Principles of professional conduct for liquidators and bankruptcy trustees

Checklists and guides, Ethics, Insolvency practices, Practitioners Association (IPAA), Standards Comments Off

Apr 282011

Set out below are seventeen principles of professional conduct devised by the trade body for Australian insolvency practitioners to govern and inform their conduct as liquidators, administrators, receivers and bankruptcy trustees.

The Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (IPA) says that the primary purposes of its Code of Professional Practice (Code) are “to:

set standards of conduct for insolvency professionals;
inform and educate IPA members as to the standards of conduct required of them
in the discharge of their professional responsibilities; and
provide a reference for stakeholders against which they can gauge the conduct of IPA members. “

The summary of principles presented below is taken from the Code. Each principle is described in great detail in the Code. A PDF copy of the 124 page Code is available at the IPAA website, or may be found HERE. Earlier versions of the Code may be found HERE. This current edition of the Code has been effective since 1 January 2011.

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The Principles

Conduct

Principle 1 Members must exhibit the highest levels of integrity, objectivity and impartiality in all aspects of Administrations and practice management.

Principle 2 When accepting or retaining an Appointment the Practitioner must at all times during the Administration be, and be seen to be, independent.

Principle 3 Disclosure and acceptance of a lack of independence is not a cure.

Principle 4 Members must communicate with affected parties in a manner that is accurate, honest, open, clear, succinct and timely to ensure effective understanding of the processes, and their rights and obligations.

Principle 5 Members must attend to their duties in a timely way.

Principle 6 A Practitioner must not acquire directly or indirectly any assets under the administration of the Practitioner.

Principle 7 When promoting themselves, or their firm, or when competing for work, Members must act with integrity and must not bring the profession into disrepute.

Principle 8 When dealing with other Members in transitioning or parallel appointments, Members must be professional and co-operative, without compromising the obligations of the Member in their own particular appointment.

Principle 9 Practitioners must maintain professional competency in the practice of insolvency.

Remuneration

Principle 10 A Practitioner is entitled to claim remuneration, and disbursements, in respect of necessary work, properly performed in an Administration.

Principle 11 A claim by a Practitioner for remuneration must provide sufficient, meaningful, open and clear disclosure to the Approving Body so as to allow that body to make an informed decision as to whether the proposed remuneration is reasonable.

Principle 12 A Practitioner is entitled to draw remuneration once it is approved and according to the terms of the approval.

Practice Management

Principle 13 When accepting an Appointment the Practitioner must ensure that their Firm has adequate expertise and resources for the type and size of the Administration, or the capacity to call in that expertise and those resources as needed.

Principle 14 Members must implement policies, procedures and systems to ensure effective Quality Assurance.

Principle 15 Members must implement policies, procedures and systems to ensure effective Compliance Management.

Principle 16 Members must implement policies, procedures and systems to ensure effective Risk Management.

Principle 17 Members must implement policies, procedures and systems to ensure effective Complaints Management.

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The IPAA says:

“The Code is a living document. It will continue to be amended from time to time to reflect changes and developments in insolvency law and practice. …. (and) it is the fundamental building block upon which the insolvency profession sets and manages standards of professional conduct. We were gratified to see the ready acceptance of the Code by the profession, regulatory bodies and the Courts following its initial release.”

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Author: P Keenan 28/4/2011

Liquidator voluntarily resigns

ASIC, Industry People, Insolvency Laws, Prosecution of Liquidators, Regulation Comments Off

Mar 022011

Paul Pattison – the Australian liquidator whose own private company became insolvent – has voluntarily resigned from his company appointments and agreed not to take on any more until he demonstrates that he has the financial capacity to adequately and properly perform his duties as a liquidator.

The announcement was made on 1 March 2011 by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), which applied on 7 February to the Supreme Court of Victoria for suspension of his license to practice.

ASIC’s investigation into the conduct and affairs of Mr Pattison and two of his private companies is continuing.

In its media release ASIC states:

Following Mr Pattison’s voluntary resignation, ASIC yesterday obtained orders by consent in the Supreme Court of Victoria appointing new liquidators or deed administrators to 80 companies which were formerly administered by him.

Mr Pattison resigned as liquidator or deed administrator of those companies and gave an undertaking that he would cease to carry out, consent to, or otherwise accept appointment as a liquidator, provisional liquidator, voluntary administrator, administrator of a deed of company arrangement or controller, until he produces evidence in a form acceptable to ASIC or to the Court which demonstrates he has the practice and financial capacity to adequately and properly carry out his duties as a liquidator.

