Apr 272015
 

{UPDATE 10/12/2015: The ATO lost in the High Court case. See my post of 10/12/2015.}

On 17 April 2015 the High Court granted special leave for the Australian Taxation Office to appeal the decision by the Full Federal Court in the Australian Building Systems case.

Previously … The liquidators of Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd disposed of company property for a capital gain. The Commissioner of Taxation claimed that the liquidators were required to retain funds from the sale proceeds to pay tax arising from the gain. The Federal Court (21/2/2014) and the Full Federal Court (8/10/2014) rejected the Commissioner’s position, holding that the payment and retention obligations in s 254 of the Income Tax Assessment Act arose only when a notice of assessment was issued by the Commissioner.

Commenting on the High Court’s grant of leave to appeal against those decisions of the Federal Court, David Pratley of Minter Ellison, Lawyers, says:

“Regrettably, the tax obligations of insolvency practitioners will continue to be uncertain for some time. It will likely be at least 12 months before the High Court hands down its decision on the appeal. If the appeal is allowed it would generally have retrospective application. Hence practitioners that rely on the Full Federal Court decision in releasing funds could be exposed to the risk of personal liability.”

Extracts from the transcript of the application for special leave

Below are extracts I have made from the High Court transcript number [2015] HCATrans 082.  CLICK HERE to see full transcript.  The application for special leave to appeal was before KIEFEL J and KEANE J. The full name of the case is : Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd  (In Liquidation); Commissioner of Taxation v Ginette Dawn Muller and Joanne Emily Dunn as Liquidators of Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2015] HCATrans 82 (17 April 2015)
_________________________________________________________

MR J T GLEESON, SC (representing the Commissioner of Taxation):

…. So, in practical terms, a commissioner contends that if the liquidator sells a block of land on a certain date in the year for, let us say, a $10 million gain, the section requires the liquidator as a trustee to ensure that sufficient moneys remain in his or her hands to meet the tax when it is assessed at some future point. The obligation cuts in because the gain has been derived and it has its particular force at the time the liquidator is contemplating paying away money from the fund. So, in the example I have given, assuming they were the only facts known to the liquidator and the corporate tax rate was 30 per cent, the liquidator before making distributions to creditors or contributories would always make sure $3 million remained in the bank to pay the tax.

KIEFEL J: Do you say the obligation arises upon the receipt on each occasion of income or each transaction by which profit or gain is – – –

MR GLEESON: Yes, it arises because the derivation under paragraph (a), which is treated as being a derivation by the trustee or agent, and he thereby is bound under the obligation for the very good purpose that the whole point is so that the money remains there rather than the liquidator pay it away and then, when an assessment is later issued, the Commissioner would have to try and chase the creditors or the contributories.

….

KIEFEL J: What do you say – I think you have dealt with this in your reply – to the respondents’ argument that your construction leads to difficult results about how the liquidator has to estimate exact amounts?

MR GLEESON: It may or may not require attention by the liquidator to those questions. If it does, that does not call for any different construction, because the point of being a liquidator or a trustee or an agent, by taking on that responsibility the Act has placed upon you the duty to sufficiently inform yourself of the circumstances of the trust estate or the principal’s affairs with which you are acting in a representative capacity.

What the liquidator does – I have given a simple example where the liquidator says, “I must keep $3 million back from the creditors”, and if later on in the year there are further transactions on the tax account which the liquidator has information which might adjust the amount that he or she needs to keep, he or she makes an adjustment. But the critical thing is, the purpose of it is, do not pay away the money which needs to be there to make sure the Commissioner can recover the tax. By taking on the duty of trustee or agent you take on a statutory responsibility to ensure that is done. May it please the Court.

__________________________________________________

MR S DOYLE, QC (representing the liquidators of Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd Acn 094 238 678 (In Liquidation)):

….

The respondent’s contention is “due” there means payable and our learned friend’s contention is that it means “owing” and it turns therefore on the question of whether there need be or need not be an assessment.

The construction for which the respondent contends, we would submit, is plainly right. It is required by the language of 254(1)(d), which speaks of a sum which is due but, more importantly, of a sum which will become due, not as the case against us requires that it be understood as if it might become due because our learned friend’s capital gain tax case is a good example upon the sale for a capital gain one can postulate that tax might become due, one cannot say that tax will become due without having regard to the totality of the affairs of the principal, the underlying taxpayer.

Additionally, the construction for which we contend gives defined content to the obligation to retain sufficient to pay because it is only when there is an assessment that one can know what that figure is. Our learned friend says against us that a liquidator has an obligation to understand the affairs of the company or a trustee has an obligation to understand the estate assets. This is not a question of diligence. This is a question of certainty. There is a defined obligation which requires one to be able to say, what is the sum sufficient to pay for the tax? The construction for which the respondent contends – which was favoured below – permits that to occur; the opposite construction does not.

KIEFEL J: Are you saying that the liquidator should only be required to be in a position to understand the overall obligations to pay tax on behalf of the company for the whole year rather than it being considered on a transactional basis?

MR DOYLE: It can only be when there is an assessment made. Assuming there are other affairs of the company within that period, it is only when there is an assessment issue that one can say that there is tax which will become due and that gives definition to the content of the obligation to retain a sum sufficient to pay it. It also gives content to – I hope I have answered your Honour’s question.

….

MR DOYLE:

…. To answer your Honour Justice Keane’s question, it is right to say the liquidator conducts the affairs of the company and has the obligation to put the tax return in. But our learned friend’s contention is the content of the obligation to withhold the money from the principal and to retain it under relevantly (d) and (e) arises long before that is done – arises at the moment of each receipt as it was put to you. That requires one to be able to say, the statute imposes a definable obligation on someone to withhold – as is the case here – a sum sufficient to pay the tax due upon a sale which gives rise to a capital gain in circumstances where there is no sum which can be defined as the tax due, or will become due, because of the other uncertainties which will influence the amount, if any, of tax which will become due.

That is, in our submission, the real difficulty with the case which is put by the applicant. It requires you to be able to say that when a liquidator makes a sale at a capital gain, he is obliged to do something to retain that money – that is, obliged by the Tax Act – forgetting his obligations as a liquidator – obliged by the Tax Act to do something with that money in circumstances where it is not possible to say how much. It is not possible to say there will, in fact, be tax due because subsequent events may mean there is no tax due.

….

KIEFEL J: Yes, there will be a grant of special leave in this matter. The Court notes the Commission is undertaking to pay the respondent’s costs, regardless of the outcome in this matter. The parties should obtain a copy of the directions for the filing of submissions with respect to this matter and, of course, to adhere strictly to the timetable there set out. Time estimate? No more than a day? ….

_____________________________________________________

Links to previous post about tax on this blog site:

“Post-appointment income tax debts of liquidator” – 10 October 2010
“Taxing capital gains made during liquidation” – 15 October 2010
“Legal opinion warns external administrators about personal liability for company taxes” – 16 November 2010
“Decision only partly resolves tax puzzle for liquidators” – 7 March 2014
“ATO appeals against decision in Australian Building Sysytems case” – 19 March 2014
“Tax Office loses to liquidators in test case regarding tax obligations” – 10 October 2014

 

Insolvency law in United Kingdom to help external administrators obtain essential supplies

 Corporate Insolvency, External administration, Insolvency Law  Comments Off on Insolvency law in United Kingdom to help external administrators obtain essential supplies
Feb 102015
 

In the UK on 9 February 2015 the government issued the following statement by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Employment Relations and Consumer Affairs (Business Minister, Jo Swinson) :

Rescuing struggling but viable businesses out of formal insolvency helps save jobs and improves the prospect of creditors recovering some of what they are owed. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 introduced new powers to help insolvency practitioners secure essential IT and utility supplies to keep a business going whilst it is being rescued.

I have today laid an Order to ensure that insolvency practitioners can retain the essential supplies they need to save viable businesses. There will be an impact on suppliers in the IT and utility sectors but I believe that by providing strong safeguards to ensure the supplier can have  confidence they will be paid, we will ensure that the benefits of this measure far outweigh the
costs. In particular:

1. The supplier will be able to seek a personal guarantee from the insolvency practitioner at any time to give them more certainty that the supplies will be paid for.
2. The supplier will be able to apply to court to terminate their contract on the grounds of
‘ hardship’.
3. Guidance will be issued to insolvency practitioners to urge them to make contact with essential suppliers at the earliest possible time following their appointment to discuss their needs in relation to supply, to ensure that undue costs are not incurred.

The Government’s aim remains to ensure that a balance is struck between ensuring the rescue of viable businesses against the obligations placed on those suppliers that will be impacted by the Order. The proposed changes will have effect in relation to contracts made after 1 October 2015.

The Government consulted on how those new powers should be exercised and whether the safeguards proposed were adequate to ensure that those essential suppliers bound to supply an insolvent business would be paid. A total of 31 responses were received and I am very grateful for the time those respondents took to provide constructive feedback to the consultation. Almost all respondents expressed their support for the aims of the proposals with some suggesting ways to make the safeguards more effective. The draft Order was amended in the light of comments received.

Source: House of Commons: Written Statement (HCWS265)

Press Release: Insolvency Service Essential supplies to be guaranteed during business rescue

The Insolvency Service: Summary of Responses: Consultation on the Continuity of Essential Supplies.

Jan 142015
 

UPDATED 16/1/2015

Despite directors receiving official admonishments, detailed instructions and threats about the practice of allowing a company to trade whilst insolvent (see, for example, ASIC Regulatory Guide 217), the curse of insolvent trading seems to be growing.

So, in an attempt to reel it in – or perhaps (for the cynical) to reduce the number of reported cases – the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is putting the onus on liquidators to provide “better” information in their statutory reports.

Background

Where liquidators of insolvent companies become aware that a past or present director or other officer of a company may have committed an offence, they are required to make a formal report to ASIC. Several years ago ASIC came up with a form and guidelines spelling out the information it wanted from liquidators before it would take their allegations of offences any further. This change came with the introduction of an electronic means of lodging reports, but also occurred after ASIC had become fed-up with receiving offence reports considered by its investigators to be almost worthless.

The latest version of this offence report form was released on 18 December 2014. The changes that have been drawn to the attention of liquidators by ASIC concern allegations of insolvent trading. The previous version of the form (July 2008) asked little of liquidators regarding this subject: about all it wanted was a “Yes” or “No” on the availability of documentary evidence. But the new version requires far more.

In the insolvency profession the ASIC form is known as EX01. More technically it is Schedule B of Regulatory Guide 16: Report to ASIC under s422, s438D or s533 of the Corporations Act 2001 or for statistical purposes. (Note: This reporting requirement applies not only to liquidators but also to receivers or managing controllers and voluntary administrators. However for simplicity all these classes of external administrators are referred to collectively in this article as liquidators.)

ex01-embossed

Possible Misconduct – EX01

In EX01 reporting of “insolvent trading” is carried out in the section headed Possible Misconduct.

