Jul 172014
 

Is there evidence that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail and, if so, what could be done to address this?

This is the question being asked about external administrations in the Interim Report of the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) (July 2014). The FSI says it would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the following policy options or other alternatives:

  • No change to current arrangements.
  • Implement the 2012 proposals to reduce the complexity and cost of external administration for SMEs. [See below for details of these proposals.]

The brief section of the FSI’s report dealing with external administration may be viewed HERE.  (The full report in pdf format is available HERE.)

David Murray

David Murray, FSI chairman. Artwork from bluenotes.anz.com

US Chapter 11 regime?

Adoption by Australia of a US Chapter 11 style form of external administration could still be an option, although the FSI has already given it the thumbs down, as this extract from its interim report shows:

“The Inquiry considers adopting such a regime would be costly and could leave control in the hands of those who are often the cause of a company’s financial distress. Capital would be maintained in a business that is likely to fail, which would restrict or defer the capital from being channelled to more viable and productive enterprises. Adopting such a regime would also create more uncertainty for creditors by limiting their rights. The Inquiry notes that Chapter 11 has rarely enabled businesses to continue as going concerns in the long term. There is little empirical evidence that Australia’s voluntary administration process is causing otherwise viable businesses to fail. The Inquiry would like stakeholders to provide any empirical evidence that supports that view.”

Second round of submissions to FSI

Submissions in response to the Interim Report are due by 26 August 2014. Submissions can be lodged online using the Financial System Inquiry special facility,  or may be lodged by email or post: fsi@fsi.gov.au or Financial System Inquiry,  GPO Box 89,  Sydney NSW 2001.

Insolvency reform proposals of 2012

The 2012 insolvency reform proposals to which the FSI specifically refers in its request for second round submissions concern:

  1. Registration and discipline of insolvency practitioners (See note 1 at end of post for more information).
  2. Specific rules relating to external administrations (note 2).
  3. Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments (note 3).

The Explanatory Material issued with the Insolvency Law Reform Bill  on 19 December 2012 can be viewed HERE.

“Thought leadership”

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) (previously known as the Insolvency Practitioners Association) says it has embarked on “a major project to drive thought leadership around our insolvency regime”.  It is asking insolvency practitioners who want to make a submission to FSI to work with the professional association:

“ARITA has embarked on a major project to drive thought leadership around our insolvency regime.  Along with some of ARITA’s excellent previous work, significant new work has already been completed and ARITA members will soon be asked for comment on key aspects of our policy positions. This work is, obviously, well timed to support the FSI request for submissions. ARITA will actively work to represent the views of its membership and the profession to the FSI. We would urge all members and their firms to work with ARITA on providing strong and consistent representation to the FSI. If you or your firm is looking at making its own submission, please let ARITA know so that we can collaborate with you.”  ARITA Press Release 15/7/2014



NOTES re Proposals in December 2012 Insolvency Reform Bill:

Note 1: Registration and discipline of insolvency practitioners

Common rules regarding:   the physical registers of insolvency practitioners;  registration and disciplinary Committees.

Note 2: Specific rules relating to external administrations

Common rules regarding: •

  • Remuneration and other benefits received by the insolvency  practitioner;
  • The handling of administration or estate funds;
  • The provision of information by insolvency practitioners during an external administration or bankruptcy;
  • The meetings of creditors during an external administration or bankruptcy;
  • Committee of inspection formed as part of an external administration or bankruptcy; and
  • The external review of the administration of an estate or insolvency.

Note 3, part (a): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

Provide ASIC with further powers to assist it in its oversight of the regulation of registered liquidators. In particular, the Bill amends the ASIC Act to:

  • enable ASIC to require the provision of information and books as part of an ASIC proactive surveillance program;
  • enable ASIC to provide administration information to a person with a material interest in the information; and
  • improve the transparency of ASIC oversight of the corporate insolvency industry.

Note 3, part (b): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

Amend the Bankruptcy Act to enable ITSA to provide information relevant to the administration of the corporate law to ASIC.

Note 3, part (c): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

A range of miscellaneous amendments, including:

  • amending the Acts to strengthen the penalties for breach of a bankrupt’s or directors’ obligations to provide a report as to affairs (RATA), or the books of the company, to an insolvency practitioner;
  • amend the Corporations Act to provide a process for the automatic disqualification of directors that have failed to provide a RATA, or the books of the company, to a registered liquidator until they have complied with those obligations; and
  • amend the Acts to enable the assignment of an insolvency practitioner’s statutory rights of actions.

“Nudges” may be used by ASIC to persuade company directors to comply

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Forms, Offences, Practitioners Association (IPAA), Regulation  Comments Off on “Nudges” may be used by ASIC to persuade company directors to comply
Jun 132014
 

A story by Michael Murray of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) brings news that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has commissioned the Queensland University Business School to investigate “approaches that can be used to improve director co-operation with liquidators and director compliance with their statutory and other obligations”.

ASIC appears to be looking for styles of approach that are more scientific and more savvy.

The news story suggests that an approach to be considered is that of the “pure nudge”, the “assisted nudge” and the “shove”.

A “nudge” is defined in a government paper entitled “Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving Regulatory Design” (see below) as a change to choice architecture which influences the decision of an individual without restricting, or raising the price of, the set of choices available”.  The paper says that “under certain conditions, some evidence suggests that nudge interventions can be cost-effective relative to more direct or traditional forms of government intervention; used alongside existing regulatory approaches; targeted in influence; and easy to implement.”

ASIC seems to be keen to try the “nudges” experiment. In its April 2014 submission to the Financial Systems Inquiry ASIC recommends that it should have a more flexible regulatory toolkit such as would enable it to intervene in the financial product and service supply chain by way of ‘shoves’ and ‘nudges’ to achieve regulatory outcomes that more effectively meet the needs of investors and consumers. It suggests that simple “nudges” are likely to achieve cost-effective results in many cases.

Nudge

ARITA’s news story of 6 June 2014 is headed “How Directors of Insolvent Companies [Should] Behave” and says:

“Liquidators will be aware that director compliance can be variable and that non-compliance can ultimately call for prosecution of the directors, adversely distracting liquidators from their duties and imposing costs on creditors. The behavioural economics approach seeks to influence and direct director behaviour in order to promote positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions in order to achieve compliance.

