently report to facilitate the assessment and, where appropriate, investigation of reports of alleged misconduct

Registered liquidators’ independence and remuneration (new project) ⚬ Independence (including referral relationships with pre-insolvency advisors) and remuneration (including adequacy of disclosure and reasonableness); anticipated to continue into 2017-18
Surveillance of high-risk registered liquidators (ongoing project) ⚬ Misconduct resulting from conflicts of interest, incompetence and improper gain
Ensuring compliance with statutory lodgements obligations and publication of notices requirements (ongoing project) ⚬ Reviewing registered liquidator outstanding statutory lodgements and publication of notices (including insolvency and external administration related notices) on the ASIC published notices website to identify systemic non-compliance
Lodgement of annual statements (ongoing project) ⚬ Reviewing all annual statements from registered liquidators to detect non-compliance with the requirements to maintain registration, including identification of potential competence concerns
Transactional reviews (ongoing project) ⚬ Undertaking reviews identified through referrals, and responding to identified concerns including:
– inappropriate relationships between registered liquidators and pre-insolvency advisers
– inadequate declarations of relevant relationships and indemnities
– inadequate remuneration disclosure
Investigate and where appropriate take administrative or court action (ongoing project) ⚬ Investigating and taking action against registered liquidator misconduct, as identified through surveillances and referrals
Policy advice
Support development and implementation of key Government law reforms and other initiatives (ongoing project)
⚬ Advising Government on proposed insolvency reforms (including proposed reforms in the Government’s National Innovation and Science Agenda) and implementing the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016, including engaging with Treasury, industry and professional bodies, introducing new guidance and implementing IT and business process changes

⚬ Delivering an enhanced ASIC Form 507 Report as to Affairs (RATA), including stakeholder consultation, to provide better information to facilitate the conduct of external administrations and improve reporting to creditors

⚬ Liaising with Treasury and industry/professional bodies regarding the Government’s proposals/reforms to facilitate corporate restructure (a ‘safe harbour’ and voiding of ipso facto clauses) from the Productivity Commission (in recommendations from its inquiry report into business set-up, transfer and closure) and the Government’s National Innovation and Science Agenda

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Levy on registered liquidators and other “industries” to help fund ASIC

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, External administrators, Regulation  Comments Off on Levy on registered liquidators and other “industries” to help fund ASIC
Dec 022016
 

….(UPDATE to post – 1 April 2017: In an email on 24 March 2017, Adrian Brown, leader of ASIC’s Insolvency Practitioners Team, informed practitioners that following a consultation process ASIC has worked with Treasury “to develop an alternative option for the Minister’s consideration”. The alternative option includes halving the fixed annual levy to $2,500.)….

….(SECOND UPDATE to post – 10 May 2017: The proposed fixed annual levy is now $2500 – SEE MY NEW POST.

A refined proposal for a government levy on registered liquidators – intended to recover costs incurred by the ASIC in regulating them – has been released as part of a Treasury consultation paper titled Proposed Industry Funding Model for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission – November 2016.

treasury consult banner

The proposal in brief

Each registered liquidator would pay a minimum, fixed annual levy of $5,000. On top of that the liquidator would be required to pay an activity-based levy – estimated to be $550 per appointment – for each external administration appointment in the financial year.

External administration appointments includes appointment as a controller, provisional liquidator, liquidator, voluntary administrator or administrator of a deed of company arrangement.

Special rules and adjustments are to apply where registered liquidators are appointed jointly and where an external administration appointment transitions from one type of external administration to another.

The paper states that there are 710 registered liquidators and the levies are aimed at recovering ASIC regulatory costs of $8.5 million.(Supporting attachment to the Government’s Proposals Paper, Table 8)

(More details of the proposal are supplied below, under the heading Extracts from the Consultation paper.)

What the liquidators’ professional association thinks

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) opposes the proposed quantum of the levy. In a statement on its website on 9 November ARITA describes the ASIC user-pays funding model for registered liquidators as “highly controversial”. It says:

“ARITA remains strongly of the view that the quantum per practitioner is excessive in every respect and will cause significant harm to the structure of the profession, regardless of the methodology used” , adding that “the quantum is completely disproportionate to other similar profession’s fees”.