Here, ASIC asks the liquidator “Are you reporting possible misconduct?”

If the answer is “Yes”, the liquidator is invited to examine Schedule D of ASIC Regulatory Guide 16 to learn “what is likely to constitute a breach of the relevant section, and the evidence needed to prove such a breach”. Schedule D contains over 6,500 words.

There is also a warning “that ASIC may ask you to provide a supplementary report addressing in detail the possible misconduct reported and we may later require further evidence or statements from you for Court purposes”. A description of what is required in the ASIC supplementary report is set out in Schedule C: Supplementary report by receiver or managing controller under s422(2), by voluntary administrator under s438D(2), or by liquidator under s533(2). Schedule C contains about 3,000 words. Liquidators of “assetless companies” are eligible under Regulatory Guide 109 to apply for funding from ASIC for reasonable remuneration and costs in preparing a supplementary report (ASIC form EX03).

If, after considering what is involved in answering “Yes”, the liquidator still thinks the misconduct is worth reporting, or filing a complaint, he or she is directed to the section headed “Criminal Offences”.

Possible Misconduct – Criminal Offences – Insolvent Trading – EX01

Preliminary details of an allegation of insolvent trading – an offence under section 588G(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 – are sought by ASIC in the usual tick-the-box manner.

First the liquidator reports the alleged offence by ticking “Yes” to the following statement:

“In your opinion, one or more directors failed to prevent the company incurring a debt or debts at a time when the director suspected that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result, and the failure to prevent the company incurring the debt(s) was dishonest.”

Having ticked that box, the liquidator is asked “Do you have documentary evidence or other to support your opinion?” and “Are you aware of documentary evidence in the possession of another person that supports this allegation?”

Up to this section the revised form is practically the same as the previous version.

But in the new version, if the liquidator reports a case of insolvent trading and has, or knows of, documentary evidence supporting this conclusion, the liquidator must provide more information by answering several extra questions.

These extra questions concern the period of insolvency, the methods and records used to determine the date of insolvency, the amount of debts incurred, and the reasonable grounds for the director had to suspect insolvency. (The actual questions are set out verbatim below, but the heading are mine.) They are the type of questions that a liquidator, especially one with sufficient funds, ought to consider as a matter of course before reaching an opinion regarding the existence (or non-existence) of insolvent trading.

Effects of changes to insolvent trading sections of EX01

Prior to the recent changes, if ASIC saw a completed EX01 form in which the liquidator had alleged a breach of the insolvent trading laws, and had also answered “yes” to questions about the possession or existence of documentary evidence “or other” to support that opinion, ASIC would have then needed to consider whether to investigate. Its task would likely have entailed obtaining, or trying to obtain, from the liquidator the extra information that is now set out in the latest version of EX01. So, as far as the extra demands in the form are concerned, ASIC would probably argue that liquidators are no greater imposed upon now than they were before.

But regardless of the information ASIC has or could readily obtain, it often decides not to investigate complaints of alleged offences. For many years this inaction has deeply frustrated a lot of liquidators. Many feel that completing an EX01 form is a waste of their time and also, where there are still funds in the insolvent company, a waste of creditors’ money. Unless the revised EX01 results in greater tangible action by ASIC (increased investigations and prosecutions and not just more detailed statistics), making the form more demanding will aggravate these feelings.

It might even see an increase in the non-reporting of insolvent trading offences (see the new question “Reasons for not reporting insolvent trading”), or in “no” being the liquidator’s response when it really should be “yes”.


Extra questions about insolvent trading – new EX01

Period insolvency commenced

Indicate the period, which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts as and when they became due and payable:

◻ At appointment ◻ 1 – 3 months prior to appointment ◻ 4 – 9 months prior to appointment ◻ 10 – 15 months prior to appointment ◻ 16 – 24 months prior to appointment ◻ Over 2 years prior to appointment

Method/s of determining date of insolvency

How did you determine the date on which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts as and when they became due and payable? (tick one or more):

◻ Cash flow analysis ◻ Trading history analysis ◻ Balance sheet analysis ◻ Informed by director(s) ◻Other, please specify __________________

Records used to determine date of insolvency

Which of the following records, in your possession, did you use to determine the date on which, in your opinion, the company became unable to pay all its debts? (tick one or more):

◻ Cash flow (actual / forecasts / budgets) ◻ Banking records ◻ Aged debtors’ list ◻ Aged creditors’ list ◻ Profit & loss statements ◻ Balance sheets ◻ Other, please specify _______________

Grounds for director to suspect insolvency

If you believe the director had reasonable grounds to suspect the company was insolvent or would become insolvent by incurring the debt (or a reasonable person in a like position would have reason to suspect), please identify on which of the following indicators of insolvency you have based your belief (tick one or more):

◻ Financial statements that disclose a history of serious shortage of working capital, unprofitable trading ◻ Poor or deteriorating cash flow or evidence of dishonoured payments ◻ Difficulties paying debts when they fell due (e.g. evidenced by letters of demand, recovery proceedings, increasing age of accounts payable) ◻ Non-payment of statutory debts (e.g. PAYGW, SGC, GST) ◻ Poor or deteriorating working capital ◻ Increasing difficulties collecting debts ◻ Overdraft and/or other finance facilities at their limit ◻ Evidence of creditors attempting to obtain payment of outstanding debts ◻ Other, please specify ________________

Approximate debt after insolvency

Estimate the approximate amount of debts incurred after the date (in your opinion) of insolvency:

◻ $0 – $250,000 ◻ $250,001 – less than $1 million ◻ $1 million to $5 million ◻ Over $5 million ◻ Unable to determine

Aged list of creditors

Do you have an aged creditors’ list as at (tick one or more):

◻ Date of insolvency ◻ Date of appointment

Dishonesty by director

If the director/directors was dishonest in failing to prevent the company from incurring the debt, indicate what evidence you have available to support this (tick one or more):

◻ Evidence showing that the director/directors had an opportunity to prevent the company from incurring the debt and did not. Such evidence could include: • documents evidencing discussions with the directors, employees and creditors concerning the circumstances surrounding the incurring of particular debts; • correspondence or other documents relating to the circumstances surrounding the incurring of the debt. ◻ Evidence showing that the failure was dishonest (i.e., the director/directors incurred the debt with the knowledge that it would produce adverse consequences, the failure was intentional, wilful or deliberate, and it included an element of deceit or fraud). Such evidence could include: • documents evidencing discussions with the directors, employees and creditors concerning the circumstances surrounding the incurring of particular debts; • correspondence or other documents relating to the circumstances surrounding the incurring of the debt.

Reasons for not reporting insolvent trading

If you did not report insolvent trading (s588(1)-(2) or s588(3)), was it because, in your opinion:

◻ The books and records are insufficient to establish insolvent trading ◻ The company did not incur debts at a time when it was unable to pay its debts (e.g., it ceased to trade) ◻ The directors had reasons to expect the company could pay its debts as they fell due and payable (eg. they obtained independent advice) ◻ Other, please specify ________________

Whether creditor/s are seeking compensation for insolvent trading

Has a creditor commenced, or indicated that they intend to commence, action to recover compensation for loss resulting from insolvent trading?

◻ Yes ◻ No

Possible Misconduct – Breaches of civil obligations – Insolvent Trading – EX01

Insolvent trading may also be a breach of civil penalty sections 588G(1)-(2) of the Act. The revised form EX01 also seeks details of allegations of this nature, by asking about the period of insolvency, the methods and records used to determine the date of insolvency, the amount of debts incurred, and the reasonable grounds for the director had to suspect insolvency. The questions are practically the same as those asked when a criminal offence is alleged (see above). In the previous version of EX01 only three brief questions were posed, which concerned the availability of evidence and the perceived legitimacy of a director’s defence.

Corporate insolvency laws: the shape of things to come

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Law reform proposals, Regulation, Standards  Comments Off on Corporate insolvency laws: the shape of things to come
Nov 282014
 

The exposure draft of Australia’s Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014  has, in its 240 pages dealing with corporate insolvency,  so many proposed changes in the form of amended, repealed, omitted, added and substituted words, items, definitions and sections, and so many additional parts, divisions, subdivisions, schedules and transitional provisions, that only an expert with tremendous devotion to the task would be able to understand what it all means and see what the new law governing corporate insolvencies is going to look like. The rest of us will probably have to wait until this Bill is passed and a compilation of the Corporations Act 2001 that takes into account all these changes is prepared.

Even then it appears we’ll see quite a mishmash of insolvency laws scattered throughout the Corporations Act and its Rules and Regulations. Perhaps our corporate insolvency laws need a real clean up, like gathering all existing provisions together and moving the lot (with amendments and additions) out of the Corporations Act and into a new, specific Act, such as a Corporate Insolvency Act. But that’s a discussion for another day.

However, one of the changes proposed by the Insolvency Law Reform Bill will take us a little in this direction. Several rules that are currently scattered throughout the Corporations Act will be encompassed in a new Division 4 – which is to be called the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations).  It will be added to Part 5.9 (Miscellaneous) of Chapter 5 (External Administration) of the Corporations Act 2001. The table below shows the layout of this new Division and points to the pages of the Bill’s Exposure Draft where the text of the laws is set out. I hope it’s of some help to those trying to understand the proposed changes.

 

Division 4—Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations)

Part

Division

Exposure Draft – pages

1-Introduction 1-Introduction 151 to 152
5-Definitions 153 to 158
2-Registering and disciplining practitioners 10-Introduction 158 to 159
15-Register of liquidators 159 to 160
20-Registering liquidators 160 to 168
25-Insurance 169
30-Annual liquidator returns 170
35-Notice requirements 171 to 172
40-Disciplinary and other action 172 to 189
45-Court oversight of registered liquidators 189 to 190
50-Committees under this Part 190 to 195
3-General rules relating to external administrations 55-Introduction 195
60-Remuneration and other benefits received by external administrators 196 to 208
65-Funds handling 208 to 215
70-Information 216 to 234
75-Meetings 235 to 244
80-Committees of inspection 244 to 256
85-Directions by creditors 256 to 257
90-Review of the external administration of a company 257 to 269
4-Other matters 95-Introduction 270
100-Other matters 270 to 271
105-The Insolvency Practice Rules *** 271 to 272. (Note: To be made by the Minister.)

*** The Bill’s Exposure Draft mentions  the Insolvency Practice Rules many times, stating how and where they may be used to clarify, interpret, amplify, refine and flesh out the insolvency laws. A separate document – a 27 page Proposals Paper for Insolvency Practice Rules – has been released for comment (closing date 19/12/2014). The part of the Paper that applies to Corporate Insolvency is pages 16 to 27.