At a simple level, it could be applied to refine the form and content of letters sent by liquidators to directors stating their obligations. Improvement of the report as to the company’s financial position (the RATA) is another coalface example, ARITA research showing that it can be a daunting, unduly complex and difficult document for directors to complete: Peter Keenan, Terry Taylor Scholarship Report 2011. In some circumstances, small changes can give effect to significant behavioural changes.

ARITA sees this research as very worthwhile and it mirrors similar approaches being taken by the Australian government in other areas – see Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving Regulatory Design, Office of Best Practice Regulation, Department of Finance and Deregulation. Among many issues, that paper discusses the concepts of a “pure” nudge, an “assisted” nudge and ultimately a “shove”, in seeking regulatory compliance. Such approaches are used by revenue authorities in Australia and internationally. For example, in the UK, a change in the wording of letters sent to those owing income tax was claimed to have resulted in an extra £200 million in tax being collected on time.

ARITA also sees potential for research into the behaviour of directors at the pre-liquidation stage, that is, in managing a failing company that is heading towards collapse – what may usefully be used to prompt directors to take action or seek advice? to have a more real perception of the company’s financial position? to more positively react to possible insolvent trading liability and to the company’s creditors? and many other such issues.

We also see potential for this research to be applied in personal insolvency.

ARITA is monitoring the progress of this research and its outcomes. Any comments or questions? to Michael Murray, Legal Director, ARITA.


Link: News story by Michael Murray of ARITA: “HOW DIRECTORS OF INSOLVENT COMPANIES [SHOULD] BEHAVE”
Link: Paper from Office of Best Practice Regulation in 2012 “INFLUENCING CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR: IMPROVING REGULATORY DESIGN”
Link: ASIC’s April 2014 submission to the Financial Systems Inquiry

Insolvency Services Standard for public accountants to be strengthened

 Checklists and guides, Corporate Insolvency, Ethics, Insolvency practices, Regulation, Standards  Comments Off on Insolvency Services Standard for public accountants to be strengthened
May 282014
 

Australia’s Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (ASESB) is revising the professional standard that governs accountants in public practice who perform insolvency services.

APESB logo

On 21 May 2014 ASESB issued an exposure draft of the proposed revisions. It is seeking feedback from insolvency accountants and “other stakeholders” by 4 July 2014.

Chairman of ASESB, Stuart Black, says

“The proposed new requirements to (the professional standard) APES 330 will further strengthen the professional requirements applicable to liquidators and administrators and provide a reference for creditors, regulators and other stakeholders to evaluate and monitor practitioner conduct”

The Media Release states that:

“APESB sets the code of ethics and professional standards by which members of Australia’s three major professional accounting bodies (CPA Australia, the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia and the Institute of Public Accountants) are required to abide.”

Overview of the proposed changes

The exposure draft  contains the following list of “significant revisions” to the existing APES 330:

  • Revision or addition of the following definitions: Administration, Appointment, Approving Body, Contingent Fee, Controller, Firm, Independence, Insolvency Services, Insolvent Debtor, Member, Member in Public Practice, Professional Activity, Professional Bodies, Professional Services, Professional Standards, Referring Entity, and Related Entity;
  • Removal of the defined terms: Associated Entity, Controlled Entity, and Witness Report;
  • Extending the scope of the standard to include members’ voluntary liquidations with the exception of having to comply with the Independence requirements of the standard;
  • Introduction of a requirement to disclose the source of a referral where the Appointment follows a specific referral;
  • Introduction of a requirement to declare in the DIRRI that no information or advice, beyond that outlined in the DIRRI, was provided;
  • Use of the term “believing” to clarify that it is the Member in Public Practice’s reasons for believing that the Pre-appointment Advice provided or the relationship disclosed does not result in a conflict of interest or duty;
  • Extension of the prohibition on providing Pre-appointment Advice to both an insolvent Entity and its directors; to include an Insolvent Debtor and any corporate Entity associated with that individual;
  • New guidance to encourage disclosure of relationships with Associates of the insolvent Entity that were more than two years prior to the Appointment;
  • Amendment of the current prohibition of consenting to an Appointment where prior business dealings were held to exclude immaterial dealings, or those business dealings that occurred more than two years prior to the Appointment;
  • Additional guidance on what is considered a material business relationship;
  • A new requirement to provide the basis of fee calculations and where relevant the scale
  • Mandating that where fee estimates are provided that these be provided in writing with explanations of the variables that may affect the estimated fee;

  • An obligation on the Member in Public Practice to provide details of Expenses that may be charged from the Administration and the basis of how the Expenses will be charged and recovered by the Firm;

  • Prohibition of Members in Public Practice claiming any pre-appointment disbursements as an Expense;

  • Requirement for consistency between fees charged and those sought for prospective fee approval;
  • The scale of rates used to calculate prospective fees must be that approved by the Approving Body
  •  Where a Member in Public Practice accepts an Appointment with another Member, all Members are equally responsible for all decisions on the Appointment; 

  • Payments received for the costs of an Administration from third parties must be disclosed to the Approving Body and approved (other than in an Appointment as a Controller);
  •  Detailed requirements and guidance on Expert Witness obligations has been replaced by referring Members in Public Practice to APES 215 Forensic Accounting Services; and
  •  New requirements for a Member in Public Practice to use appropriate procedures to ensure statutory timeframes are met in a timely manner.

 

Deadline for comments

 

The deadline for stakeholder comments is 4 July 2014. APESB says it welcomes comments from respondents on any matters in the exposure draft (ED 01/14).

Comments should be addressed to:
The Chairman, Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited
Level 7, 600 Bourke Street, MELBOURNE, VIC, 3000.

A copy of each submission will be placed on public record on the APESB website. http://www.apesb.org.au/apesb-exposure-drafts-open-for-comment.

 

Sources and Links

APESB Media Release 21 May 2014

APESB At A Glance, APES 330 Insolvency Services ED, May 2014

Proposed Standard: apes 330 Insolvency Services

 Footnote

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) also has an extensive Code of Professional Practice.  That governs members of ARITA, but has also been accepted by some judges in hearings concerning misconduct as a guide to the professional standards expected of all insolvency practitioners.  Accordingly, the changes by the accounting bodies to APES 330 may not make much real difference to practice standards. But of course the accounting bodies must have their own rules in place.

 

Apr 152014
 

senate committe report bookFour senior representatives of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association (ARITA) (formerly (IPAA) gave evidence on 2 April 2014 at the public hearing held by the Senate Economics References Committee which is inquiring into the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).