ARITA’s detailed analysis and critique of the proposal will be made in a submission to Treasury, due by December 16.

Passing on cost of the per-appointment part of the levy to clients

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Dec 042015
 

The Senate Economics References Committee has criticised the contempt that some directors show for company laws, the “mild” consequences of non-compliance and the low likelihood that unlawful conduct will be detected.

In its report “Insolvency in the Australian construction industry: I just want to be paid” – published 3 December 2015 – the Senate Committee states:

The committee considers that the estimates of the incidence of illegal phoenix activity detailed in this report suggest that construction industry is being beset by a growing culture among some company directors of disregard for the corporations law. This view is reinforced by the anecdotal evidence received by the committee which indicates that phoenixing is considered by some in the industry as merely the way business is done in order to make a profit.

The committee is particularly concerned at evidence that a culture has developed in sections of the industry in which some company directors consider compliance with the corporations law to be optional, because the consequences of non-compliance are so mild and the likelihood that unlawful conduct will be detected is so low.

This culture is reflected in the number of external administrator reports indicating possible breaches of civil and criminal misconduct by company directors in the construction industry. Over three thousand possible cases of civil misconduct and nearly 250 possible criminal offences under the Corporations Act 2001 were reported in a single year in the construction industry. This is a matter for serious concern. It suggests an industry in which company directors’ contempt for the rule of law is becoming all too common.

[from Executive summary, Phoenixing (page xix) and paragraph 5.100 (page 87)]
Continue reading »

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ASIC winds up more abandoned companies to help employees

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, External administration, Insolvency Statistics  Comments Off on ASIC winds up more abandoned companies to help employees
Oct 262015
 

Some directors of insolvent companies abandon their companies rather than adopt the proper course, which is to put the company through formal liquidation under the Corporations Act.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) recently (21 October 2015) published a list of the latest abandoned companies that it has placed in liquidation under the special powers provided in section 489EA of the Corporations Act 2001. This brings to 60 the total of such company liquidations.

Were it not for special powers given to ASIC, abandonment of a company would cause employees who had not been paid their wages, leave and other entitlements to miss out on the compensation administered through the Australian Government’s Fair Entitlements Guarantee scheme (FEG), because such financial assistance is only available to employees of businesses that have gone into liquidation (or bankruptcy in the case of non-corporate employers). So putting an abandoned company into liquidation gives unpaid employees access to the FEG compensation. Unpaid employees of an abandoned companies can submit a request to ASIC to wind up the company.

The latest group of 10 abandoned companies owed at least 15 employees a total in excess of $429,000 in employee entitlements. They are:

LATEST LIST OF ABANDONED COMPANIES
Source: ASIC Media Release 15-305MR, 21-10-2015

Company Name

State

Adelaide Commercial Furniture Pty Ltd SA
JBKM Ventures Pty Ltd QLD
New Energy Technologies Pty Ltd NSW
Rifam Pty Ltd VIC
Let it Rain Pty Ltd NSW
Focus on Training Pty Ltd VIC
YQ Trading Pty Ltd NSW
Parklane Building Corporation Pty Ltd NSW
Sureline Training Services Pty Ltd WA
Australian Veterinary Hospitals (South Australia) Pty Ltd NSW

Apart from the names of the liquidators appointed, this is the only information supplied by ASIC. (The “corporate veil”, or something like it, seems to require that the identity of the company directors be kept confidential.)

As to the costs per company, ASIC said in January 2013:

“The cost of taking winding-up action is generally estimated to be about $15,000. This figure comprises ASIC’s costs and the liquidator’s remuneration.” (Reg Guide 242)

One can only hope that the liquidators are recovering company assets to pay the liquidation costs, or that the directors are penalised in some way for making taxpayers foot the bill.

The 60 abandoned companies wound up by ASIC since 2013 owed a total of 213 employees more than $2.9 million in entitlements.

END OF POST

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Government contemplates imposing a regulation levy on external administrators

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, External administration, External administrators, Regulation  Comments Off on Government contemplates imposing a regulation levy on external administrators
Aug 312015
 

UPDATE TO THIS POST: In November 2016 the Treasury issued a revised proposal for consultation. See my blog titled “Levy on registered liquidators and other industries to help fund ASIC”.