Note:  There is an official Explanatory Material to the exposure draft of the Bill. It is 228 pages long, but only 115 pages concern  changes to corporate insolvency laws!

________________________ END OF POST ____________________________

2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Personal Bankruptcy, Regulation  Comments Off on 2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws
Nov 172014
 

On 7 November 2014  an exposure draft of the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (ILRB 2014) was released by the Australian Treasury for comment.

The Treasury Crest

Summaries:

The Treasury’s summary/promotion of the legislation is as follows:

“The draft Bill comprises a package of proposals to amend and streamline the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and the Corporations Act 2001. The proposed amendments will:

•remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
•enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
•promote market competition on price and quality;
•boost confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners; and
•remove unnecessary costs from the insolvency industry resulting in around $55.4 million per annum in compliance cost savings.”

The Explanatory Material issued with the Bill opens with this outline:

“The Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (Bill) amends the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Bankruptcy Act) to create common rules that would:
• remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
• align and modernise the registration and disciplinary frameworks that apply to registered liquidators and registered trustees;
• align and modernise a range of specific rules relating to the handling of personal bankruptcies and corporate external administrations;
• enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
• promote market competition on price and quality;
• improve the powers available to the corporate regulator to regulate the corporate insolvency market and the ability for both regulators to communicate in relation to insolvency practitioners operating in both the personal and corporate insolvency markets; and
• improve overall confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners.”

 Links to government material:

The draft Bill (ILRB 2014) in PDF format

The Explanatory Material in PDF format

The Insolvency Practice Rules – Proposals Paper in PDF format

Coversheet for a submission by post

The Treasury website page

Previous Bill and background material:

The first version of ILRB 2014 appeared on 19/12/2012 as Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2012, but it never became law. However, the 2012 Explanatory Memorandum and  the 2012 Exposure Draft  contains valuable background information related to the current Bill. (Sixteen submissions were made for this 2012 consultation.)

Further background information regarding ILRB 2014 is available in the June 2011 Treasury Options Paper titled “A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia”. (Thirty three submissions were made for this consultation.)

The 2011 options paper was followed in December 2011 by a Proposals Paper with the same title. (Twenty nine submissions were made for this consultation.)

Submissions regarding ILRB 2014:

Closing date for submissions: Friday, 19 December 2014.

Email submissions are to be done online at:

http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/Submission-Form?parent={34029467-07BE-46D9-AA9E-86DAC3715DFF}

Address for written submissions:

Manager
Corporations and Scheme Unit
Financial System and Services Division
The Treasury
Langton Crescent
PARKES ACT 2600

 For enquiries call Peter Levy at The Treasury on (02) 6263 3976.

Further posts on this site:

Further posts will be made on this blog site in the coming days with details of some of the proposed changes to corporate insolvency laws.

 


 

ASIC publishes an overview of statistics and offences reported by liquidators

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Statistics, Offences, Regulation  Comments Off on ASIC publishes an overview of statistics and offences reported by liquidators
Sep 302014
 

In the 2013–14 financial year, 7,218 reports alleging misconduct were lodged with ASIC by external administrators.

That’s one statistic contained in “Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports (July 2013 to June 2014)”, a report by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The report (Report 412) is the latest data from ASIC on liquidations and other forms of external administrations.

ASIC Media Release

The following is from ASIC’s media release of 29 September 2014:

Report 412 Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports (July 2013 to June 2014) (REP 412) is ASIC’s sixth report and provides information on the nature of corporate insolvencies, supplementing the monthly and quarterly statistics that ASIC publishes on its website.

The report summarises information from 10,073 reports received during the 2013–14 financial year and includes ASIC’s response to reports of alleged misconduct from external administrators.

Commissioner John Price acknowledged the work of external administrators in carrying out their investigations and reporting to ASIC.

‘External administrators’ reports are a critical source of intelligence for ASIC. In addition to providing more detailed qualitative data, the information obtained from reports helps ASIC focus its regulatory efforts. It also helps us assess whether enforcement action is warranted, or if a director banning action should be pursued.

‘We encourage external administrators to provide these reports and any allegations of misconduct in a timely manner to assist in our supervision of insolvency and corporate governance issues,’ Mr Price said.

Profile of insolvent companies

REP 412 includes information about the profile of companies placed into external administration, including:
•industry types
•employee numbers
•causes of company failure
•estimated number and value of a company’s unsecured creditor debts, and
•estimated dividends to unsecured creditors.

Table 1 summarises key data from the report.

REP 412 shows small to medium size corporate insolvencies again dominated external administrators’ reports. Of note, 86% had assets of $100,000 or less, 81% had less than 20 employees and 43% had liabilities of $250,000 (or less).

97% of creditors in this group received between 0–11 cents in the dollar, reflecting the asset/liability profile of small to medium size corporate insolvencies.

Allegations of misconduct

REP 412 details how often external administrators report alleged misconduct by company officers and the types of alleged misconduct most frequently reported.

In the 2013–14 financial year, 7,218 reports alleging misconduct were lodged with ASIC by external administrators.

ASIC asked external administrators to prepare 802 supplementary reports where external administrators alleged company officer misconduct. This accounted for 11.1% of all reports, which alleged misconduct, lodged in the financial year.

Supplementary reports are typically detailed, free-format reports, which set out the results of the external administrator’s inquiries and the evidence they have to support alleged offences. Generally, ASIC can determine whether to commence a formal investigation on the basis of a supplementary report. While only a portion of the offences reported may result in a formal investigation or surveillance, ASIC uses the information for broader intelligence and targeting purposes.
In both the 2012–13 and 2013–14 financial years, after assessment, ASIC referred 25% and 19% of these cases respectively for investigation or surveillance.

ASIC considers a range of factors when deciding to investigate and take enforcement action and this is detailed in Information Sheet 151 ASIC’s approach to enforcement (INFO 151).

Future improvements: Reporting of alleged insolvent trading and other offences

To assist external administrators in their reporting obligations, ASIC anticipates releasing an amended report template for external administrators (Form EX01) in early-2015.

The amendments aim to capture more accurate information on alleged insolvent trading offences which might provide greater insight into the extent of insolvent trading and enable ASIC to focus our resources on matters that warrant further investigation.

The revised form is a further ASIC initiative to collect better information on corporate insolvencies in Australia. It complements recent enhancements to other forms to capture data in electronic format such as:
•industry statistics for external administration appointments from Form 505 (notice of appointment)
•key information from deeds of company arrangement from an enhanced Form 5047, and
•key financial data from Form 524 (presentation of accounts and statement).

ASIC expects to continue our work with industry to improve reporting including on other offences, such as alleged breaches of director duties.

The full Report 412 is available for download in PDF format from ASIC.

Jul 172014
 

Is there evidence that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail and, if so, what could be done to address this?

This is the question being asked about external administrations in the Interim Report of the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) (July 2014). The FSI says it would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the following policy options or other alternatives:

  • No change to current arrangements.
  • Implement the 2012 proposals to reduce the complexity and cost of external administration for SMEs. [See below for details of these proposals.]

The brief section of the FSI’s report dealing with external administration may be viewed HERE.  (The full report in pdf format is available HERE.)

David Murray

David Murray, FSI chairman. Artwork from bluenotes.anz.com

US Chapter 11 regime?

Adoption by Australia of a US Chapter 11 style form of external administration could still be an option, although the FSI has already given it the thumbs down, as this extract from its interim report shows:

“The Inquiry considers adopting such a regime would be costly and could leave control in the hands of those who are often the cause of a company’s financial distress. Capital would be maintained in a business that is likely to fail, which would restrict or defer the capital from being channelled to more viable and productive enterprises. Adopting such a regime would also create more uncertainty for creditors by limiting their rights. The Inquiry notes that Chapter 11 has rarely enabled businesses to continue as going concerns in the long term. There is little empirical evidence that Australia’s voluntary administration process is causing otherwise viable businesses to fail. The Inquiry would like stakeholders to provide any empirical evidence that supports that view.”

Second round of submissions to FSI

Submissions in response to the Interim Report are due by 26 August 2014. Submissions can be lodged online using the Financial System Inquiry special facility,  or may be lodged by email or post: fsi@fsi.gov.au or Financial System Inquiry,  GPO Box 89,  Sydney NSW 2001.

Insolvency reform proposals of 2012

The 2012 insolvency reform proposals to which the FSI specifically refers in its request for second round submissions concern:

  1. Registration and discipline of insolvency practitioners (See note 1 at end of post for more information).
  2. Specific rules relating to external administrations (note 2).
  3. Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments (note 3).

The Explanatory Material issued with the Insolvency Law Reform Bill  on 19 December 2012 can be viewed HERE.

“Thought leadership”

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) (previously known as the Insolvency Practitioners Association) says it has embarked on “a major project to drive thought leadership around our insolvency regime”.  It is asking insolvency practitioners who want to make a submission to FSI to work with the professional association:

“ARITA has embarked on a major project to drive thought leadership around our insolvency regime.  Along with some of ARITA’s excellent previous work, significant new work has already been completed and ARITA members will soon be asked for comment on key aspects of our policy positions. This work is, obviously, well timed to support the FSI request for submissions. ARITA will actively work to represent the views of its membership and the profession to the FSI. We would urge all members and their firms to work with ARITA on providing strong and consistent representation to the FSI. If you or your firm is looking at making its own submission, please let ARITA know so that we can collaborate with you.”  ARITA Press Release 15/7/2014



NOTES re Proposals in December 2012 Insolvency Reform Bill:

Note 1: Registration and discipline of insolvency practitioners

Common rules regarding:   the physical registers of insolvency practitioners;  registration and disciplinary Committees.

Note 2: Specific rules relating to external administrations

Common rules regarding: •

  • Remuneration and other benefits received by the insolvency  practitioner;
  • The handling of administration or estate funds;
  • The provision of information by insolvency practitioners during an external administration or bankruptcy;
  • The meetings of creditors during an external administration or bankruptcy;
  • Committee of inspection formed as part of an external administration or bankruptcy; and
  • The external review of the administration of an estate or insolvency.

Note 3, part (a): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

Provide ASIC with further powers to assist it in its oversight of the regulation of registered liquidators. In particular, the Bill amends the ASIC Act to:

  • enable ASIC to require the provision of information and books as part of an ASIC proactive surveillance program;
  • enable ASIC to provide administration information to a person with a material interest in the information; and
  • improve the transparency of ASIC oversight of the corporate insolvency industry.

Note 3, part (b): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

Amend the Bankruptcy Act to enable ITSA to provide information relevant to the administration of the corporate law to ASIC.