Although the Senate is inquiring into ASIC, most of the questions faced by the ARITA representatives – and the sometimes lengthy discussions that followed  – concerned insolvency administration, law and reconstruction, as well as the insolvency profession itself.

The following extract from the Hansard transcript provides insights into both ARITA’s current views on a range of issues to do with corporate insolvency and the kind of recommendations that the Senate committee might make.

I have split the transcript up by inserting the following subject headings:

  1. ASIC AND ARITA WORKING TOGETHER
  2. PROCESSING OFFENCE REPORTS (S.533 ETC) – FIRST DISCUSSION
  3. ASIC AGENDA FOR INSOLVENCY
  4. SPLITTING UP ASIC OR INTERNAL REFORM?
  5. BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING: ADOPTING U.S. CHAPTER 11 METHOD
  6.  WHITE-COLLAR CRIME WITHIN THE INSOLVENCY PROFESSION (ARIFF ETC.)
  7. STATUTORY REPORTS BY LIQUIDATORS REGARDING OFFENCES (S.533 ETC) – SECOND DISCUSSION
  8. COMPLAINTS ABOUT INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS. STOP ORDERS.
  9. PRE-PACK INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATIONS
  10. WHAT CHANGES IN THE LAW WOULD HELP ASIC PERFORM BETTER?
  11. RENEWING A LIQUIDATOR’S LICENCE
  12. LIQUIDATOR’S FEES FOR SMALL COMPANIES
  13. DUTY OF CARE IN EXERCISING POWER OF SALE
  14. ACCESS TO INFORMATION HELD BY ASIC
  15. LIQUIDATORS LICENCES AND STOP ORDERS (AGAIN)

Appearing for ARITA were:

  • David Lombe, President
  • Michael McCann, Deputy President
  • Michael Murray, Legal Director
  • John Winter, Chief Executive Officer

The committee chairman is Senator Mark Bishop.

_________________________________________________________________

Senate Logo

Extract from Hansard transcript of Senate Economics References Committee 2 April 2014

1. ASIC AND ARITA WORKING TOGETHER

CHAIR:  I have some general questions. I think we might be going to explore four or five different issues and then my colleagues will jump in as appropriate. Firstly, do you consider that ASIC works effectively with your organisation?

Mr Lombe:  In my view, the liaison side of the relationship has improved. I think, in the last two or three years, ASIC have been more active in consulting with ARITA. We have regular liaison meetings with them as a body. They have also, I think, ramped up their activity with senior practitioners, and there are regular meetings with them. In general terms, I think the liaison process is much better and that they are very much listening to some of the issues that are raised by ARITA and members.

2. PROCESSING OFFENCE REPORTS (S.533 ETC) – FIRST DISCUSSION

CHAIR: Do you draw any shortcomings to our attention?

Mr Lombe: One of the biggest issues that I would draw to your attention is that, in every administration, there is a form of offences report. In other words, if a liquidator, in reviewing the books and records or reviewing the conduct of the directors, forms a view that they have committed an offence under the act, they are required to make a report. In many cases, it is compulsory that they do that. The issue for us—and I believe it is a resources issue—is the fact that they are not being acted upon. That those reports are not being acted upon is a bit like the broken window in New York. I think there is a general perception within the business community that, if you do certain things at a certain level, there will be no effective review. We prepare thousands of reports each year and they are not being acted upon.

CHAIR: How do you know they are not being acted upon? Why do you assert that?

Mr Lombe:  We simply get a letter saying, ‘There will be no action taken in relation to this matter.’ So it is very definite.

CHAIR:  It is a standard form response?

Mr Lombe:  Yes, it is.

CHAIR:  There are always degrees of significance. Something can be a routine breach, an inadvertent breach or a breach that has no consequences, while something else can be quite deliberate, fraudulent and planned. What do you do with the second group when they say no action will be taken?

Mr Lombe:  The difficulty that we have as official liquidators is that you get a matter off the court list and often that matter has no funds in it, so there are no available assets. Often that is a process by which directors have deliberately done that—it has been a deliberate course of action. If you report the matter to ASIC and there is no assistance from that space, there is not much you can do. If you felt really aggrieved by it or you felt that it was a matter that was of sufficient importance, you may be able to persuade a firm of solicitors to act on a pro bono basis, but that is very difficult. I found myself in that sort of situation with Babcock & Brown, where I had inadequate funds to be able to pursue a proper investigation. The only thing that was available to me was to ask creditors to fund me, which they did, which then allowed me to do a public examination, which brought out the conduct of directors and other stakeholders in that company. If you do not have funds in a matter, the courses are very limited….

3.  ASIC AGENDA FOR INSOLVENCY

CHAIR: What needs to be higher on ASIC’s agenda?

Mr Lombe:  A reform package. There is the reform bill that is in parliament at the moment, but that is really in many ways at a lighter level. It is not a significant reform. It is harmonisation. It is giving more powers to creditors. But, importantly, it does not deal with, for example, a chapter 11 regime which might be considered. It does not deal with ipso facto clauses which may cause in an insolvency matter the liquidator or the voluntary administrator to lose the power to have a lease in respect of a store or a property, which then means that you cannot sell the business or restructure it. Prepacks are another item. There are a number of items that we have on our agenda for reform. I think it could be higher on ASIC’s list of things that they are looking at.

 4.  SPLITTING UP ASIC OR INTERNAL REFORM?

CHAIR:  We had the discussion this morning—and I think you might have been in the back while we were having it—that over time ASIC has been given more and more responsibilities as the financial services industry has grown. Is there a case for splitting ASIC up or for internal reform of the organisation itself? Or is it just a resourcing issue?

Mr Lombe:  From our perspective, it is not a splitting-up matter but a consolidation with AFSA, the regulator that controls bankruptcy. That was considered by the government previously and the ultimate result was that they decided not to move them together. With the economies of scale, I think I could see a better way of dealing with liquidators and trustees. At the moment they are two separate groups of people. But if you have a trustee he is more than likely a liquidator and vice versa. So I think there would be ways of making sure that, if you have an issue with, for example, a trustee’s conduct, that would be known to the regulator. Whereas at the moment there is a situation where potentially there could be an issue and it is not seen. Just in terms of dealing with liquidators and registered trustees, I can see some benefits to having one body.