Yesterday’s consent orders follow the commencement of ASIC’s action against Mr Pattison and Pattison Business Recovery & Insolvency Specialists Pty Ltd (PBRIS) in the Supreme Court of Victoria. On 7 February 2011, ASIC asked the Supreme Court to begin an inquiry into Mr Pattison’s conduct and his capacity to adequately and properly perform his duties as a liquidator.

Upon making the orders by consent, the Court ordered that these proceedings be otherwise dismissed.

No findings of impropriety as to the conduct of Mr Pattison as a liquidator were made.

ASIC’s investigation into the conduct and affairs of Mr Pattison, PBRIS and his former company, Pattison Consulting Pty Ltd, is continuing. ASIC will make no further comment on the investigation at this time.

Regulator challenges liquidator’s right to practice

ASIC, Practitioners Association (IPAA), Prosecution of Liquidators, Regulation Comments Off

Feb 162011

The financial collapse of a private company belonging to a liquidator has led the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to apply to the Supreme Court of Victoria for suspension of his license to practice. This was recently revealed by business journalist Leonie Wood of The Age.

The liquidator, Paul Pattison, of Melbourne, is a former director of Pattison Consulting Pty Ltd.

Pattison Consulting Pty Ltd – which ran his insolvency firm – made a declaration of solvency and went into a members voluntary (solvent) liquidation in April 2010. In the Declaration of Solvency filed with ASIC at the time Mr Pattison said Pattison Consulting Pty Ltd had a net worth of $250,000, comprised of assets worth $4.62 million (including “work in progress” of $4.1 million), less liabilities of $4.37million. (Ordinarily in this context, “work in progress” would mean fees accrued but not yet billed for work done in connection with insolvency appointments.)

In November 2010 the liquidator of Pattison Consulting Pty Ltd resigned, and both a voluntary administrator and a receiver were appointed. In December 2010 creditors resolved to wind up the company as a creditors voluntary (insolvent) winding up. The company changed its name to ACN 079 638 501 Pty Ltd.

Throughout these events Mr Pattison continued to practice as a registered liquidator, court appointed liquidator and trustee in bankruptcy, and does so to this day, because , in the words of the Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA), insolvency appointments are “personal to a practitioner, rather than to a company or firm”.

Commencement of ASIC’s proceedings has led the IPA to suspend his membership of the Association and commence disciplinary proceedings against him. (IPA Media Release)

Neither ASIC nor the IPA has suggested that there is anything wrong with the way in which Mr Pattison has ran any of his numerous insolvency administrations.

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UPDATE 2/3/2011: Now see my article “Liquidator voluntarily resigns”.

Trustee for Liquidation of Bernard Madoff’s company castigates J P Morgan Chase

Insolvency Laws, Offences, Regulation, White collar crime Comments Off

Feb 042011

Details were released today of the $US6 billion lawsuit brought in December 2010 against JPMorgan Chase (JPMC) by the Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS).

The lawsuit, brought under the US Bankruptcy Code, the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) and other laws, seeks to recover fees, profits and damages. JPMorgan Chase was the primary banker of Mr. Madoff’s firm. The Trustee further alleges that the bank aided and abetted his fraud.

The Trustee, Irving H. Picard, has sued J P Morgan Chase & Co., J P Morgan Chase Bank NA, J P Morgan Securites LLC, and J P Morgan Securities Ltd.

Many of the words, phrases and concepts contained in the Causes of Action – of which there are 21 – will be familiar to Australian insolvency practitioners.

For example, claims are made for Preference Period Initial Transfers (“a preferential transfer avoidable by the Trustee”); Two Year Initial Transfers (“a fraudulent transfer avoidable by the Trustee”); and Six Year Initial Transfers (“made by BLMIS with the intention to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors”).

Also, it is alleged that “BLMIS did not receive fair consideration for the Six Year Initial Transfers. BLMIS was insolvent at the time it made each of the Six Year Initial Transfers or, in the alternative, BLMIS became insolvent as a result of each of the Six Year Initial Transfers”.

JPMorgan Chase strenuously denied the allegations, calling the suit meritless and “based on distortions of both the relevant facts and the governing law.”

“J.P. Morgan did not know about or in any way become a party to the fraud orchestrated by Bernard Madoff,” the bank said in a statement. “Madoff’s firm was not an important or significant customer in the context of J.P. Morgan’s commercial banking business.”

JPMorgan Chase says it will “defend itself vigorously against the unfounded claims brought by the trustee.”

In the Nature of the Action, the Trustee uses strong language and is severely critical of JPMC (see below).