Note 3, part (c): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

A range of miscellaneous amendments, including:

  • amending the Acts to strengthen the penalties for breach of a bankrupt’s or directors’ obligations to provide a report as to affairs (RATA), or the books of the company, to an insolvency practitioner;
  • amend the Corporations Act to provide a process for the automatic disqualification of directors that have failed to provide a RATA, or the books of the company, to a registered liquidator until they have complied with those obligations; and
  • amend the Acts to enable the assignment of an insolvency practitioner’s statutory rights of actions.

Jun 272014
 

Recommendation 17 of the Senate Economics References Committee final report (26/6/2014) on the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is:

“… that  ASIC,  in  collaboration  with  the Australian  Restructuring  Insolvency  and  Turnaround  Association  and accounting  bodies,  develop  a  self-rating  system,  or  similar  mechanism,  for statutory  reports  lodged  by  insolvency  practitioners  and  auditors  under  the Corporations  Act  2001  to  assist  ASIC  identify  reports  that  require  the  most urgent attention and investigation.” (Page 244, para. 15.66)

Source: Final report of Senate Economics References Committee on Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 26/6/2014 

Committee’s comments preceding this recommendation

Before making recommendation 17 the Senate Committee’s Report looks at “Reports from industry professionals”  including external administrators. It states as follows (note: I’ve removed its footnotes):

 

External administrators

15.55  The  Corporations  Act  also  places an obligation on liquidators, receivers and voluntary  administrators  (external  administrators)  to  report  suspected  breaches  of the  Corporations  Act  to  ASIC….

15.56  Reports  made  pursuant  to  these  sections  are  referred  to  as  statutory  reports and  are  an  important  source  of  information  about  possible  breaches  of  the  law….

15.57  Liquidators  also  have  the  discretion  to  lodge  further  reports  if,  in  their opinion, it is desirable to draw the matter to ASIC’s attention.

15.58  In 2012–13, external administrators lodged 9,788 reports with ASIC. Of this number,  initial  external  administrators  accounted  for  95  per  cent  or  9,254  reports. ASIC recorded  that 81 per cent of the initial reports  involved  companies with fewer than  20  employees.  The  construction  industry  was  subject  to  the  highest  number  of reports  accounting  for  just  over  24  per  cent.  Of  the  initial  external  administrators’ reports, receivers lodged one per cent under section 422; administrators lodged 3.8 per cent under section 438D; and 95 per cent of the reports were submitted by liquidators under section 533.

15.59  Importantly,  external  administrators  alleged  misconduct  in  more  than two-thirds of reports  (6,761)  involving an overall possible 16,562 breaches. Although this  number  accounts  for  an  average  of  between  two  and  three  breaches  per  report, almost  30  per  cent  of  reports  or  2,493  recorded  no  misconduct. ASIC  asked  the external administrator to prepare a supplementary section 422, section 438D or section 533  report  for  677  of  the  6,761  reports  that  identified  possible  misconduct. In its analysis of the statistics, ASIC explained  that its request for an additional report is  a  function  of  its  assessment  of  risk  based  on  a  number  of  factors,  including,  but not limited to:
*   the nature of the possible misconduct reported;
*   the amount of liabilities;
*   the deficiency suffered;
*   the availability of evidence;
*   prior misconduct; and
*   the advice of the external administrator that the reported possible misconduct warranted further investigation.

15.60  In  a 2007 report, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)  observed that given  the  large  number  of  statutory  reports  received  by  ASIC  each  year  that  allege offences  against  the  Corporations  Act,  it  was  appropriate  that  ASIC  had  systems  in place  to  prioritise  its  regulatory  action,  through  risk  scoring.  It  found  that  ASIC’s recording of statutory report information was accurate to  a high degree. The ANAO recognised  that  ASIC  could  use  a  wide  variety  of  possible  remedies  to  deal  with offences identified in statutory reports or other deficiencies that warranted some sort  of regulatory action. They ranged from warning letters to directors for the less serious offences  to  prosecution  and  potentially  imprisonment  for  more  serious  offences. It noted that where ASIC identified  that a statutory report raised  issues of regulatory significance,  it  sought  further  information  about  the  matter  from  the  external administrator.

15.61  According to  the ANAO  report, ASIC  did  not always obtain that additional information.  Based on its sample, it found that in 40 per cent of instances,  ASIC did not obtain additional information that it had requested. The ANAO concluded:

… the  small  number  of  statutory  reports  subject  to  regulatory  action  by ASIC  each  year  indicates  that  there  is  opportunity  for  greater  regulatory action on these reports.

15.62  Mr  David  Lombe,  President  of  the  Australian  Restructuring  Insolvency  and Turnaround Association  (ARITA)  was of the view that  ANAO’s  2007  findings  were still  relevant  and  applicable. He  noted  the  thousands  of  reports  lodged  with  ASIC each  year  but  not  acted  upon.  In  Mr  Lombe’s  view,  there  was  a  ‘general  perception within  the business community that, if you do certain things at a certain level, there will be no effective review’. He explained further:

“The difficulty that we have as official liquidators is that you get a matter off the  court  list  and  often  that  matter  has  no  funds  in  it,  so  there  are  no available assets. Often that is a process by which directors have deliberately done that—it has been a deliberate course of action. If you report the matter to ASIC and there is no assistance from that space, there is not much  you can do. If you felt really aggrieved by it or you felt that it was a matter that was  of  sufficient  importance,  you  may  be  able  to  persuade  a  firm  of solicitors to act on a pro bono basis, but that is very difficult. I found myself in  that  sort  of  situation  with  Babcock  &  Brown,  where  I  had  inadequate funds to be able to pursue a proper investigation. The only thing that was available to me was to ask creditors to fund me, which they did, which then allowed me to do a public examination, which brought out the conduct of directors and other stakeholders in that company. If you do not have funds in a matter, the courses are very limited.”

15.63  By  way  of  example,  Mr  Lombe  expanded  on  his  concerns  citing  the requirement  to  lodge  a  section  533  report,  which  deals  with  offences  committed  by directors.  He explained that for the liquidator to understand what has happened,  he or she  needs  to

  ‘review the books and records, determine the transactions, try to find out what assets are there, look at insolvent trading and look at preference payments and all those sorts of things’.

  The liquidator is  required to file that report,  which  takes  time. So, according to Mr Lombe,  the reports involve both  time and money, and often  with official liquidations there are no assets at all and, if there are, creditors are effectively paying for the report.  He noted that thousands of  such reports  are lodged  with ASIC but  most  of  them  come  back  ‘no  further  action’.  In  his  view,  it  is  frustrating  for liquidators because they feel, ‘Why am I bothering to do it?’ Mr Lombe concluded that ‘you  can  understand  someone’s  frustration,  where  they  have  reported  offences  and nothing happens’.

15.64  When asked whether liquidators, in their  statutory  reports,  could assist ASIC to  distinguish  the  very  serious  breaches  from  the  less  so,  ARITA  indicated  that  it ‘might be a useful reform’. After considering the matter further, ARITA informed the committee that if it were consulted, it could assist ASIC to determine a risk scoring profile. It explained further, however:

“But we consider that the decision on how the information required by s533 is ‘risk-scored’ for action is ultimately one for the regulator and its decision and  methods  should  not  be  publicly  disclosed.  For  one  thing,  this  would appear to give the  ‘green light’ to the  commission of certain offences that are deemed not serious enough to warrant action by ASIC.”

15.65  ARITA  also  stated  that  ‘a  more  co-operative  approach  between  ASIC  and liquidators  should  also  be  pursued’.  The  committee  believes  that  ASIC  and  ARITA should  work  closely  together  to  develop  a  more  effective  and  efficient  reporting mechanism that would assist ASIC to identify the alleged  serious  breaches from the less so.”


“Nudges” may be used by ASIC to persuade company directors to comply

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Forms, Offences, Practitioners Association (IPAA), Regulation  Comments Off on “Nudges” may be used by ASIC to persuade company directors to comply
Jun 132014
 

A story by Michael Murray of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) brings news that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has commissioned the Queensland University Business School to investigate “approaches that can be used to improve director co-operation with liquidators and director compliance with their statutory and other obligations”.

ASIC appears to be looking for styles of approach that are more scientific and more savvy.

The news story suggests that an approach to be considered is that of the “pure nudge”, the “assisted nudge” and the “shove”.

A “nudge” is defined in a government paper entitled “Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving Regulatory Design” (see below) as a change to choice architecture which influences the decision of an individual without restricting, or raising the price of, the set of choices available”.  The paper says that “under certain conditions, some evidence suggests that nudge interventions can be cost-effective relative to more direct or traditional forms of government intervention; used alongside existing regulatory approaches; targeted in influence; and easy to implement.”

ASIC seems to be keen to try the “nudges” experiment. In its April 2014 submission to the Financial Systems Inquiry ASIC recommends that it should have a more flexible regulatory toolkit such as would enable it to intervene in the financial product and service supply chain by way of ‘shoves’ and ‘nudges’ to achieve regulatory outcomes that more effectively meet the needs of investors and consumers. It suggests that simple “nudges” are likely to achieve cost-effective results in many cases.

Nudge

ARITA’s news story of 6 June 2014 is headed “How Directors of Insolvent Companies [Should] Behave” and says:

“Liquidators will be aware that director compliance can be variable and that non-compliance can ultimately call for prosecution of the directors, adversely distracting liquidators from their duties and imposing costs on creditors. The behavioural economics approach seeks to influence and direct director behaviour in order to promote positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions in order to achieve compliance.

At a simple level, it could be applied to refine the form and content of letters sent by liquidators to directors stating their obligations. Improvement of the report as to the company’s financial position (the RATA) is another coalface example, ARITA research showing that it can be a daunting, unduly complex and difficult document for directors to complete: Peter Keenan, Terry Taylor Scholarship Report 2011. In some circumstances, small changes can give effect to significant behavioural changes.

ARITA sees this research as very worthwhile and it mirrors similar approaches being taken by the Australian government in other areas – see Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving Regulatory Design, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Department of Finance and Deregulation. Among many issues, that paper discusses the concepts of a “pure” nudge, an “assisted” nudge and ultimately a “shove”, in seeking regulatory compliance. Such approaches are used by revenue authorities in Australia and internationally. For example, in the UK, a change in the wording of letters sent to those owing income tax was claimed to have resulted in an extra £200 million in tax being collected on time.

ARITA also sees potential for research into the behaviour of directors at the pre-liquidation stage, that is, in managing a failing company that is heading towards collapse – what may usefully be used to prompt directors to take action or seek advice? to have a more real perception of the company’s financial position? to more positively react to possible insolvent trading liability and to the company’s creditors? and many other such issues.

We also see potential for this research to be applied in personal insolvency.

ARITA is monitoring the progress of this research and its outcomes. Any comments or questions? to Michael Murray, Legal Director, ARITA.