5.  BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING: ADOPTING U.S. CHAPTER 11 METHOD

CHAIR:  Let’s turn to current insolvency laws in the context of the US chapter 11 processes. Is the current insolvency framework appropriate for restructuring a business in this country or is value destruction inevitable once an insolvency practitioner has been appointed?

Mr Lombe:  That is a very big question.

CHAIR:  It is.

Mr Lombe:  What I would say to you is that our regimes work well. I am not sure whether you are aware of this but there was a paper called Safe harbour which talked about trying to allow businesses to be restructured without the value destruction. I think that particular issue got some discussion but it was very brief. I think we need to go back to that. In terms of chapter 11, again I do not want to mislead you. It is not necessarily a popular thing amongst insolvency practitioners. We very much have a wide church of insolvency practitioners that deal with smaller matters, medium-sized matters and larger matters.

CHAIR: Why is it not necessarily popular?

Mr Lombe:  I think people have a view that it is a very expensive process. It is an American process. You are leaving the people who caused the problem in charge of the company still. What I would say to that is that we do not need to adopt holus-bolus the situation in the US. It could work effectively in Australia. I would refer you to a matter that I was involved in. The organisation was called United Medical Protection, which was a medical insurer who insured about 60 per cent of Australian doctors. Basically, medical services ceased at that particular point. In relation to that matter, it was a chapter 11 in Australia, being run by me as a provisional liquidator using the provisional liquidation regime and being carried out by a Supreme Court judge, Justice Austin. That was very much a situation where, effectively, for all intents and purposes you had a chapter 11 running in Australia. Chapter 11 is not for mum-and-dad grocery stores that go into liquidation.

CHAIR: No, it is not; it is for major enterprises.

Mr Lombe:  It is for major enterprises. If you put a major enterprise into a VA the costs with the VA are probably going to approximate the costs if you had to go off to a court and talk to a judge. Often, it is advanced that a judge is not capable, or that our judges would not be able to do this. I do not agree with that assessment. I have found first hand, in dealing with Justice Austin, that our judges are very capable of dealing with it. In the US they have a separate bankruptcy court, but I do not believe that that is a major issue. I am a firm believer in chapter 11, but I might pass to one of my colleagues, Michael Murray, to give a little bit of background to that.

Mr Murray:  As Mr Lombe said, chapter 11 is an arrangement whereby the restructuring of the company is left in the hands of the directors, or existing management, but under the control of a court. In Australia, we take a different approach where what we call the voluntary administration regime involves the appointment of an administrator or company liquidator to be in charge of the company—so in Australia the existing management does not have any further role in the restructuring of the company. There are pros and cons to each arrangement. In Australia it is commonly said that we do not have the same culture that they might have in America, in terms of attitudes to corporate failure, and that we would probably find it difficult, as Mr Lombe mentioned, to leave the management of the enterprise with the directors during the restructuring exercise.

CHAIR:   But that is an indigenous concern. They leave the directors in control in the United States, and hundreds of companies have gone into liquidation over the years under chapter 11 and then traded out to be viable, ongoing concerns—all the auto companies, the airline companies. Just because there are some concerns in this country that, perhaps, the directors were not as competent as they could have been—the evidence from overseas is that that is not an issue. Why would it be different here?

Mr Lombe:  I have a view—this is a personal view; it is not an ARITA view—that we are too obsessed with insolvent trading and with charging directors rather than saving jobs and saving businesses. You have given a number of quotations—

CHAIR: That is what this discussion is about: value creation and value destruction.

Mr Lombe:  Exactly. There is no doubt that if you appoint a voluntary administrator, you appoint a receiver, you appoint a liquidator, there is value destruction. There is no doubt about that. Chapter 11 has a different connotation, which is why I am, personally, in favour of it. But, as I say to you, it is not necessarily a popular view.

CHAIR:  No. I hear that loud and clear, but what I am pressing down on is: so what if it is not a popular view? If  hundreds  of  companies  have  been  saved  to  be  now  effective,  viable  concerns  returning  dividends  to shareholders and employing tens of thousands of people, who cares if people in this country are upset?

Mr Lombe:  These things need to be debated more. They need to be discussed. I was extremely disappointed that that safe harbour document just disappeared without being properly publicly debated.

CHAIR: Mr Murray, I interrupted you

Mr Murray:  I was going to follow up on the point that Mr Lombe raised about the insolvent-trading laws in Australia, which are regarded internationally as quite severe. They are seen as an impediment to flexibility of restructuring, and the issue of value destruction comes up in that context. There is seen to be too much of a readiness to go into a formal insolvency arrangement where a more informal or more flexible arrangement might serve a better purpose.

CHAIR: So is there a bit of value in having a significant public debate around this issue?

Mr Lombe:   I believe there is, and certainly for ARITA at the moment it is very much on the top of our agenda to come out with a piece of thought leadership which might encourage people to look at reform, because I think 1993 was the last serious reform we had, when the voluntary administration regime was brought in. We have been tinkering at the edges. There are some worthwhile things in the reform bill—I am not saying that there is not—but I think we should have that debate about substantial reform.

CHAIR:  So your organisation is doing a fair bit of internal policy thought on the efficacy of an alternative situation, as opposed to a straight application of the insolvency laws and the immediate harm that flows from that.

Mr Lombe:  Yes. Wherever I go as president of ARITA, I am making those sorts of statements—that we need to be looking at this. We need to be looking at reform. We need to have a dialogue about these sorts of matters.

CHAIR:  Mr Medcraft, I think, said to us that the United States chapter 11 bankruptcy system is a very good structure. He believes it significantly mitigates the loss of value that results from essentially going in and just selling up whole entities and that it is far less harmful in terms of job losses and general destruction of value.

Mr Lombe:  I would certainly agree with that part of his statement. I do not know about the rest of it, but I certainly agree with that.

CHAIR: There is some substance there on the table?

Mr Lombe:  There is, yes. We would obviously like to encourage ASIC along those lines.

 6.  WHITE-COLLAR CRIME WITHIN THE INSOLVENCY PROFESSION (ARIFF ETC.)

CHAIR:  ASIC has called for a review of penalties for white-collar crime. Do you have experience in white- collar crime within your professional organisations?

Senator WILLIAMS:   I can give you some names: McVeigh, Macdonald, Patterson, Ariff. You need any more?