Full details of the lawsuit may be found at http://documents.nytimes.com/madoff-trustees-lawsuit-against-jpmorgan-chase?ref=business

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Irving H. Picard (“Trustee”), as trustee for the substantively consolidated liquidation of the business of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”) under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa, et seq. (“SIPA”), and the estate of Bernard L. Madoff, by and through his undersigned counsel, as and for his Complaint against JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. (collectively, “JPMC” or “Defendants”), states as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. The story has been told time and time again how Madoff duped the best and the brightest in the investment community. The Trustee’s investigation reveals a very different story—the story of financial institutions worldwide that were keen to the likely fraud, and decidedly turned a blind eye to it. While numerous financial institutions enabled Madoff’s fraud, JPMC was at the very center of that fraud, and thoroughly complicit in it.

2. JPMC was BLMIS’s primary banker for over 20 years, and was responsible for knowing the business of its customers—in this case, a very large customer. JPMC is a sophisticated financial institution, and it was uniquely situated to see the likely fraud. Billions of dollars flowed through BLMIS’s account at JPMC, the so-called “703 Account,” but virtually none of it was used to buy or sell securities as it should have been had BLMIS been legitimate. But if those large transactions that did not jibe with any legitimate business purpose triggered any warnings, they were suppressed as the drive for fees and profits became a substitute for common sense, ethics and legal obligations. It is estimated that JPMC made at least half a billion dollars in fees and profits off the backs of BLMIS’s victims, and is responsible for at least $5.4 billion in damages for its role in allowing the Ponzi scheme to continue unabated for years, with an exact amount to be determined at trial.

3. In addition to being BLMIS’s banker, JPMC also profited from the Ponzi scheme by selling structured products related to BLMIS feeder funds to its clients. Its due diligence revealed the likelihood of fraud at BLMIS, but JPMC was not concerned with the devastating effect of fraud on investors. Rather, it was concerned only with its own bottom line, and did nothing but a cost-benefit analysis in deciding to become part of Madoff’s fraud: “Based on overall estimated size of BLM strategy, . . . it would take [a] . . . fraud in the order of $3bn or more . . . for JPMC to be affected.” JPMC also relied on the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) to protect its profits: “JPMorgan’s investment in BLM . . . is treated as customer money . . . and therefore [is] covered by SIPC.” By the Fall of 2008, in the midst of a worldwide economic downturn, the cost-benefit analysis had changed. JPMC, no longer comfortable with the risk of fraud, decided to redeem its $276 million in investments in BLMIS feeder funds. JPMC also received an additional $145 million in fraudulent transfers from BLMIS in June 2006. The Trustee seeks the return of this money in this Action.

4. JPMC allowed BLMIS to funnel billions of dollars through the 703 Account by disregarding its own anti-money laundering duties. From 1986 on, all of the money that Madoff stole from his customers passed through the 703 Account, where it was commingled and ultimately washed. JPMC had everything it needed to unmask the fraud. Not only did it have a clear view of suspicious 703 Account activity, but JPMC was provided with Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single Reports (“FOCUS Reports”) from BLMIS. The FOCUS Reports contained glaring irregularities that should have been probed by JPMC. For example, not only did BLMIS fail to report its loans from JPMC, it also failed to report any commission revenue. JPMC ignored these issues in BLMIS’s financial statements. Instead, JPMC lent legitimacy and cover to BLMIS’s operations, and allowed BLMIS to thrive as JPMC collected hundreds of millions of dollars in fees and profits and facilitated the largest financial fraud in history.

5. In addition to the information JPMC obtained as BLMIS’s long-time banker, JPMC also performed due diligence on BLMIS beginning in 2006, using information it obtained from those responsible at JPMC for the 703 Account, as well as information provided by various BLMIS feeder funds. At some point between 2006 and the Fall of 2008, if not before, JPMC unquestionably knew that:

a. BLMIS’s returns were consistently too good—even in down markets—to be true;

b. Madoff would not allow transparency into his strategy;

c. JPMC could not identify, and Madoff would not provide information on, his purported over-the-counter (“OTC”) counterparties;

d. BLMIS’s auditor was a small, unknown firm;

e. BLMIS had a conflict of interest as it was the clearing broker, sub-custodian, and sub-investment adviser;

f. feeder fund administrators could not reconcile the numbers they got from BLMIS with any third party source to confirm their accuracy; and

g. there was public speculation that Madoff operated a Ponzi scheme, or was engaged in other illegal activity, such as front-running.

6. JPMC looked the other way, ignoring the warning signs, even in the aftermath of other well-known frauds. In response to those who, prior to Madoff’s arrest, found it “[h]ard to believe that [fraud] would be going on over years with regulators [sic] blessing,” REDACTED Risk Officer of JPMC’s Investment Bank responded, “you will recall that Refco was also regulated by the same crowd you refer to below and there was noise about them for years before it was discovered to be rotten to the core.”