Link: News story by Michael Murray of ARITA: “HOW DIRECTORS OF INSOLVENT COMPANIES [SHOULD] BEHAVE”
Link: Paper from Office of Best Practice Regulation in 2012 “INFLUENCING CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR: IMPROVING REGULATORY DESIGN”
Link: ASIC’s April 2014 submission to the Financial Systems Inquiry

Apr 152014
 

senate committe report bookFour senior representatives of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association (ARITA) (formerly (IPAA) gave evidence on 2 April 2014 at the public hearing held by the Senate Economics References Committee which is inquiring into the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).

Although the Senate is inquiring into ASIC, most of the questions faced by the ARITA representatives – and the sometimes lengthy discussions that followed  – concerned insolvency administration, law and reconstruction, as well as the insolvency profession itself.

The following extract from the Hansard transcript provides insights into both ARITA’s current views on a range of issues to do with corporate insolvency and the kind of recommendations that the Senate committee might make.

I have split the transcript up by inserting the following subject headings:

  1. ASIC AND ARITA WORKING TOGETHER
  2. PROCESSING OFFENCE REPORTS (S.533 ETC) – FIRST DISCUSSION
  3. ASIC AGENDA FOR INSOLVENCY
  4. SPLITTING UP ASIC OR INTERNAL REFORM?
  5. BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING: ADOPTING U.S. CHAPTER 11 METHOD
  6.  WHITE-COLLAR CRIME WITHIN THE INSOLVENCY PROFESSION (ARIFF ETC.)
  7. STATUTORY REPORTS BY LIQUIDATORS REGARDING OFFENCES (S.533 ETC) – SECOND DISCUSSION
  8. COMPLAINTS ABOUT INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS. STOP ORDERS.
  9. PRE-PACK INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATIONS
  10. WHAT CHANGES IN THE LAW WOULD HELP ASIC PERFORM BETTER?
  11. RENEWING A LIQUIDATOR’S LICENCE
  12. LIQUIDATOR’S FEES FOR SMALL COMPANIES
  13. DUTY OF CARE IN EXERCISING POWER OF SALE
  14. ACCESS TO INFORMATION HELD BY ASIC
  15. LIQUIDATORS LICENCES AND STOP ORDERS (AGAIN)

Appearing for ARITA were:

  • David Lombe, President
  • Michael McCann, Deputy President
  • Michael Murray, Legal Director
  • John Winter, Chief Executive Officer

The committee chairman is Senator Mark Bishop.

_________________________________________________________________

Senate Logo

Extract from Hansard transcript of Senate Economics References Committee 2 April 2014

1. ASIC AND ARITA WORKING TOGETHER

CHAIR:  I have some general questions. I think we might be going to explore four or five different issues and then my colleagues will jump in as appropriate. Firstly, do you consider that ASIC works effectively with your organisation?

Mr Lombe:  In my view, the liaison side of the relationship has improved. I think, in the last two or three years, ASIC have been more active in consulting with ARITA. We have regular liaison meetings with them as a body. They have also, I think, ramped up their activity with senior practitioners, and there are regular meetings with them. In general terms, I think the liaison process is much better and that they are very much listening to some of the issues that are raised by ARITA and members.

2. PROCESSING OFFENCE REPORTS (S.533 ETC) – FIRST DISCUSSION

CHAIR: Do you draw any shortcomings to our attention?

Mr Lombe: One of the biggest issues that I would draw to your attention is that, in every administration, there is a form of offences report. In other words, if a liquidator, in reviewing the books and records or reviewing the conduct of the directors, forms a view that they have committed an offence under the act, they are required to make a report. In many cases, it is compulsory that they do that. The issue for us—and I believe it is a resources issue—is the fact that they are not being acted upon. That those reports are not being acted upon is a bit like the broken window in New York. I think there is a general perception within the business community that, if you do certain things at a certain level, there will be no effective review. We prepare thousands of reports each year and they are not being acted upon.

CHAIR: How do you know they are not being acted upon? Why do you assert that?

Mr Lombe:  We simply get a letter saying, ‘There will be no action taken in relation to this matter.’ So it is very definite.

CHAIR:  It is a standard form response?

Mr Lombe:  Yes, it is.

CHAIR:  There are always degrees of significance. Something can be a routine breach, an inadvertent breach or a breach that has no consequences, while something else can be quite deliberate, fraudulent and planned. What do you do with the second group when they say no action will be taken?

Mr Lombe:  The difficulty that we have as official liquidators is that you get a matter off the court list and often that matter has no funds in it, so there are no available assets. Often that is a process by which directors have deliberately done that—it has been a deliberate course of action. If you report the matter to ASIC and there is no assistance from that space, there is not much you can do. If you felt really aggrieved by it or you felt that it was a matter that was of sufficient importance, you may be able to persuade a firm of solicitors to act on a pro bono basis, but that is very difficult. I found myself in that sort of situation with Babcock & Brown, where I had inadequate funds to be able to pursue a proper investigation. The only thing that was available to me was to ask creditors to fund me, which they did, which then allowed me to do a public examination, which brought out the conduct of directors and other stakeholders in that company. If you do not have funds in a matter, the courses are very limited….

3.  ASIC AGENDA FOR INSOLVENCY

CHAIR: What needs to be higher on ASIC’s agenda?

Mr Lombe:  A reform package. There is the reform bill that is in parliament at the moment, but that is really in many ways at a lighter level. It is not a significant reform. It is harmonisation. It is giving more powers to creditors. But, importantly, it does not deal with, for example, a chapter 11 regime which might be considered. It does not deal with ipso facto clauses which may cause in an insolvency matter the liquidator or the voluntary administrator to lose the power to have a lease in respect of a store or a property, which then means that you cannot sell the business or restructure it. Prepacks are another item. There are a number of items that we have on our agenda for reform. I think it could be higher on ASIC’s list of things that they are looking at.

 4.  SPLITTING UP ASIC OR INTERNAL REFORM?

CHAIR:  We had the discussion this morning—and I think you might have been in the back while we were having it—that over time ASIC has been given more and more responsibilities as the financial services industry has grown. Is there a case for splitting ASIC up or for internal reform of the organisation itself? Or is it just a resourcing issue?

Mr Lombe:  From our perspective, it is not a splitting-up matter but a consolidation with AFSA, the regulator that controls bankruptcy. That was considered by the government previously and the ultimate result was that they decided not to move them together. With the economies of scale, I think I could see a better way of dealing with liquidators and trustees. At the moment they are two separate groups of people. But if you have a trustee he is more than likely a liquidator and vice versa. So I think there would be ways of making sure that, if you have an issue with, for example, a trustee’s conduct, that would be known to the regulator. Whereas at the moment there is a situation where potentially there could be an issue and it is not seen. Just in terms of dealing with liquidators and registered trustees, I can see some benefits to having one body.

5.  BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING: ADOPTING U.S. CHAPTER 11 METHOD

CHAIR:  Let’s turn to current insolvency laws in the context of the US chapter 11 processes. Is the current insolvency framework appropriate for restructuring a business in this country or is value destruction inevitable once an insolvency practitioner has been appointed?

Mr Lombe:  That is a very big question.

CHAIR:  It is.

Mr Lombe:  What I would say to you is that our regimes work well. I am not sure whether you are aware of this but there was a paper called Safe harbour which talked about trying to allow businesses to be restructured without the value destruction. I think that particular issue got some discussion but it was very brief. I think we need to go back to that. In terms of chapter 11, again I do not want to mislead you. It is not necessarily a popular thing amongst insolvency practitioners. We very much have a wide church of insolvency practitioners that deal with smaller matters, medium-sized matters and larger matters.

CHAIR: Why is it not necessarily popular?

Mr Lombe:  I think people have a view that it is a very expensive process. It is an American process. You are leaving the people who caused the problem in charge of the company still. What I would say to that is that we do not need to adopt holus-bolus the situation in the US. It could work effectively in Australia. I would refer you to a matter that I was involved in. The organisation was called United Medical Protection, which was a medical insurer who insured about 60 per cent of Australian doctors. Basically, medical services ceased at that particular point. In relation to that matter, it was a chapter 11 in Australia, being run by me as a provisional liquidator using the provisional liquidation regime and being carried out by a Supreme Court judge, Justice Austin. That was very much a situation where, effectively, for all intents and purposes you had a chapter 11 running in Australia. Chapter 11 is not for mum-and-dad grocery stores that go into liquidation.

CHAIR: No, it is not; it is for major enterprises.

Mr Lombe:  It is for major enterprises. If you put a major enterprise into a VA the costs with the VA are probably going to approximate the costs if you had to go off to a court and talk to a judge. Often, it is advanced that a judge is not capable, or that our judges would not be able to do this. I do not agree with that assessment. I have found first hand, in dealing with Justice Austin, that our judges are very capable of dealing with it. In the US they have a separate bankruptcy court, but I do not believe that that is a major issue. I am a firm believer in chapter 11, but I might pass to one of my colleagues, Michael Murray, to give a little bit of background to that.

Mr Murray:  As Mr Lombe said, chapter 11 is an arrangement whereby the restructuring of the company is left in the hands of the directors, or existing management, but under the control of a court. In Australia, we take a different approach where what we call the voluntary administration regime involves the appointment of an administrator or company liquidator to be in charge of the company—so in Australia the existing management does not have any further role in the restructuring of the company. There are pros and cons to each arrangement. In Australia it is commonly said that we do not have the same culture that they might have in America, in terms of attitudes to corporate failure, and that we would probably find it difficult, as Mr Lombe mentioned, to leave the management of the enterprise with the directors during the restructuring exercise.

CHAIR:   But that is an indigenous concern. They leave the directors in control in the United States, and hundreds of companies have gone into liquidation over the years under chapter 11 and then traded out to be viable, ongoing concerns—all the auto companies, the airline companies. Just because there are some concerns in this country that, perhaps, the directors were not as competent as they could have been—the evidence from overseas is that that is not an issue. Why would it be different here?

Mr Lombe:  I have a view—this is a personal view; it is not an ARITA view—that we are too obsessed with insolvent trading and with charging directors rather than saving jobs and saving businesses. You have given a number of quotations—

CHAIR: That is what this discussion is about: value creation and value destruction.

Mr Lombe:  Exactly. There is no doubt that if you appoint a voluntary administrator, you appoint a receiver, you appoint a liquidator, there is value destruction. There is no doubt about that. Chapter 11 has a different connotation, which is why I am, personally, in favour of it. But, as I say to you, it is not necessarily a popular view.

CHAIR:  No. I hear that loud and clear, but what I am pressing down on is: so what if it is not a popular view? If  hundreds  of  companies  have  been  saved  to  be  now  effective,  viable  concerns  returning  dividends  to shareholders and employing tens of thousands of people, who cares if people in this country are upset?