Mr Lombe:  Are you alluding to Mr Ariff?

CHAIR:   I am, by way of introduction. But more generally the question is: are current penalties and their application sufficient in the area of white-collar crime or do they need to be reviewed? That is really the issue.

Mr Lombe:  Looking at the Ariff matter, to start off, that is a real blight on our profession. It is extremely regrettable and it is still a matter that gets a lot of discussion at the ARITA table. We are extremely embarrassed by it. The other thing that I would say is my view was the matter potentially was not handled as quickly as our profession would have liked. I think there were other ways. There is a thing called the Crimes Act which could have been looked at. Also, in terms of being an officer of the court, this matter could have been brought to the court. It could potentially have stopped him practising by having a receiver or some practitioner appointed to his practice to stop it, because I think it is the position that, whilst the investigation was going on and whilst the matter was proceeding in court, he was stealing funds. It is extremely regrettable and, as I say, it is a blight on our profession and we are extremely embarrassed by it.

But I would say this fellow was a criminal. He misappropriated moneys. We can sit down with a blank piece of paper and I can have a lawyer with me—the best lawyer in Australia—writing about how you stop people doing what Mr Ariff did, and the answer is you cannot because he is simply a criminal.

There may well be a case for better processes that make it easier to deal with these sorts of matters. I would say at the moment there are things in place which could have been accessed, but maybe there needs to be some reform to deal with this, to make it easier to deal with those sorts of things. I am not talking about someone who makes a mistake in their declaration of relationships, independence or indemnities. I am talking about someone who is taking money illegally, misappropriating money out of a matter. In that case, that has to be treated differently.

There are powers for ASIC to investigate those matters and get the material to understand that that is not a legitimate payment but a payment for a trip for his family, or things of that nature. From that perspective, I think there is some basis there. I might just ask Mike McCann, who is our vice president, to comment on that.

Mr McCann:  The other day someone like Ariff was a criminal, and in a lot of cases of white-collar fraud or crime it is the directors of companies who are perpetrating similar crimes or other fraudulent activity, and they are true criminals.

In the case of Australia a lot of the penalties that we have seen handed out have been relatively modest compared to some of the high-water marks in the US et cetera, where they seem to have a much more rapid and much more draconian penalty regime. They seem to prosecute very quickly and the penalties are very severe. As a deterrent, I suspect that our penalty regime here is not quite sufficient, because there is a culture of crime and fraud being conducted around the country. While that is still the case in many countries, I think there could be more of a deterrent.

In our practice, obviously, we come across a lot of companies who have failed, for various reasons. To be honest, the majority are probably due to incompetence and misfortune, but there is certainly a hard-core element of fraudulent or criminal activity by people who have the status of directors of companies.

CHAIR: You said there is ‘core’ illegal activity.

Mr  McCann:    You  do  see  on  a  recurring  basis—not  the  same  people  necessarily—activity  which  is tantamount to fraud or criminal activity. You see that a lot in some these investment schemes that we are well aware of. That activity has been perpetrated very blatantly with the intention of taking funds from investors and similar parties. That is a criminal activity.

CHAIR: So you are saying to us that the penalty regime that applies is not an effective deterrent?

Mr McCann:  Seemingly so, because we seem to have recurring activity of that sort of behaviour. People do go through that process. It takes them some time to be prosecuted and, if they are prosecuted, they serve a period. I am not sure if I am correct, but usually three to six years is a fairly serious sentence. I think in the US a lot of these crimes receive in excess of 10 years penal sentences.

Mr Lombe:  Mr Chairman, could I make a small correction to what was said by the previous witness. It is on this topic. What it relates to is a comment that he made that ASIC had not pursued a criminal insolvent trading case for more than 10 years. I can tell the committee today that in fact they are pursing the Kleenmaid matter. It is a matter that is in Queensland. I think we are all familiar with the Kleenmaid product—washing machines, fridges and associated things. ASIC have taken criminal action against those directors and in fact a committal hearing finished this week and those directors have been committed to face trial.

7.  STATUTORY REPORTS BY LIQUIDATORS REGARDING OFFENCES (S.533 ETC) – SECOND DISCUSSION

CHAIR:   Thank you for that. Can we talk about statutory liquidator reports for a while? There is a huge volume filed every year—almost 7,000—from auditors and liquidators. We have had a submission from a number of firms that essentially says that auditors are frustrated with the statutory reporting process and that an enormous amount of time and expense is put into the preparation of such reports. They are filed with ASIC. There may well be some significant recommendations in their reports for follow-up action—drawing to attention shortcomings or deficiencies in various areas—and, by and large, they are received, noted, filed and moved on. In that light, does your organisation have concerns about the process and follow-up action deriving from the filing of the reports?

Mr Lombe:   Yes. That was the issue I was talking about a little bit earlier—the extension reports. For example, in a liquidation by the court, you are required to lodge a section 533 report, which deals with offences committed by directors. What that means as a liquidator is you need to review the books and records, determine the transactions, try to find out what assets are there, look at insolvent trading and look at preference payments and all those sorts of things to understand what has gone on. We are required to file that report, and it does take time. So it is time and money, and often in these official liquidations there are no assets at all. If there are, creditors are effectively paying for that.

You are quite right: thousands of them are lodged and most of them come back ‘no further action’. I think it is frustrating to liquidators because they feel, ‘Why am I bothering to do it?’

The answer is, ‘You are required to do it under the law, so you need to do it.’ So we do not support anyone not lodging section 533 reports. But you can understand someone’s frustration, where they have reported offences and nothing happens.

CHAIR:   The question then becomes: does ASIC use these thousands of reports it receives to effectively analyse and detect patterns of dubious behaviour?

Mr Lombe:   I think you could probably say they have used them in the past to come up with a phoenix activity, so they have then had a focus on phoenix activity, and still do. I believe they are reading them for trends, but the frustration is that you are reporting an offence that you believe should be prosecuted in that particular company. So the fact that they are monitoring trends or things that are coming up is certainly useful, because it may mean that they see a trend and therefore they can take some action against it. But the fact that it is not being prosecuted is a frustration. I think sometimes that happens in larger matters as well.

CHAIR: So it is the lack of prosecutorial action that you complain of?

Mr Murray (?):   I was just going to say at times, so do you use those reports where they have directors in a number of companies and they use that to identify a recurring activity for a particular individual or individuals, and then can you use that as a basis to seek a banning order, banning that party from being a director?