7. JPMC’s due diligence team was further concerned about fraud at BLMIS in the wake of another well-known fraud, the Petters fraud. Some of these concerns centered on BLMIS’s small, unknown auditor, Friehling & Horowitz (“Friehling”):

The “DD” [due diligence] done by all counterparties seems suspect. Given the scale and duration of the Petters fraud it cannot be sufficient that there’s simply trust in an individual and there’s been a long operating history . . . . Let’s go see Friehling and Horowitz the next time we’re in NY . . . to see that the address isn’t a car wash at least.

8. In or about September 2008, as JPMC was re-evaluating its hedge fund investments in the midst of the worldwide financial crisis, REDACTED [JPMC Employee 3], of JPMC’s London office, had a telephone call with individuals at Aurelia Finance, S.A. (“Aurelia Finance”), a Swiss company that purchased and distributed JPMC’s structured products. During the course of that call, the individuals at Aurelia Finance made references to “Colombian friends” and insisted that JPMC maintain its BLMIS-related hedge. That conversation triggered a concern that Colombian drug money was somehow involved in the BLMIS-Aurelia Finance relationship, which led to an internal investigation at JPMC of BLMIS and Aurelia Finance for money laundering. Significantly, it was only when its own money was at stake that JPMC decided to report BLMIS to a government authority.

9. As reported in the French press, by the end of October 2008, JPMC admitted in a filing of suspicious activity made to the United Kingdom’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (“SOCA”) that it knew that Madoff was “too good to be true,” and a likely fraud:

(1) . . . [T]he investment performance achieved by [BLMIS’s] funds . . . is so consistently and significantly ahead of its peers year-on-year, even in the prevailing market conditions, as to appear too good to be true—meaning that it probably is; and

(2) the lack of transparency around Madoff Securities trading techniques, the implementation of its investment strategy, and the identity of its OTC option counterparties; and

(3) its unwillingness to provide helpful information.

None of this information was new to JPMC—it had known it for years. It was only in an effort to protect its own investments that JPMC finally decided to inform a government authority about BLMIS. JPMC further sought permission from SOCA to redeem its Aurelia Finance-related investments and admitted that “as a result [of these issues with BLMIS] JPMC[] has sent out redemption notices in respect of one fund, and is preparing similar notices for two more funds.”

10. Incredibly, even when it admitted knowing that BLMIS was a likely fraud in October 2008, JPMC still did nothing to stop the fraud. It did not even put a restriction on the 703 Account. It was Madoff himself who ultimately proclaimed his fraud to the world in December 2008, and the thread of the relationships allowing the fraud to exist and fester began to be revealed as well. JPMC’s complicity in Madoff’s fraud, however, remained disguised, cloaked in the myth that Madoff acted alone and fooled JPMC. But that is the fable. What follows is the true story.

Decline in UK in number of dodgy directors being penalised

Insolvency Laws, Insolvency Statistics, Offences, Regulation, White collar crime Comments Off

Jan 192011

The UK government’s corporate insolvency regulator (the Insolvency Service) investigates too few cases of alleged misconduct by company directors.

This is the view of the UK’s Association of Business Recovery Professionals (known as “R3”), which represents 97% of the UK’s Insolvency Practitioners.

In a media release – “Public at risk from ‘dodgy directors’” – on 10 January 2011, R3 (which stands for rescue, recovery, renewal) says its research shows that:

“The number of directors disqualified by the government for misconduct, such as fraud, has failed to keep pace with an increased number of reports of potential misconduct.”

“The percentage of reports taken forward by the Insolvency Service (i.e. disqualifications) has halved from 40% in 2003/4 to 20% in 2009/10. Fraudulent activity is known to increase during tough economic times. In 2009/10, insolvency practitioners submitted 7,030 reports on directors’ behaviour which they believed warranted further investigation. However, in that year, only 1,387 cases were concluded by the Insolvency Service.”

R3’s President Steven Law commented:

“This mechanism is in place to protect the general public and other businesses from dishonest directors. Not punishing directors who are blameworthy sends out a dangerous message to others.”

To read a copy R3’s media release, go to https://www.r3.org.uk/pressandpublic/default.asp?page=1&i=523&id=548#PressStory

R3 has published a paper headed “Directors’ Disqualification: Room for improvement”. It provides some interesting statistics, summarizes actual case studies – of “cases when directors have not been disqualified despite the insolvency practitioner reporting obvious misconduct” – and makes 5 recommendations. A copy is available HERE.

Does deregistration short cut conflict with Court judgment?