Mr Lombe:  These things need to be debated more. They need to be discussed. I was extremely disappointed that that safe harbour document just disappeared without being properly publicly debated.

CHAIR: Mr Murray, I interrupted you

Mr Murray:  I was going to follow up on the point that Mr Lombe raised about the insolvent-trading laws in Australia, which are regarded internationally as quite severe. They are seen as an impediment to flexibility of restructuring, and the issue of value destruction comes up in that context. There is seen to be too much of a readiness to go into a formal insolvency arrangement where a more informal or more flexible arrangement might serve a better purpose.

CHAIR: So is there a bit of value in having a significant public debate around this issue?

Mr Lombe:   I believe there is, and certainly for ARITA at the moment it is very much on the top of our agenda to come out with a piece of thought leadership which might encourage people to look at reform, because I think 1993 was the last serious reform we had, when the voluntary administration regime was brought in. We have been tinkering at the edges. There are some worthwhile things in the reform bill—I am not saying that there is not—but I think we should have that debate about substantial reform.

CHAIR:  So your organisation is doing a fair bit of internal policy thought on the efficacy of an alternative situation, as opposed to a straight application of the insolvency laws and the immediate harm that flows from that.

Mr Lombe:  Yes. Wherever I go as president of ARITA, I am making those sorts of statements—that we need to be looking at this. We need to be looking at reform. We need to have a dialogue about these sorts of matters.

CHAIR:  Mr Medcraft, I think, said to us that the United States chapter 11 bankruptcy system is a very good structure. He believes it significantly mitigates the loss of value that results from essentially going in and just selling up whole entities and that it is far less harmful in terms of job losses and general destruction of value.

Mr Lombe:  I would certainly agree with that part of his statement. I do not know about the rest of it, but I certainly agree with that.

CHAIR: There is some substance there on the table?

Mr Lombe:  There is, yes. We would obviously like to encourage ASIC along those lines.

 6.  WHITE-COLLAR CRIME WITHIN THE INSOLVENCY PROFESSION (ARIFF ETC.)

CHAIR:  ASIC has called for a review of penalties for white-collar crime. Do you have experience in white- collar crime within your professional organisations?

Senator WILLIAMS:   I can give you some names: McVeigh, Macdonald, Patterson, Ariff. You need any more?

Mr Lombe:  Are you alluding to Mr Ariff?

CHAIR:   I am, by way of introduction. But more generally the question is: are current penalties and their application sufficient in the area of white-collar crime or do they need to be reviewed? That is really the issue.

Mr Lombe:  Looking at the Ariff matter, to start off, that is a real blight on our profession. It is extremely regrettable and it is still a matter that gets a lot of discussion at the ARITA table. We are extremely embarrassed by it. The other thing that I would say is my view was the matter potentially was not handled as quickly as our profession would have liked. I think there were other ways. There is a thing called the Crimes Act which could have been looked at. Also, in terms of being an officer of the court, this matter could have been brought to the court. It could potentially have stopped him practising by having a receiver or some practitioner appointed to his practice to stop it, because I think it is the position that, whilst the investigation was going on and whilst the matter was proceeding in court, he was stealing funds. It is extremely regrettable and, as I say, it is a blight on our profession and we are extremely embarrassed by it.

But I would say this fellow was a criminal. He misappropriated moneys. We can sit down with a blank piece of paper and I can have a lawyer with me—the best lawyer in Australia—writing about how you stop people doing what Mr Ariff did, and the answer is you cannot because he is simply a criminal.

There may well be a case for better processes that make it easier to deal with these sorts of matters. I would say at the moment there are things in place which could have been accessed, but maybe there needs to be some reform to deal with this, to make it easier to deal with those sorts of things. I am not talking about someone who makes a mistake in their declaration of relationships, independence or indemnities. I am talking about someone who is taking money illegally, misappropriating money out of a matter. In that case, that has to be treated differently.

There are powers for ASIC to investigate those matters and get the material to understand that that is not a legitimate payment but a payment for a trip for his family, or things of that nature. From that perspective, I think there is some basis there. I might just ask Mike McCann, who is our vice president, to comment on that.

Mr McCann:  The other day someone like Ariff was a criminal, and in a lot of cases of white-collar fraud or crime it is the directors of companies who are perpetrating similar crimes or other fraudulent activity, and they are true criminals.

In the case of Australia a lot of the penalties that we have seen handed out have been relatively modest compared to some of the high-water marks in the US et cetera, where they seem to have a much more rapid and much more draconian penalty regime. They seem to prosecute very quickly and the penalties are very severe. As a deterrent, I suspect that our penalty regime here is not quite sufficient, because there is a culture of crime and fraud being conducted around the country. While that is still the case in many countries, I think there could be more of a deterrent.

In our practice, obviously, we come across a lot of companies who have failed, for various reasons. To be honest, the majority are probably due to incompetence and misfortune, but there is certainly a hard-core element of fraudulent or criminal activity by people who have the status of directors of companies.

CHAIR: You said there is ‘core’ illegal activity.

Mr  McCann:    You  do  see  on  a  recurring  basis—not  the  same  people  necessarily—activity  which  is tantamount to fraud or criminal activity. You see that a lot in some these investment schemes that we are well aware of. That activity has been perpetrated very blatantly with the intention of taking funds from investors and similar parties. That is a criminal activity.

CHAIR: So you are saying to us that the penalty regime that applies is not an effective deterrent?

Mr McCann:  Seemingly so, because we seem to have recurring activity of that sort of behaviour. People do go through that process. It takes them some time to be prosecuted and, if they are prosecuted, they serve a period. I am not sure if I am correct, but usually three to six years is a fairly serious sentence. I think in the US a lot of these crimes receive in excess of 10 years penal sentences.

Mr Lombe:  Mr Chairman, could I make a small correction to what was said by the previous witness. It is on this topic. What it relates to is a comment that he made that ASIC had not pursued a criminal insolvent trading case for more than 10 years. I can tell the committee today that in fact they are pursing the Kleenmaid matter. It is a matter that is in Queensland. I think we are all familiar with the Kleenmaid product—washing machines, fridges and associated things. ASIC have taken criminal action against those directors and in fact a committal hearing finished this week and those directors have been committed to face trial.

7.  STATUTORY REPORTS BY LIQUIDATORS REGARDING OFFENCES (S.533 ETC) – SECOND DISCUSSION

CHAIR:   Thank you for that. Can we talk about statutory liquidator reports for a while? There is a huge volume filed every year—almost 7,000—from auditors and liquidators. We have had a submission from a number of firms that essentially says that auditors are frustrated with the statutory reporting process and that an enormous amount of time and expense is put into the preparation of such reports. They are filed with ASIC. There may well be some significant recommendations in their reports for follow-up action—drawing to attention shortcomings or deficiencies in various areas—and, by and large, they are received, noted, filed and moved on. In that light, does your organisation have concerns about the process and follow-up action deriving from the filing of the reports?

Mr Lombe:   Yes. That was the issue I was talking about a little bit earlier—the extension reports. For example, in a liquidation by the court, you are required to lodge a section 533 report, which deals with offences committed by directors. What that means as a liquidator is you need to review the books and records, determine the transactions, try to find out what assets are there, look at insolvent trading and look at preference payments and all those sorts of things to understand what has gone on. We are required to file that report, and it does take time. So it is time and money, and often in these official liquidations there are no assets at all. If there are, creditors are effectively paying for that.

You are quite right: thousands of them are lodged and most of them come back ‘no further action’. I think it is frustrating to liquidators because they feel, ‘Why am I bothering to do it?’

The answer is, ‘You are required to do it under the law, so you need to do it.’ So we do not support anyone not lodging section 533 reports. But you can understand someone’s frustration, where they have reported offences and nothing happens.

CHAIR:   The question then becomes: does ASIC use these thousands of reports it receives to effectively analyse and detect patterns of dubious behaviour?

Mr Lombe:   I think you could probably say they have used them in the past to come up with a phoenix activity, so they have then had a focus on phoenix activity, and still do. I believe they are reading them for trends, but the frustration is that you are reporting an offence that you believe should be prosecuted in that particular company. So the fact that they are monitoring trends or things that are coming up is certainly useful, because it may mean that they see a trend and therefore they can take some action against it. But the fact that it is not being prosecuted is a frustration. I think sometimes that happens in larger matters as well.

CHAIR: So it is the lack of prosecutorial action that you complain of?

Mr Murray (?):   I was just going to say at times, so do you use those reports where they have directors in a number of companies and they use that to identify a recurring activity for a particular individual or individuals, and then can you use that as a basis to seek a banning order, banning that party from being a director?

CHAIR:  Let us get down to brass tacks. Does your organisation have a complaint about ASIC’s response to the reports once filed?

Mr Lombe:  We have certainly raised this issue with ASIC, and the answer that comes back, in my recall, is that they simply do not have the resources to deal with it.

CHAIR: What is it that they do not have the resources to do?

Mr Lombe:  To investigate the matters and prosecute the directors.

CHAIR:  In its 2007 report, the ANAO looked at this issue and they found that, given the large number of reports received by ASIC each year that alleged offences against the Corporations Act, it was appropriate that ASIC had systems in place to prioritise its regulatory actions through risk scoring. It noted further:

… the small number of statutory reports subject to regulatory action by ASIC each year indicates that there is opportunity for greater regulatory action on these reports.

Are those findings from six or seven years ago relevant today?

Mr Lombe:  I think they are very relevant.

CHAIR:   In your view, could liquidators in their reports assist ASIC in distinguishing between the very serious breaches from the less-so? There are limited resources; there have to be priorities. Everything is not absolutely important. Is there a mechanism that could be developed whereby the industry advise ASIC that this set of issues or this set of complaints or this set of directors or this set of companies really are most egregious and need to be attended to?

Mr Lombe:  I think that might be useful reform if that were the case. If there were some way of collating or rating, if you like, particular matters, I think that could be useful. At the moment the liquidator simply prepares his report and describes—

CHAIR:  Perhaps you could develop a framework whereby, on a score of zero to 100, all of those above 80 points, for example—whatever the criteria are—are particularly egregious and warrant follow-up action, and the rest are therefore for analysis and noting purposes.

Mr Lombe:  Yes.

CHAIR:  Is it worthwhile giving consideration to the development of such a recommendation?

Mr Lombe:  I think that would be worthwhile.

CHAIR:  We are talking about developing criteria for risk scoring that liquidators and trustees would apply in the development of their report and provide to ASIC.

Mr Lombe:  That is correct. If, for example, a bankrupt does something or does not cooperate, does not file his statement of affairs or whatever, his bankruptcy can be extended, so there is an actual penalty in those sorts of things. Whereas, in a liquidation, if there is a particular offence or whatever that does not get investigated then there is no penalty.