A Government levy on registered liquidators is included in a draft proposal to adopt an “industry funding” model, or user-pays system, for the Australian Investments and Securities Commission (the ASIC). The levy is intended to recover costs incurred by the ASIC in regulating registered liquidators.

The Consultation Paper, issued on 28 August 2015, estimates that a flat levy on registered liquidators:

“… would equate to around $12,700 per year and some liquidators would potentially pay a high proportional fee relative to their costs of regulation.”

The paper discusses, as another option, the merits of the levy being based on “assets realised”. It states that one point in favour would be that:

“Levying liquidators on the basis of ‘assets realised’ would promote greater harmonisation between bankruptcy and corporate insolvency laws. It would be similar to the asset realisations charge administered by the Australian Financial Security Authority.”

In bankruptcies the liability to pay the asset realisations charge is that of the practitioner, but the amount of charge paid is borne by the estate or administration. This aspect is not discussed in the Consultation Paper. But presumably if the ASIC levy follows the bankruptcy scheme, the levy will be paid from funds held or realised by the company under external administration. Continue reading »

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Jul 312015
 

During the June 2015 hearing in Canberra of the Senate Economics References Committee’s inquiry into “Insolvency in the Australian construction industry”, Mr Dave Noonan, a national secretary in the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU), listed what he thought were the main causes of business failure in the construction industry. In doing so he was drawing largely on figures published by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), which gathers that information from liquidators and other external administrators.

It’s the latest example of these ASIC statistics being quoted as if they were accurate and credible. In the CFMEU’s case, Mr Noonan took delight in agreeing with a Dorothy Dixer from a friend in the Senate (Senator Doug Cameron) that “the CFMEU was not named as one of the major reasons for corporate failure in the construction industry”. The inference was, of course, that the statistics proved that the CFMEU was not a problem for the industry.

What some of those who quote these ASIC statistics may not know is that the categories of causes from which external administrators must choose are predetermined. In other words, in nominating causes of failure external administrators must select from a list of categories created by the ASIC. Also, one of those categories – one which gets a large number of ticks – is labelled merely “Other”.

Furthermore, and curiously, the information given to the ASIC by external administrators appears, on the face of it, to be at odds with the widespread belief amongst the insolvency community, unions and regulators that many business failures, especially in the construction industry, are the result of fraudulent phoenix activity. Which raises the question of whether the number of permitted categories of causes need to be increased, and/or whether the categories need to be modernised, broadened and clarified.

circle-of-confusion

Permitted categories of causes

The ASIC compiles its statistics on the causes of failure from information supplied by external administrators when they fill out their statutory reports online (Form EX01, Schedule B of ASIC Regulatory Guide 16). In filling out these reports – i.e., in nominating the causes of a particular corporate insolvency – external administrators must select from 13 categories of causes, which are shown below in the order established by the ASIC and using its exact words. This list of categories has existed for at least thirteen years. The only change since 2002 has been to alter the name of cause number 13, from  “None of the above” to “Other, please specify”.

Select from these causes of failure

1.  Under capitalisation
2.  Poor financial control, including lack of records
3.  Poor management of accounts receivable
4.  Poor strategic management of business
5.  Inadequate cash flow or high cash use
6.  Poor economic conditions
7.  Natural disaster
8.  Fraud
9.  DOCA (Deed of Company Arrangement) failed
10. Dispute among directors
11. Trading losses
12. Industry restructuring
13. Other, please specify

For those with business savvy, a rough definition of most of these ASIC categories can be deduced from their titles. (Which is just as well, because there is no official explanation.) But some categories – particularly “Fraud” (ASIC cause 8) – are vague and broad, and would benefit from the ASIC stating exactly what they mean.