ASIC, Forms, Insolvency Laws, Regulation Comments Off

Nov 252010

A controversial ASIC-approved short cut to deregistration in a creditors’ voluntary liquidation seems to be at odds with sentiments expressed in a decision of the Federal Court of Australia.

In my post headed “Obscure short cut through insolvency law on company deregistration” (24/11/2010) I questioned whether this officially sanctioned short cut or escape mechanism – which allows liquidators to bypass sections 509(1) to (5) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act) in loosely defined and very common circumstances – was warranted.

Now it stikes me that it might actually be unlawful.

His Honour, Jacobsen J, examined section 509 of the Act in considering the case of Emergen X Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) ACN 114 579 510 [2010] FCA 487.

His Honour’s written judgment (May 2010) illustrates the importance attached to the requirements to convene a final meeting and to let 3 months elapse after that date.

A shareholder of the company applied to the Court for an order under section 509(6) to bring forward the date of deregistration by shortening the 3 month period that is otherwise required to elapse. (The shareholder wanted deregistration to occur on the earlier date so that it (the shareholder) could obtain a tax benefit, under CGT rules, by being able to claim a loss on the shares in the current tax year.)

His Honour took the view from examining legal authorities that the 3 month period is a “period of grace”, designed to allow “for claims by creditors or other aggrieved parties so as to ensure that they can make a claim against a company without having to go through the process of seeking an order reinstating it.”

I find it difficult to see how the sentiments expressed by His Honour sit in harmony with the short cut – as ASIC has approved with companies Form 578 – which allows liquidators to bypass giving notice of a final meeting of creditors and also removes the 3 month period of grace.

Let’s have a debate.

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Note: The following quote is from His Honour’s judgment in Emergen X Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) ACN 114 579 510 [2010] FCA 487:

“The reason why there is a period of grace of three months allowed after the filing of the return seems to be explained in a Victorian authority from the nineteenth century. The decision, which is relevant, is John Birch & Co. Limited v The Patent Cork Asphalt Co. Limited (1894) 20 VLR 471 (“John Birch”). In that case Madden CJ said at 472 that the suspension of a dissolution for three months in the then relevant section of the legislation means that a purpose is to be served. His Honour said the only easily understandable purpose is to enable persons who are affected to come in and make a claim. Thus the period of grace is allowed for claims by creditors or other aggrieved parties so as to ensure that they can make a claim against a company without having to go through the process of seeking an order reinstating it.

Although the decision of Madden CJ in John Birch was reversed on appeal, the discussion of the Full Court does not affect the primary judge’s explanation for the rationale of the three month period, see John Birch & Co. Limited v The Patent Cork Asphalt Co. Limited (1985) 21 VLR 268.”

Note: For the full text of this judgment, issued in May 2010, click HERE.

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The comments and materials contained on this blog are for general information purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer.

Obscure short cut through insolvency law on company deregistration

ASIC, Insolvency Laws, Regulation 1 Response »

Nov 242010

Here’s a tip for the student of insolvency law and practice. Don’t look to legislation or legal judgments for all the answers. Some of the official rules are contained in “regulatory guides” which can easily escape your attention.

But even more problematic is the occasional, obscure, almost unwritten, rule which is the result of a pragmatic arrangement between regulators and insolvency practitioners.

A good, current example , is deregistration of a company following a creditors’ voluntary liquidation. Here, the pragmatic twist to the law dwells in the text on a non-prescribed form, and in the text of an even more obscure document, a statement issued by the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (IPAA or IPA) to its members.

But I’m getting ahead of myself.

Look up Part 5.5 of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act), under the heading “Final meeting and deregistration”, and you will find law (section 509) which states that “ASIC must deregister the company at the end of the 3 month period after the (final) return was lodged.” This requirement is sometimes referred to as “automatic deregistration”.

To get to this point in a creditors’ voluntary liquidation where the liquidator lodges a final return, the Act states that the liquidator “must convene a general meeting of the company, or, in the case of a creditors’ voluntary liquidation, a meeting of the creditors and members of the company, for the purpose of laying before it the account and giving any explanation of the account” .

On the face of it, these provisions would appear to be the law. Put simply, a company which has entered into a creditors’ voluntary liquidation is deregistered automatically 3 months after the liquidator’s return of the final meeting is lodged.

If you, the student, wanted this confirmed, you might consult a book on corporate insolvency law in Australia, where you would almost definitely find such confirmation.

But what you and the author of the book (and, of course, creditors and the general public) don’t know is that ASIC has modified the law.

How? Well not – as far as I can see – through the official process of issuing a regulatory document, such as a Regulatory Guide or Information Sheet (of which there are a great many).