CHAIR:  Let us get down to brass tacks. Does your organisation have a complaint about ASIC’s response to the reports once filed?

Mr Lombe:  We have certainly raised this issue with ASIC, and the answer that comes back, in my recall, is that they simply do not have the resources to deal with it.

CHAIR: What is it that they do not have the resources to do?

Mr Lombe:  To investigate the matters and prosecute the directors.

CHAIR:  In its 2007 report, the ANAO looked at this issue and they found that, given the large number of reports received by ASIC each year that alleged offences against the Corporations Act, it was appropriate that ASIC had systems in place to prioritise its regulatory actions through risk scoring. It noted further:

… the small number of statutory reports subject to regulatory action by ASIC each year indicates that there is opportunity for greater regulatory action on these reports.

Are those findings from six or seven years ago relevant today?

Mr Lombe:  I think they are very relevant.

CHAIR:   In your view, could liquidators in their reports assist ASIC in distinguishing between the very serious breaches from the less-so? There are limited resources; there have to be priorities. Everything is not absolutely important. Is there a mechanism that could be developed whereby the industry advise ASIC that this set of issues or this set of complaints or this set of directors or this set of companies really are most egregious and need to be attended to?

Mr Lombe:  I think that might be useful reform if that were the case. If there were some way of collating or rating, if you like, particular matters, I think that could be useful. At the moment the liquidator simply prepares his report and describes—

CHAIR:  Perhaps you could develop a framework whereby, on a score of zero to 100, all of those above 80 points, for example—whatever the criteria are—are particularly egregious and warrant follow-up action, and the rest are therefore for analysis and noting purposes.

Mr Lombe:  Yes.

CHAIR:  Is it worthwhile giving consideration to the development of such a recommendation?

Mr Lombe:  I think that would be worthwhile.

CHAIR:  We are talking about developing criteria for risk scoring that liquidators and trustees would apply in the development of their report and provide to ASIC.

Mr Lombe:  That is correct. If, for example, a bankrupt does something or does not cooperate, does not file his statement of affairs or whatever, his bankruptcy can be extended, so there is an actual penalty in those sorts of things. Whereas, in a liquidation, if there is a particular offence or whatever that does not get investigated then there is no penalty.

CHAIR:  If that were the practice, after it were developed and became common practice, that would be a very, very up-to-date mechanism for noticing trends and behaviours and taking the appropriate either regulatory or prosecutorial action for the more severe cases.

Mr Lombe:  That is right. Maybe in a situation where there are automatic offences, if you have done such and such, you cannot be a director for four years.

CHAIR:  We will give consideration to such recommendations. Questions on this issue? Do you want to go onto the complaints about insolvency practitioners or do you want to go somewhere else?

8.  COMPLAINTS ABOUT INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS. STOP ORDERS.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Just about ASIC doing their job, Chair. We come to Mr Ariff and the frustration there with it being four years almost until ASIC acted. In this inquiry when I asked why it took three years to scrub out one particular financial planner when they had been given a file from the Commonwealth Bank. It is the speed at which ASIC acts that I have been finding frustrating when we know Ariff’s record and what he did.

In your submission you say that:

We mention that we support the IPA being given access to ASIC complaints details etc under the ILRB. The present laws do not allow ASIC to share information with IPA, nor IPA with ASIC.

That is the situation you were saying.

Mr Lombe:  That is the situation except I would correct that we normally provide that information to ASIC.

Senator WILLIAMS:  So you are saying you need more transparency between your organisation and ASIC to work on issues.

Mr Lombe:   Definitely. For example, we might be looking at a particular complaint about a particular member.  We  might look  at it and  really struggle  to  see  a  lot wrong  with  it once  we  have  gone  through submissions and those sorts of things. But this same practitioner, for example, could be subject to a very serious ASIC investigation. We don’t know about that, so we are making a decision about a practitioner in isolation. That is the key point we are trying to make.

Senator WILLIAMS:  While I have been running through this inquiry, Mr Lombe, I would like a stop order power be given to ASIC. In the case of financial planners, clear evidence is given to ASIC that they have given the wrong advice, have not done their job properly, ripped people off, done whatever—forgery, fraud, you name it. ASIC can just ring up that financial planner and say, ‘From this minute, you’re banned from operating as a financial planner. You can go to the AAT, if you wish to appeal it.’ How would you feel if that was also put on liquidators? If the liquidators were licensed instead of registered, so the licence was renewed every three years, and then ASIC could have gone to Ariff and in one phone call scrubbed him out. How would you feel about representing your organisation if that was to be put in place?

Mr Lombe:   I think you need to have some form of investigation in relation to these matters because the nature of insolvency is there are confrontations and that can be—

Senator WILLIAMS:  We had the 2010 Senate inquiry into liquidators and the previous government did draw up a white paper. I know the current government is working more to complete that. CarLovers are costing $1.8 million in legal fees to have Ariff removed. Who in administration has got a lazy $1.8 million to pay legal fees? That is outrageous.

Mr Lombe:  Yes. I understand the point you are making. I think there needs to be a more streamlined position where there are serious issues of conduct. It needs to be easier or there needs to be a more streamlined process that works better to do that.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Mr D’Aloisio told us at Senate estimates to deregister a liquidator is very difficult. If we have them licensed and ASIC have the power, it may never be used, but it puts your industry on notice that if you do do the wrong thing, one phone call and the next day you are down at Centrelink.

Mr Lombe:  I would like to see a bit more than one phone call, frankly. I would like to see a proper process—

Senator WILLIAMS:  The point I am making is I believe they should have the powers to say, ‘Right-o. We’ve got clear evidence here of wrongdoing,’ as they could have done with Singleton Earthmoving or Independent Powdercoating or whatever the companies were that were done over. But they haven’t got that power; instead, the company had to spend almost $2 million to have him removed out of one company. I think that is outrageous.

Mr Lombe:  That is certainly wrong. I think there needs to be a more streamlined process; I agree with you—

Senator WILLIAMS:  So do I.

Mr Lombe:  where there is serious misconduct.

Senator WILLIAMS:  There will be changes coming, I can assure you. I think you will be happy with them. I want ASIC feared. I want them to be a corporate watchdog where people are too scared to do the wrong thing. There is a lot of money out there, especially in superannuation, and there are people who do the wrong thing, clearly. I want to have a corporate watchdog that is feared out there in your industry or the financial planners or whoever to say: we do the wrong thing, ASIC will slam us straightaway.