CHAIR:  If that were the practice, after it were developed and became common practice, that would be a very, very up-to-date mechanism for noticing trends and behaviours and taking the appropriate either regulatory or prosecutorial action for the more severe cases.

Mr Lombe:  That is right. Maybe in a situation where there are automatic offences, if you have done such and such, you cannot be a director for four years.

CHAIR:  We will give consideration to such recommendations. Questions on this issue? Do you want to go onto the complaints about insolvency practitioners or do you want to go somewhere else?

8.  COMPLAINTS ABOUT INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS. STOP ORDERS.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Just about ASIC doing their job, Chair. We come to Mr Ariff and the frustration there with it being four years almost until ASIC acted. In this inquiry when I asked why it took three years to scrub out one particular financial planner when they had been given a file from the Commonwealth Bank. It is the speed at which ASIC acts that I have been finding frustrating when we know Ariff’s record and what he did.

In your submission you say that:

We mention that we support the IPA being given access to ASIC complaints details etc under the ILRB. The present laws do not allow ASIC to share information with IPA, nor IPA with ASIC.

That is the situation you were saying.

Mr Lombe:  That is the situation except I would correct that we normally provide that information to ASIC.

Senator WILLIAMS:  So you are saying you need more transparency between your organisation and ASIC to work on issues.

Mr Lombe:   Definitely. For example, we might be looking at a particular complaint about a particular member.  We  might look  at it and  really struggle  to  see  a  lot wrong  with  it once  we  have  gone  through submissions and those sorts of things. But this same practitioner, for example, could be subject to a very serious ASIC investigation. We don’t know about that, so we are making a decision about a practitioner in isolation. That is the key point we are trying to make.

Senator WILLIAMS:  While I have been running through this inquiry, Mr Lombe, I would like a stop order power be given to ASIC. In the case of financial planners, clear evidence is given to ASIC that they have given the wrong advice, have not done their job properly, ripped people off, done whatever—forgery, fraud, you name it. ASIC can just ring up that financial planner and say, ‘From this minute, you’re banned from operating as a financial planner. You can go to the AAT, if you wish to appeal it.’ How would you feel if that was also put on liquidators? If the liquidators were licensed instead of registered, so the licence was renewed every three years, and then ASIC could have gone to Ariff and in one phone call scrubbed him out. How would you feel about representing your organisation if that was to be put in place?

Mr Lombe:   I think you need to have some form of investigation in relation to these matters because the nature of insolvency is there are confrontations and that can be—

Senator WILLIAMS:  We had the 2010 Senate inquiry into liquidators and the previous government did draw up a white paper. I know the current government is working more to complete that. CarLovers are costing $1.8 million in legal fees to have Ariff removed. Who in administration has got a lazy $1.8 million to pay legal fees? That is outrageous.

Mr Lombe:  Yes. I understand the point you are making. I think there needs to be a more streamlined position where there are serious issues of conduct. It needs to be easier or there needs to be a more streamlined process that works better to do that.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Mr D’Aloisio told us at Senate estimates to deregister a liquidator is very difficult. If we have them licensed and ASIC have the power, it may never be used, but it puts your industry on notice that if you do do the wrong thing, one phone call and the next day you are down at Centrelink.

Mr Lombe:  I would like to see a bit more than one phone call, frankly. I would like to see a proper process—

Senator WILLIAMS:  The point I am making is I believe they should have the powers to say, ‘Right-o. We’ve got clear evidence here of wrongdoing,’ as they could have done with Singleton Earthmoving or Independent Powdercoating or whatever the companies were that were done over. But they haven’t got that power; instead, the company had to spend almost $2 million to have him removed out of one company. I think that is outrageous.

Mr Lombe:  That is certainly wrong. I think there needs to be a more streamlined process; I agree with you—

Senator WILLIAMS:  So do I.

Mr Lombe:  where there is serious misconduct.

Senator WILLIAMS:  There will be changes coming, I can assure you. I think you will be happy with them. I want ASIC feared. I want them to be a corporate watchdog where people are too scared to do the wrong thing. There is a lot of money out there, especially in superannuation, and there are people who do the wrong thing, clearly. I want to have a corporate watchdog that is feared out there in your industry or the financial planners or whoever to say: we do the wrong thing, ASIC will slam us straightaway.

Mr Lombe:  We certainly do not support misconduct. As I mentioned before, we are very embarrassed by the Ariff matter and we certainly support a better process to deal with someone who has a serious allegation of misconduct against them.

Senator  WILLIAMS:    You  saw  the  recommendations.  The  committee  was  chaired  by  former  South Australian Labor senator Annette Hurley, and I thought it was a good inquiry. Mr Murray, was it you who said at first that we did not need the inquiry, or was it Ms North?

Mr Murray:  It was not me; it was our previous president.

Senator WILLIAMS:   So you think there should be closer work with ASIC in terms of transparency and sharing information with the organisation?

Mr Lombe:  Yes, I would be very much in favour of that.

Senator WILLIAMS:  That would be something you would like to see this committee recommend?

Mr Lombe: Yes, I would.

9.  PRE-PACK INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATIONS

Senator WILLIAMS:  Is there anything else you would like to see? I agree with your pre-packs, by the way. I think that is something to really look at closely. I have done a lot of work with some liquidators about pre-packs to save the cost and return more money to their creditors; that is what it is all about.

Mr Lombe:   It usually stops that destruction of value. Often you have got businesses with complex arrangements—leases,  agreements,  licensing  and  all  that  sort  of  stuff.  As  soon  as  you  have  an  event  of insolvency, they are void; they can be terminated. That is the difficulty in restructuring a business.

Senator WILLIAMS:  The assets sold way below their value.

Mr Lombe:  That can be the outcome. Often the reason that occurs is that you have had a destruction of value by the existing directors; they have traded the business down. By the time the liquidator, the voluntary administrator or the receiver gets appointed, the business has been seriously impacted by the trading.

10.  WHAT CHANGES IN THE LAW WOULD HELP ASIC PERFORM BETTER?

Senator WILLIAMS:  If you were in charge of Australia for one day, what changes would you make to our Corporations Law so that ASIC can perform their job better?

Mr Lombe:  I would be trying to give ASIC some more resources, or have resources shifted, so that ASIC can focus on some of those key investigated aspects that I have been talking about today.

11.  RENEWING A LIQUIDATOR’S LICENCE

Senator WILLIAMS: Do you support user pays?

Mr Lombe:  One thing that has always amazed me in Australia is that I can go out today and set up a company and incur $1 million worth of a credit and I do not have to put any money down at all. I do not have to put a deposit down for creditors or whatever if the company gets liquidated. So I think there is some angle to that.

Senator WILLIAMS:  I am referring more to when we license your industry. You pay a licence fee every three years. Perhaps when you apply for a licence you should have a face-to-face interview instead of something on paper. People can write anything about their character and good standing, and I think that needs to be addressed as well. But they are issues that we will address later.

Mr Lombe:  One of the issues that was addressed in the reforms is that, if you want to become a liquidator, it is a paper driven exercise. If I want to become a liquidator, I have got some experience and some references and I give those to the regulator. I have never understood why there is not a face-to-face interview. The law is going to change if that bill comes in. When I became a trustee, I had to sit an exam and I had to sit through two hours of questions. So I think a face-to-face interview is the right thing in terms of when you initially get licensed. At the end of the day, it is probably something to consider in relation to ongoing licensing.

Senator WILLIAMS:   I said to my eldest son, who is a chartered accountant, ‘Why didn’t you become a liquidator?’ and he said, ‘You’ve got to be joking!’ He really baulked at the idea.

Mr Lombe:   A lot of people like the insolvency space because it is not merely liquidating companies but assisting companies to restructure. We do a lot of work to save companies from getting into liquidation and voluntary administration.

Senator WILLIAMS:  If we can save the companies—whether it be pre-pack or chapter 11—we are saving the jobs. As the chair has said, a lot of creditors would not like the freezing of assets and payments et cetera. Case International is a big agricultural machinery manufacture right around the world. They were in serious trouble 15 years ago; now they are a prime player in agricultural machinery and those jobs have been saved.

Mr Lombe:  I certainly support what you are saying and that is what our profession is developing into. The business acumen that our practitioners have is so important.

Mr Winter:  In terms of the pathways into practice, from ARITA’s perspective we have an extensive education requirement which is effectively two units of Masters level study, which is delivered by Queensland University of technology. That is part of our requirement to become a member of ARITA. So, at a professional level, we are expecting a high standard, and of course you need to be a member of Chartered Accountants, CPA, or your relevant Law Society in order to gain membership of ARITA as well.

12.  LIQUIDATOR’S FEES FOR SMALL COMPANIES

Senator  WILLIAMS:    It  has  been  suggested  to  me  that  the  liquidators’  fees  should  be  capped  when liquidating smaller companies. How do you feel about that?

Mr Lombe:  I think that is something that should be investigated.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Because 96 per cent of liquidations return less than 10c in the dollar to the creditors.

Mr Lombe:  I think a capped fee situation is something that should be investigated. One of the things I would also say is that you might get a particular matter and there might be a capped fee on it, and then you look at it and you say, ‘There’s insolvent trading that I want to pursue and there are preference payments that I want to pursue,’ so in those situations you would have to go back to the creditors and say, ‘There are these things that need to be pursued,’ and the creditors would authorise you by increasing that cap. At the end of the day, creditors control liquidators and voluntary administrators being paid.

Senator WILLIAMS:  They do to a certain extent. For example, KordaMentha, when they liquidated Ansett, were exempted, seven out of the 10 years, from reporting to ASIC. No-one should be exempted in the first year, so that ASIC can get a listing of the assets. It is ironic that during that period KordaMentha grew their offices right around Australia. We do not know how much they charged.

Mr Lombe:  I do not think that is a political matter. I think it was an anomaly that existed then.

Senator WILLIAMS:  I think there should have been three liquidators sent into Ansett—one for the aircraft, one for the real estate and one for the spare parts and machinery or whatever. It probably would have been over in two or three years instead of 10.

13.  DUTY OF CARE IN EXERCISING POWER OF SALE

CHAIR:  Can we now turn to section 420A of the act, ‘Controller’s duty of care in exercising power of sale’. It imposes a duty on the controller of a company, including liquidators, to take all reasonable care, when selling the property of a company, to obtain the best price that is reasonably obtainable, having regard to the circumstances when the property is sold. We have received a number of written complaints, and I think all of us have been lobbied extensively by persons who have been or are still aggrieved at a liquidation process. I have been made aware of allegations concerning hotels in Fremantle worth $2 million or $3 million sold off for $80,000 or

$100,000, without notice. A whole range of people have been to see me on those sorts of matters. The other example,  of  course,  is  the  South  Johnstone  sugar  mill case.  The  allegation  is  that it  was  sold  at a  much

undervalued asset price. That is the context in which I want to have a discussion about section 420A. How is this

section of the act enforced and what authority, if any, does ASIC have to deal with such allegations of assets being sold way under value?