Instead, the modified rule finds its expression in companies Form 578 (which is not a prescribed form). The form is headed “Deregistration request (liquidator not acting or affairs fully wound up)”. One of the two tick boxes on the form, which constitute the basis for requesting deregistration, states:

“There are no funds left in the creditors’ voluntary liquidation to hold a final meeting and also the affairs of the company are fully wound up.”

So, dear student, the “law” relating to deregistration of a company following a creditors’ voluntary liquidation has been modified by inserting an escape clause. If there are no funds left in the liquidation and the affairs of the company are “fully wound up”, the requirement to hold a final meeting is nullified or overlooked, and deregistration can be achieved by simply ticking a box and lodging a form.

This change is a result of ASIC “exercising its discretion”, says the IPAA in a submission to Treasury in 2009:

“This issue concerns the application of s 601AB of the Corporations Act in finalising a creditors’ voluntary liquidation as an alternative to holding a final meeting of the company’s members and creditors under s 509. After consultation with ASIC, the IPA issued a Practice Update in the June 2008 issue of its journal. The Update informs members that ASIC has advised the IPA that in situations where the liquidator is without funds to cover the cost of holding the final meeting, ASIC will exercise its discretion and accept lodgement of a Deregistration Request (Form 578) under s 601AB(2). It may be that the words of that subsection need clarifying to accord with what appears to be this intent of the section. “

But, dear student, you should also know that there is apparently a proviso attached to the phrases “no funds left to hold a final meeting” (ASIC) and “without funds to cover the costs of holding the final meeting” (IPAA). Whether the staff in ASIC who process Form 578 applications are aware of this proviso is not clear. Nevertheless, in a statement to members in 2008 (which was published again in July 2010 due to a number of queries from members) the IPAA states that:

“Only liquidators that are without funds are eligible to use section 601AB(2). “Without funds” does not include situations where the liquidator distributes all available funds via a dividend to creditors. Therefore, liquidators should ensure that sufficient funds are retained to cover the cost of a final meeting when a dividend is paid.”

Personally, and like most people, I am strongly opposed to obscure or unwritten rules in any area of law, and especially so when they come into being with little debate and are at odds with the principle or intention of the law as it is expressed in applicable legislation.

No doubt there are practical reasons for the procedure authorized by Form 578:

1. Liquidators receive a benefit, particularly when they are winding up a company that does not have enough funds to pay the costs of calling a final meeting of members and creditors. Without this short cut to deregistration these liquidators would be out of pocket. However, the saving in each case may not be great, given that there is (apparently) no requirement to give notice of the final meeting other than by means of one advertisement in the Government Gazette.

2. The government regulator (ASIC) receives a benefit by getting more dead companies off its Register with less “fuss”, thus reducing its workload in this area and thereby saving taxpayers some government expenditure.

But what of the creditors of the company in liquidation?

Financially, the Form 578 short cut to deregistration appears to make no difference to the creditors, for if the company is able to pay them a dividend the procedure cannot be utilized; and if the company is unable to pay them a dividend, it remains unable to pay them a dividend.

From the intangible views of justice and equity, it can be seen that, in the case of creditors of a company which is unable to pay a dividend, the Form 578 short cut deprives creditors of the right to receive a final account of the winding up and the opportunity to discuss the winding up with the liquidator and others at a final meeting.

Apart from the fact that these rights and opportunities seem to be enshrined in sections 509(1), the short cut method overlooks one of the main themes of recent attempts to reform insolvency laws, namely the need to improve information to creditors.

Is this short cut justified by the financial savings and improved efficiency? Let’s have a debate.

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The comments and materials contained on this blog are for general information purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer.

Legal opinion warns external administrators about personal liability for company taxes

Priority Debts, Returns, Tax debts, Tax liabilities, Taxation Issues Comments Off

Nov 162010

A paper presented recently by two Melbourne barristers to a group of insolvency practitioners suggests that administrators, liquidators and receivers (external administrators) who do not take precautions risk personal liability for post-appointment capital gains/income tax liabilities.

Helen Symon SC is a Senior Counsel at the Victorian bar specialising in taxation and insolvency. Mark McKillop has been a junior barrister at the Victorian Bar since 2008 specialising in insolvency, banking and taxation.

Their paper, “Taxation – Common Issues for Insolvency Practitioners” (10 November 2010), looks at external administrators as viewed through the eyes of taxation legislation. The authors make three key points:

“(a) Insolvency practitioners are required to ensure that the entities to which they are appointed comply with most common tax obligations;

(b) although the entities to which they are appointed are legally separate, insolvency practitioners can be personally liable, under some circumstances, for the payment of post appointment tax liabilities of the insolvent entity: income tax, capital gains tax, PAYG collections and GST;

(c) choice of the type of appointment may affect the practitioner’s personal liability to pay capital gains tax liabilities of the appointee and, accordingly, the assets available to the secured creditor.”