Mr Lombe:  We certainly do not support misconduct. As I mentioned before, we are very embarrassed by the Ariff matter and we certainly support a better process to deal with someone who has a serious allegation of misconduct against them.

Senator  WILLIAMS:    You  saw  the  recommendations.  The  committee  was  chaired  by  former  South Australian Labor senator Annette Hurley, and I thought it was a good inquiry. Mr Murray, was it you who said at first that we did not need the inquiry, or was it Ms North?

Mr Murray:  It was not me; it was our previous president.

Senator WILLIAMS:   So you think there should be closer work with ASIC in terms of transparency and sharing information with the organisation?

Mr Lombe:  Yes, I would be very much in favour of that.

Senator WILLIAMS:  That would be something you would like to see this committee recommend?

Mr Lombe: Yes, I would.

9.  PRE-PACK INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATIONS

Senator WILLIAMS:  Is there anything else you would like to see? I agree with your pre-packs, by the way. I think that is something to really look at closely. I have done a lot of work with some liquidators about pre-packs to save the cost and return more money to their creditors; that is what it is all about.

Mr Lombe:   It usually stops that destruction of value. Often you have got businesses with complex arrangements—leases,  agreements,  licensing  and  all  that  sort  of  stuff.  As  soon  as  you  have  an  event  of insolvency, they are void; they can be terminated. That is the difficulty in restructuring a business.

Senator WILLIAMS:  The assets sold way below their value.

Mr Lombe:  That can be the outcome. Often the reason that occurs is that you have had a destruction of value by the existing directors; they have traded the business down. By the time the liquidator, the voluntary administrator or the receiver gets appointed, the business has been seriously impacted by the trading.

10.  WHAT CHANGES IN THE LAW WOULD HELP ASIC PERFORM BETTER?

Senator WILLIAMS:  If you were in charge of Australia for one day, what changes would you make to our Corporations Law so that ASIC can perform their job better?

Mr Lombe:  I would be trying to give ASIC some more resources, or have resources shifted, so that ASIC can focus on some of those key investigated aspects that I have been talking about today.

11.  RENEWING A LIQUIDATOR’S LICENCE

Senator WILLIAMS: Do you support user pays?

Mr Lombe:  One thing that has always amazed me in Australia is that I can go out today and set up a company and incur $1 million worth of a credit and I do not have to put any money down at all. I do not have to put a deposit down for creditors or whatever if the company gets liquidated. So I think there is some angle to that.

Senator WILLIAMS:  I am referring more to when we license your industry. You pay a licence fee every three years. Perhaps when you apply for a licence you should have a face-to-face interview instead of something on paper. People can write anything about their character and good standing, and I think that needs to be addressed as well. But they are issues that we will address later.

Mr Lombe:  One of the issues that was addressed in the reforms is that, if you want to become a liquidator, it is a paper driven exercise. If I want to become a liquidator, I have got some experience and some references and I give those to the regulator. I have never understood why there is not a face-to-face interview. The law is going to change if that bill comes in. When I became a trustee, I had to sit an exam and I had to sit through two hours of questions. So I think a face-to-face interview is the right thing in terms of when you initially get licensed. At the end of the day, it is probably something to consider in relation to ongoing licensing.

Senator WILLIAMS:   I said to my eldest son, who is a chartered accountant, ‘Why didn’t you become a liquidator?’ and he said, ‘You’ve got to be joking!’ He really baulked at the idea.

Mr Lombe:   A lot of people like the insolvency space because it is not merely liquidating companies but assisting companies to restructure. We do a lot of work to save companies from getting into liquidation and voluntary administration.

Senator WILLIAMS:  If we can save the companies—whether it be pre-pack or chapter 11—we are saving the jobs. As the chair has said, a lot of creditors would not like the freezing of assets and payments et cetera. Case International is a big agricultural machinery manufacture right around the world. They were in serious trouble 15 years ago; now they are a prime player in agricultural machinery and those jobs have been saved.

Mr Lombe:  I certainly support what you are saying and that is what our profession is developing into. The business acumen that our practitioners have is so important.

Mr Winter:  In terms of the pathways into practice, from ARITA’s perspective we have an extensive education requirement which is effectively two units of Masters level study, which is delivered by Queensland University of technology. That is part of our requirement to become a member of ARITA. So, at a professional level, we are expecting a high standard, and of course you need to be a member of Chartered Accountants, CPA, or your relevant Law Society in order to gain membership of ARITA as well.

12.  LIQUIDATOR’S FEES FOR SMALL COMPANIES

Senator  WILLIAMS:    It  has  been  suggested  to  me  that  the  liquidators’  fees  should  be  capped  when liquidating smaller companies. How do you feel about that?

Mr Lombe:  I think that is something that should be investigated.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Because 96 per cent of liquidations return less than 10c in the dollar to the creditors.

Mr Lombe:  I think a capped fee situation is something that should be investigated. One of the things I would also say is that you might get a particular matter and there might be a capped fee on it, and then you look at it and you say, ‘There’s insolvent trading that I want to pursue and there are preference payments that I want to pursue,’ so in those situations you would have to go back to the creditors and say, ‘There are these things that need to be pursued,’ and the creditors would authorise you by increasing that cap. At the end of the day, creditors control liquidators and voluntary administrators being paid.

Senator WILLIAMS:  They do to a certain extent. For example, KordaMentha, when they liquidated Ansett, were exempted, seven out of the 10 years, from reporting to ASIC. No-one should be exempted in the first year, so that ASIC can get a listing of the assets. It is ironic that during that period KordaMentha grew their offices right around Australia. We do not know how much they charged.

Mr Lombe:  I do not think that is a political matter. I think it was an anomaly that existed then.

Senator WILLIAMS:  I think there should have been three liquidators sent into Ansett—one for the aircraft, one for the real estate and one for the spare parts and machinery or whatever. It probably would have been over in two or three years instead of 10.