Mr Lombe:  Let me just start, and I might ask Michael Murray to help me a little bit on this question. Section

420A is a section which relates to the duties of receivers, so we are talking about receivers disposing of assets. Section 420A is very much a procedural-type issue. In other words, I get appointed to a hotel—

Senator WILLIAMS: Does that include liquidators as well?

Mr Lombe:  No, it does not.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Section 420A does not cover liquidators?

Mr Lombe:  No. It covers receivers.

CHAIR: What is the difference between a receiver and a liquidator?

Mr Lombe:  A receiver is appointed usually—unless it is a court-appointed receiver—pursuant to a fixed and floating charge. A liquidator is appointed by the court or via the voluntary administration process if no deed of company arrangement is put in place.

CHAIR:   Are there similar or the same obligations in different sections on liquidators as there are on receivers?

Mr Lombe:  They are different. Correct me if I am wrong, Michael, but my understanding of the liquidator’s duties is that he is not to act recklessly in the realisation of an asset. He does not have a section 420A but—

CHAIR: So you have got a lesser test.

Mr Lombe:  A lesser test, yes.

CHAIR: Not to behave recklessly.

Mr Lombe:  Yes. I think they are the right words, Michael?

Mr Murray:  A liquidator has to act in the interests of creditors and, in acting in the interest of creditors, he properly should get market value or good value for the assets. But it is expressed more precisely in respect of receivers. To some extent, they are parallel, I think, or fairly equal.

CHAIR:  But, whether it be receiver or liquidator, the allegation that is, repeatedly, assets are flogged off at way below their real value or market price if there was a contested market to acquire the particular asset. Does ASIC have any ability to get involved where such allegations are made. If not, why not?

Mr Lombe:   Can I just make an initial statement in relation to 420A. I started talking about a procedural
section. What that means is that a receiver should look at the asset, he should go and obtain an evaluation in relation to the asset, he should make whatever inquiries he needs to make in respect of that asset to understand the nature of that asset, he should seek expert advice in relation to that asset if he needs to. He should do whatever he needs to do to understand that asset. He should then embark upon a selling process. Now, that selling process

would be one where he would instruct an appropriate agent. So, if you are selling a major hotel, then you are looking for a person who sells hotels, not someone who sells pubs. You would get someone of that nature, you would get expert advice as to how it should be realised and then you would kick off an appropriate advertising campaign. That might be eight weeks for expressions of interest, and there ought to be a staggered process of providing information to people et cetera. Then you would go through the process of obtaining the best offer. That would be one way of doing it. You could put it to auction, which would be another way of doing it.

So the idea of section 420A is to put in place a regime to ensure that you get the best price or a market price in relation to that asset. That is what it is trying to ensure. My understanding is that it is not in that section that ASIC can take action. Although you are obviously breaching the law, my understanding, again, is that it would need to be someone like a creditor or a director who says, ‘You’ve breached section 420A,’ and who would need to prosecute that through the courts. That is my understanding.

CHAIR: Or indeed the owner of the asset.

Mr Lombe:  Yes, the owner of the asset. I do not think ASIC normally gets involved—

Mr Murray:  Typically, it is the owner of the business that challenges the receiver on the sale of the asset, saying that it was sold at under its value. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr Lombe, but often owners of businesses have an unrealistic expectation of the value of their business, and it is not an uncommon complaint that what was a wonderful business was sold too cheaply, but that is not the reality.

Mr Lombe:  I can give you an example of a major hotel—you would know the name; it is a hotel in Sydney. It was previously bought at $45 million. It was sold for around $20 million. This particular hotel was the subject of various programs on TV about the destruction in value that had occurred. In fact, the hotel, rather than having 200 guests in it—or 200 rooms multiplied by the number of guests—had three or four people in it. So you can destroy the value of particular assets. The reason I gave that example of a hotel is that the income a hotel can generate is about occupancy. If you have no income from that hotel, your price will be affected. In an insolvency situation, when you get appointed, that asset can be seriously distressed, and that is why the asset just will not be sold or will sell at a very low level.

CHAIR:   Okay. I understand the point you are making about section 420A and the process that should be followed to realise maximum value when the assets are realised, and I also accept the point that Mr Murray made that often the owner of a business will have an inflated view of its value. Is there any recourse available to the owner of the asset or creditors both before and after the sale if they believe the asset has been significantly undervalued and flogged off at way below market price?

Mr Lombe:  I think their recourse is to take legal action against the receiver for sale at below value.

CHAIR: And, essentially, alleged negligence, I suppose.

Mr Lombe:  Well, it is alleged that they breached section 420A.

CHAIR:  Is that the only avenue you are aware of?

Mr Murray:  Yes, they can take court action. I would have to say, from my experience in reading the law reports, they do not often succeed—I say that as a generalisation. You asked whether ASIC has a power. ASIC has  a  power  generally  over  receivers,  which  is  under  section  423  of  the  Corporations  Act,  in  respect  of misconduct or inattention to their duties, and there is a similar power in respect of liquidators. That is an overarching power that ASIC has in respect of the conduct of receivers.

CHAIR:  Okay. Based on your experience, gentlemen, does this section 420A, as it applies to liquidators and receivers in the context of allegations of the sale of assets at way under market price, need to be strengthened in any respect or is it adequate?

Mr McCann:  I think it is very adequate. As a practising receiver I know it is one of the things we are most mindful of whenever we take possession, say, for a bank of an asset and take it to market. We are very mindful of obtaining value and going through that process to ensure we are attaining the maximum possible price for the asset. That means we are very rigid around following a due process for the sale—in fact, to the point that, on day one of an appointment, you often get presented with people saying, ‘I want to buy that asset,’ and they put an offer on the table and you have to say, ‘That’s great. That looks like a very good offer but I cannot accept it because I have to go through a process to make sure that is the right value.’

CHAIR:   Does due process in realising the value of the assets necessarily involve a public process and competition and tenders? If not, should it?

Mr Lombe: It does and it should.

CHAIR:  I received complaints that business that have been wound up and the assets flogged off for way, way below market price was done by some fix where there was no tender process, and all of a sudden the new owner had it.

Mr Lombe:  That is wrong.

Mr McCann:  In the case of receivership that is clearly wrong.

CHAIR:  Is it also illegal?

Mr Lombe:  It is in breach of the law.

Mr McCann:  However, in a case of liquidation there are circumstances where a liquidator with no funds has an asset and has no ability to trade or continue the business to allow an opportunity to achieve a higher value, if that is possible, and may need to act to close down the business and sell the assets, because there is no way that they can pay employees the next week or the next day because there are no funds available. In that case you will see a more rapid fire-sale type of situation.

Mr Lombe:  It again goes to that issue of a liquidation versus a receivership.

14.  ACCESS TO INFORMATION HELD BY ASIC

CHAIR:   Yes, I get that  point. You noted that ASIC receives and  stores prescribed information under legislation and some of this information can be made public. But you argue that anonymous and aggregate statistics can be made public if ASIC so chooses. Can you put some more meat on those bones about why and how information should be made public?

Mr Murray:  I think we are making the point there that Mr Harris made earlier about access to statistics. We feel frustrated—along with Mr Harris and other academics—about the lack of statistics, particularly in the insolvency area.  We  compare  that  very  much,  for  example,  to  AFSA—the  Australian  Financial  Security Authority, which is the bankruptcy regulator. They produce good statistics which inform the law reform process in bankruptcy. We do not have that sort of information in corporate insolvency. We were able to attend the previous session with Mr Harris, where you made a suggestion to him that he formulate some areas where ASIC might better produce information.

CHAIR:  Could you take the question that I gave to Mr Harris and provide us, with some degree of urgency, a written note advising the type of information that ASIC has that should be made publicly available and that would be of use?

Mr Murray: Yes.

Mr Lombe:  I would make you aware of a situation. ARITA gives a research prize so that someone can do research. One of our prize-winners was looking at deeds of company arrangement. When you go into voluntary administration, there is a decision about whether you go into liquidation or a deed of company arrangement. He was trying to work out how many companies go into deeds of company arrangement and how successful those deeds of company arrangements are. He wanted to get access to information from ASIC to be able to do that very important research. It would have cost thousands of dollars and ASIC just said, ‘We can’t give that information to you.’

CHAIR: Can’t or won’t?

Mr Lombe:  Won’t.

CHAIR: Did they offer a reason?

Mr Murray:  I think they said that they cannot—and I think this was referred to earlier—because they are legislatively prevented from waiving fees or giving out information.

CHAIR: Can you take that request on notice and provide us a written response?

Mr Lombe:  Within the month?

CHAIR: Yes.

Mr Murray: Yes.

CHAIR:  And also advise us if there are legislative prohibitions in the act that we need to have a look at as well in formulating our recommendations. If ASIC are prohibited under the law to provide the information, unless the act is changed, they cannot. So we need to be aware of that as well.

15.  LIQUIDATORS LICENCES AND STOP ORDERS (AGAIN)

Mr Murray:   I would like to make a final comment, please. Senator Williams, you mentioned earlier the issues about practitioner regulation and the cost of, for example, removing Mr Ariff from CarLovers and the cost to creditors, and also the idea of regulating a practitioner by way of ASIC immediately terminating their licence. I just wanted to point out—and I am sure you are aware—

Senator WILLIAMS: A stop order; not terminate their licence—put their licence on hold.

Mr Murray:  I just wanted to point out that, following on from this report that we were involved in before, we have the bill and there is quite a regime in the bill giving powers to ASIC and also its counterpart AFSA in relation to those sorts of circumstances that you described. Also, in respect of removal of a practitioner, you do not have to go to court under the bill; the creditors can make that decision by—

Senator WILLIAMS: Has that bill has been introduced to the House?

Mr Murray:  It is not in the House; it is what is called—

Senator WILLIAMS:  It is being planned.

Mr Murray:   It is an exposure draft and we have been working closely with Treasury with respect to refinements of its draft.

Senator WILLIAMS:  I have looked over it piece by piece, the proposals, and have kept a close eye on it. Are you pretty happy with the proposals?

Mr Murray:  We are—yes. We would like to think we have had a fair degree of input into it and we would encourage its further progress into parliament.

Senator WILLIAMS: Good. I have been briefed and I am very happy with what has been proposed.

Mr Murray: Thank you.

CHAIR: Thank you very much for your assistance today and for your involvement.

Mr Murray: Thank you.

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