Personal Liability under Taxation Law

In the debate so far the most troublesome law for external administrators has been Section 254 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA 1936), which deals with agents and “trustees”, and raises the prospect that, as an agent or “trustee”, a external administrator may be personal liable for a company debt.

Section 254(1)(d) states that every “trustee”, as defined in ITAA 1936 (*), and every agent is “hereby authorized and required to retain from time to time out of any money which comes to him in his representative capacity so much as is sufficient to pay tax which is or will become due in respect of the income, profits or gains.

Section 254(1)(e) states that every “trustee”, as defined in ITAA 1936, and every agent is “hereby made personally liable for the tax payable in respect of the income, profits or gains to the extent of any amount that he has retained, or should have retained, under paragraph (d); but he shall not be otherwise personally liable for the tax.

According to Helen Symon SC and Mark McKillop, “Section 254, then, preserves the position of the Revenue vis a vis tax liabilities which arise following appointment of a liquidator, receiver or administrator …. Casting personal liability on the liquidator or receiver or administrator ensures the tax liabilities are met before funds are applied to satisfy creditors.”

Personal Liability under Other Laws

Helen Symon SC and Mark McKillop also refer to instances where personal liability may arise outside the income tax legislation.

In this context they refer to the case of Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Tideturn Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2001] NSWSC 217 (26/3/2001). This case concerned a liquidator who kept the business of the company going after he was appointed and, in the process, deducted income tax instalments (group tax) from the post appointment wages of the employees. The court held that the group tax deductions gave rise to a post liquidation debt payable in the liquidation as a priority payment under Section 556(1)(a) of the Corporations Law, as an expense properly incurred by the liquidator in carrying on the company’s business.

The liquidator failed to pay any of the group tax, but paid other priority debts. By failing to ensure that priority debts were paid proportionately in the circumstances of there being insufficient funds available (as is required by section 559 of the Corporations Law) the Court stated that this “would be a breach of duty by the liquidator”. For this breach of duty the court ordered that “The liquidator must pay personally the sum of $75,000”, which was the group tax debt discounted for certain mitigating circumstances. (**)

Other interesting judicial comments on “expenses properly incurred by a liquidator in carrying on the company’s business” and liability for breach of duty in not paying post appointment debts include:

Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Plan Pty Ltd v Ansett Australia Ltd and Others [2002] VSC 576 (20/12/2002);
Bell v Amberday [2001] NSWSC 558 (4/7/2001); and
Charlie Pace & Anor v Antlers Pty Ltd (In liq) [1998] FCA 2 (12/1/1998).

Conclusion

Helen Symon SC and Mark McKillop conclude their paper with the following warning:

“Practitioners need to be aware that, in effect, they will be liable either directly or under penalty provisions for CGT, income tax and GST applying to the entity to which they are appointed. They are also required to ensure that administrative requirements, such as filing returns, are completed. Accordingly, prudent practice requires withholding sufficient funds to cover the liabilities until they are paid.”

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Note: The profile and contact details of Helen Symon SC are available at http://www.vicbar.com.au/find-a-barrister/advanced-search/search-results/barrister-profile?RollNumber=1884. Mark McKillop’s profile and contact details are at http://www.vicbar.com.au/find-a-barrister/advanced-search/search-results/barrister-profile?RollNumber=4135

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ADDITIONAL NOTES:

(*) A “trustee” for taxation purposes is defined in Section 6(1) of the ITAA 1936 [and ITAA 1997] as: “in addition to every person appointed or constituted trustee by act of parties, by order, or declaration of a court, or by operation of the law, includes –

(a) an executor or administrator or, guardian, committee, receiver, or liquidator; and

(b) every person having or taking upon himself the administration or control of income affected by any express or implied trust, or acting in any fiduciary capacity, or having the possession control or management of the income of a person under any legal or other disability.”

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(**) It is worth noting also, that as a result of his behaviour in this external administration – including his failure to pay all the expenses incurred in carrying on the business of the company after his appointment – the liquidator (William Edward Andrew) was brought before the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (CALDB) in 2001 and was persuaded to cease acting as a liquidator. (See ASIC Media Release 01/312 at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/01%2F312+Time+limit+imposed+on+liquidator’s+registration?opendocument#. )

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(***) For my previous posts on this subject see “Post-appointment income tax debts of liquidator” and “Taxing capital gains made during liquidation.”

The comments and materials contained on this blog are for general information purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer.

$154 million used under GEERS to pay employee entitlements.