Numbers for categories of ASIC causes

The ASIC’s latest report on this subject [1.] shows that in 2013-14 the “nominated causes of failure” – for all industry types, not just the construction industry – from highest to lowest, were:

Chart 1
CAUSES OF FAILURE
NUMBER
Inadequate cash flow or high cash use
4,031
Poor strategic management of business
3,975
Trading losses
3,078
Poor financial control including lack of records
2,908
Other
2,726
Poor economic conditions
2,312
Dispute among directors
1,743
Poor management of accounts receivable
1,017
Dispute among directors
271
Industry restructuring
222
Fraud
146
Natural disaster
122
Deed of Company Arrangement failed
55
TOTAL
22,606

Top nominated causes

An external administrator may nominate as many of the prescribed causes as he or she likes. According to the ASIC, external administrators nominated an average of between two and three causes of failure per report in 2013–14. So in its summary the ASIC highlights the top three nominated causes of failure for companies and provides figures on the percentage of reports by external administrator in which these nominated causes appear:

Chart 2
CAUSES OF FAILURE
2013-14
Inadequate cash flow or high cash use (ASIC cause 5)
in 42.6% of reports
Poor strategic management of business (ASIC cause 4)
in 42.0% of reports
Trading losses (ASIC cause 11)
in 32.5% of reports

These top three nominated causes have been the same for the past four years. It appears that “Other” (ASIC cause 13) may be a close fourth.

What is fraudulent phoenix activity?

The following explanation of phoenix activity comes from “Defining and Profiling Phoenix Activity”, a paper published in December 2014 as part of a research project (still going) by Associate Professor Helen Anderson, Professor Ann O’Connell, Professor Ian Ramsay, Associate Professor Michelle Welsh and Hannah Withers of the University of Melbourne Law School and the Monash Business School:  [2.]

“The concept of phoenix activity broadly centres on the idea of a second company, often newly incorporated, arising from the ashes of its failed predecessor where the second company’s controllers and business are essentially the same. It is important to note that phoenix activity can be legal as well as illegal. Legal phoenix activity covers situations where the previous controllers start another similar business when their earlier entity fails in order to rescue its business. Illegal phoenix activity involves similar activities, but the intention is to exploit the corporate form to the detriment of unsecured creditors, including employees and tax authorities.
In a typical phoenix activity scenario, a company in financial difficulties, ‘Oldco’, is placed into liquidation or voluntary administration, or is simply left dormant (and may then be deregistered). Prior to this occurring, Oldco’s assets may be transferred either to a newly incorporated entity, ‘Newco’, or to an existing entity, such as a related company in a corporate group. “

Losses incurred

Estimates of losses incurred by the Taxation Office, employees, the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (FEG) scheme, sub-contractors, trade creditors , etc. as a result of phoenix activity vary, but are in the hundred of millions. On its website the ASIC quotes from figures in a report published by Fair Work Australia in 2012 which put the cost to the Australian economy at potentially more than $3 billion annually. The FWA report, “Phoenix activity: sizing the problem and matching solutions”, estimates that the annual cost of illegal phoenix activity is:

  • up to $655 million for employees, in the form of unpaid wages and other entitlement
  • up to $1.93 billion for businesses, as a result of phoenix companies not paying debts, and for goods and services that have been paid for but not provided, and
  • up to $610 million for government revenue, mainly as a result of unpaid tax – but also due to payments made to employees under the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) now the Fair Entitlement Guarantee (FEG).  [3.]

 

Phoenix perpetrators and phoenix victims

A phoenix transaction carried out by a company normally brings about the end of the company. If the company’s former suppliers or subcontractors cannot survive without the payments they were receiving from the company, they too may have to close down. Hence, where phoenix activity is involved a failed company might be a phoenix perpetrator or a phoenix victim (or perhaps a phoenix perpetrator as a result of being a phoenix victim!).

For simplicity’s sake, this article will focus upon companies/directors that are phoenix perpetrators.

To which category of ASIC causes of failure do phoenixing events belong?

When looking at a failed company an external administrator might conclude that the company is a phoenix perpetrator (or, to describe the event more accurately, that the directors caused the company to carry out a phoenix arrangement). However, the predetermined list of causes which the ASIC has created doesn’t provide a category that is clearly made for such cases, or a category into which such cases might logically fit.

“Fraud” (ASIC cause 8) might be an appropriate category. But if the phoenix activity was “legal” [4.] it may not.