Employee Entitlements, GEERS, Priority Debts Comments Off

Nov 092010

An annual report recently tabled in Parliament reveals that under the Australian Government’s “safety net” scheme over $154 million had to be paid out in 2009/10 to compensate 15,565 Australian workers who lost their jobs as a result of their employers’ insolvency.

This $154 million takes the total paid since the scheme began in 2001 to about $1,083 million.

The Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) runs a scheme called the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS). The scheme is officially described as follows:

“GEERS is a safety net scheme which protects the entitlements of employees who have lost their jobs as a result of the bankruptcy or liquidation of their employers. Eligible entitlements under GEERS consist of up to three months unpaid or underpaid wages for the period prior to the appointment of the insolvency practitioner (including amounts deducted from wages, such as for superannuation, but not passed on to the superannuation fund), all unpaid annual leave, all unpaid long service leave, up to a maximum of five weeks unpaid payment in lieu of notice and up to a maximum of 16 weeks unpaid redundancy entitlement. Payments made under GEERS are subject to an annually indexed income cap, which was $108,300 for 2009–10.”

In its 2009/10 Annual Report the department lists the “notable achievements” of GEERS as:

“A total of $154,058,670 was advanced under GEERS to 15,565 eligible claimants. Of claimants who received assistance under GEERS, 87.3 per cent were paid 100 per cent of their verified employee entitlements by GEERS. More than 45,632 enquiries were received by the GEERS Hotline. Over $18 million advanced under GEERS was recovered during 2009–10.”

Note: After a payment is made from GEERS, the Government seeks to recover the payment through the liquidation or bankruptcy process (as a priority debt). As stated, the amount recovered in this way was $18 million, which apparently means that the net outlay of taxpayers’ money was $136 million.

GEERS was introduced in 2001. The following chart – prepared for this article using figures extracted from past DEEWR annual reports, and an article in the Australian Journal of Management (June 2009, pages 51-72, authors Jeannette Anderson and Kevin Davis) – shows amounts paid out over past years:

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The comments and materials contained on this blog are for general information purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer.

Mystery of ION Ltd $13 million income tax refund continues despite massive report

Tax debts, Tax liabilities, Taxation Issues Comments Off

Oct 212010

The insolvency administrators’ 200 page report on ION Limited and subsidiaries (20/10/10) does not mention the once-anticipated income tax refund of $13 million.

So the mystery – described in my article “Insolvency administration income tax refund held up” – continues.

But then a tax dispute over $13 million could be regarded by some as trivial, compared with the momentous and complex issues addressed in the Deed Administrators’ report. The report deals with ION Limited and its 17 subsidiary companies. It was produced after the Deed Administrators had received from shareholders “numerous allegations of misconduct by ION”, and after the Deed Administrators obtained directions/permission regarding the report from the Federal Court of Australia.

The report’s main purpose is described in its introduction:

“In this Report we set out details of the work that has been done to date in relation to shareholder claims and the steps which remain to be taken to enable the Deed Administrators to determine these claims and to distribute funds to creditors. “

The present position in the administrations is summarised as follows:

“Since the initial appointment of the Administrators and the appointment of the Deed Administrators on 27 May 2005, the realisation of ION’s businesses and assets has been completed. The review of proofs of debt lodged by suppliers of goods and services and by financiers has largely been completed with only a small number of complex claims still in dispute. The only matter of significance still to be concluded is the adjudication of proofs of debt lodged (or to be lodged) by shareholders.”

A taste of the report’s contents can be seen in the main headings in its Table of Contents, namely:

PART A – UPDATE AND WAY FORWARD

1. Introduction
2. Executive Summary
3. The Fund
4. Who can share in the Fund
5. Calling for and lodgement of Proofs of Debt or Claim
6. Estimated Return to Creditors
7. Updates to Creditors and Creditors’ Committee meetings
8. Purpose of Report
9. The Way Forward

PART B – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS

10. Overview of ION Group
11. Overview of Forensic Investigation Process
12. Factual Overview
13. ION’s disclosures regarding Financial Outlook
14. Consequences if tru position disclosed
15. Potentially Actionable Disclosures and Non-Disclosures

PART C – DETAILED RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS

16. Introduction
17. Financial Controls
18. Albury
19. Altona
20. Wingfield
21. North Plympton
22. Auckland
23. Kentucky
24. Energy Services
25. ION’s disclosures regarding Financial Outlook
Annexure 1. Pooled and Non-Pooled Entities.

For the full report go to http://www.ionlimited.com and click on the link to ION Report to Creditors 20 October 2010. For a short version click on the link to Creditor information.

Enjoy the read!

Any information on what happened to the expected income tax refund would be gratefully received.

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The comments and materials contained on this blog are for general information purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer.

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