Even if “Fraud” is the cause category into which external administrators should, and do, put fraudulent or illegal phoenix cases, then it appears that the commonly accepted extent of such activity is not being reflected in their reports to the ASIC.  As chart 1. shows, “Fraud” accounts for only 146 out of 22,606 causes.

Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that “Fraud” is regarded by external administrators as referring to dishonesty by employees or outsiders – like the misappropriation of funds, or the abuse of position by employees, or wrongful or criminal deception by outsiders.

In a “legal phoenix” case the external administrator might select the cause category of “Other” (ASIC cause 13). The fact that this cause stands at an appreciable 2,726 out of 22,606 on the latest count (see chart 1.) adds weight to that possibility. But because the “please specify” descriptions that are requested and given in this category are not publicly disclosed by the ASIC (and probably not even analysed), we don’t know what is being included in this undefined, catch-all category.

In a “legal phoenix” case, and even in an “illegal phoenix” case, the external administrator might – for the purpose of reporting causes of failure – disregard the phoenix transaction, preferring the view that the company failed before implementation of the phoenix scheme as a result of other causes, such as “inadequate cash flow or high cash use”, “poor strategic management of business” and/or “poor financial control including lack of records”.

What we don’t know

There is so much we don’t know. For example:

  • We don’t know whether phoenixing is generally regarded by external administrators as a cause of failure of companies.
  • We don’t know how many phoenix cases – legal and illegal – external administrators encounter.
  • We don’t know whether illegally phoenixing is generally regarded by external administrators as either an offence or “misconduct” to be reported to the ASIC.

 

Possible misconduct

The above discussion of causes has drawn on information supplied by external administrators in a particular section of the statutory report form EX01. However, the main reason for this form’s existence is to report, as required by the Corporations Act, possible offences that the external administrator has noticed.

In Schedule B external administrators are asked to advise whether they are reporting “possible misconduct”.  It is possible, therefore, that reports of illegal phoenixing are contained in this main section of their reports.

But if this is so, the ASIC’s analysis of the statutory reports received – published in “Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports” – does not mention it. In fact, the word “phoenix” appears only once in the latest of those published reports, and then only in a passing manner. Perhaps this is to be expected, given that the word “phoenix” does not even appear in Schedules B and D nor in any other part of ASIC Regulatory Guide 16.

It’s possible that the word’s absence from the offences/misconduct section of the Regulatory Guide may be due to the fact that “there is no express ‘phoenix offence’”. [4.] 

However, as “Defining and Profiling Phoenix Activity” explains, acts carried out during conduct of an “illegal phoenix scheme” are likely to be offences under one or more of several sections in the Corporations Act.  Also, the acts are likely to breach provisions of the Tax Assessment Act, the Criminal Code Act and/or the Fair Work Act.  [4.] .

Winding up

At this point we arrive at the same questions presented by the earlier analysis of the causes of failure. Is the phoenix activity observed by “the front-line investigators of insolvent corporations”  [5.]  being officially reported to the ASIC? If it is, how does the ASIC know it is, and how is the ASIC putting that information on the public record and before inquiries and researchers looking into phoenix activity?

Given the high level of interest in, and regulatory action to curb, the illegal phoenixing phenomenon, it is a pity that the store of the valuable knowledge derived from first-hand observations by external administrators is not being properly mined. The ASIC should give serious consideration to amending/expanding the Form EX01, Schedule B of Regulatory Guide 16 with simple changes to:

  •  include a category for corporate failures caused by phoenix schemes; and
  • include a question in the misconduct section asking whether the company was involved in a phoenix scheme.

FOOTNOTES:

  1. Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports 1 July 2013-30 June 2014: Report 412, 29 September 2014
  2. http://law.unimelb.edu.au/cclsr/centre-activities/research/major-research-projects/regulating-fraudulent-phoenix-activity
  3. http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/small-business/compliance-for-small-business/small-business-illegal-phoenix-activity/
  4. “Defining and Profiling Phoenix Activity”, December 2014, Associate Professor Helen Anderson and others.
  5. The ASIC often refers to external administrators as “the front-line investigators of insolvent corporations”. See for example, “Regulatory Guide 16: External administrations: Reporting and lodging”, para. R16.4

Previous posts on this blog regarding this inquiry:

 

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