13.  DUTY OF CARE IN EXERCISING POWER OF SALE

CHAIR:  Can we now turn to section 420A of the act, ‘Controller’s duty of care in exercising power of sale’. It imposes a duty on the controller of a company, including liquidators, to take all reasonable care, when selling the property of a company, to obtain the best price that is reasonably obtainable, having regard to the circumstances when the property is sold. We have received a number of written complaints, and I think all of us have been lobbied extensively by persons who have been or are still aggrieved at a liquidation process. I have been made aware of allegations concerning hotels in Fremantle worth $2 million or $3 million sold off for $80,000 or

$100,000, without notice. A whole range of people have been to see me on those sorts of matters. The other example,  of  course,  is  the  South  Johnstone  sugar  mill case.  The  allegation  is  that it  was  sold  at a  much

undervalued asset price. That is the context in which I want to have a discussion about section 420A. How is this

section of the act enforced and what authority, if any, does ASIC have to deal with such allegations of assets being sold way under value?

Mr Lombe:  Let me just start, and I might ask Michael Murray to help me a little bit on this question. Section

420A is a section which relates to the duties of receivers, so we are talking about receivers disposing of assets. Section 420A is very much a procedural-type issue. In other words, I get appointed to a hotel—

Senator WILLIAMS: Does that include liquidators as well?

Mr Lombe:  No, it does not.

Senator WILLIAMS:  Section 420A does not cover liquidators?

Mr Lombe:  No. It covers receivers.

CHAIR: What is the difference between a receiver and a liquidator?

Mr Lombe:  A receiver is appointed usually—unless it is a court-appointed receiver—pursuant to a fixed and floating charge. A liquidator is appointed by the court or via the voluntary administration process if no deed of company arrangement is put in place.

CHAIR:   Are there similar or the same obligations in different sections on liquidators as there are on receivers?

Mr Lombe:  They are different. Correct me if I am wrong, Michael, but my understanding of the liquidator’s duties is that he is not to act recklessly in the realisation of an asset. He does not have a section 420A but—

CHAIR: So you have got a lesser test.

Mr Lombe:  A lesser test, yes.

CHAIR: Not to behave recklessly.

Mr Lombe:  Yes. I think they are the right words, Michael?

Mr Murray:  A liquidator has to act in the interests of creditors and, in acting in the interest of creditors, he properly should get market value or good value for the assets. But it is expressed more precisely in respect of receivers. To some extent, they are parallel, I think, or fairly equal.

CHAIR:  But, whether it be receiver or liquidator, the allegation that is, repeatedly, assets are flogged off at way below their real value or market price if there was a contested market to acquire the particular asset. Does ASIC have any ability to get involved where such allegations are made. If not, why not?

Mr Lombe:   Can I just make an initial statement in relation to 420A. I started talking about a procedural
section. What that means is that a receiver should look at the asset, he should go and obtain an evaluation in relation to the asset, he should make whatever inquiries he needs to make in respect of that asset to understand the nature of that asset, he should seek expert advice in relation to that asset if he needs to. He should do whatever he needs to do to understand that asset. He should then embark upon a selling process. Now, that selling process

would be one where he would instruct an appropriate agent. So, if you are selling a major hotel, then you are looking for a person who sells hotels, not someone who sells pubs. You would get someone of that nature, you would get expert advice as to how it should be realised and then you would kick off an appropriate advertising campaign. That might be eight weeks for expressions of interest, and there ought to be a staggered process of providing information to people et cetera. Then you would go through the process of obtaining the best offer. That would be one way of doing it. You could put it to auction, which would be another way of doing it.

So the idea of section 420A is to put in place a regime to ensure that you get the best price or a market price in relation to that asset. That is what it is trying to ensure. My understanding is that it is not in that section that ASIC can take action. Although you are obviously breaching the law, my understanding, again, is that it would need to be someone like a creditor or a director who says, ‘You’ve breached section 420A,’ and who would need to prosecute that through the courts. That is my understanding.

CHAIR: Or indeed the owner of the asset.

Mr Lombe:  Yes, the owner of the asset. I do not think ASIC normally gets involved—

Mr Murray:  Typically, it is the owner of the business that challenges the receiver on the sale of the asset, saying that it was sold at under its value. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr Lombe, but often owners of businesses have an unrealistic expectation of the value of their business, and it is not an uncommon complaint that what was a wonderful business was sold too cheaply, but that is not the reality.

Mr Lombe:  I can give you an example of a major hotel—you would know the name; it is a hotel in Sydney. It was previously bought at $45 million. It was sold for around $20 million. This particular hotel was the subject of various programs on TV about the destruction in value that had occurred. In fact, the hotel, rather than having 200 guests in it—or 200 rooms multiplied by the number of guests—had three or four people in it. So you can destroy the value of particular assets. The reason I gave that example of a hotel is that the income a hotel can generate is about occupancy. If you have no income from that hotel, your price will be affected. In an insolvency situation, when you get appointed, that asset can be seriously distressed, and that is why the asset just will not be sold or will sell at a very low level.

CHAIR:   Okay. I understand the point you are making about section 420A and the process that should be followed to realise maximum value when the assets are realised, and I also accept the point that Mr Murray made that often the owner of a business will have an inflated view of its value. Is there any recourse available to the owner of the asset or creditors both before and after the sale if they believe the asset has been significantly undervalued and flogged off at way below market price?

Mr Lombe:  I think their recourse is to take legal action against the receiver for sale at below value.

CHAIR: And, essentially, alleged negligence, I suppose.

Mr Lombe:  Well, it is alleged that they breached section 420A.

CHAIR:  Is that the only avenue you are aware of?

Mr Murray:  Yes, they can take court action. I would have to say, from my experience in reading the law reports, they do not often succeed—I say that as a generalisation. You asked whether ASIC has a power. ASIC has  a  power  generally  over  receivers,  which  is  under  section  423  of  the  Corporations  Act,  in  respect  of misconduct or inattention to their duties, and there is a similar power in respect of liquidators. That is an overarching power that ASIC has in respect of the conduct of receivers.

CHAIR:  Okay. Based on your experience, gentlemen, does this section 420A, as it applies to liquidators and receivers in the context of allegations of the sale of assets at way under market price, need to be strengthened in any respect or is it adequate?

Mr McCann:  I think it is very adequate. As a practising receiver I know it is one of the things we are most mindful of whenever we take possession, say, for a bank of an asset and take it to market. We are very mindful of obtaining value and going through that process to ensure we are attaining the maximum possible price for the asset. That means we are very rigid around following a due process for the sale—in fact, to the point that, on day one of an appointment, you often get presented with people saying, ‘I want to buy that asset,’ and they put an offer on the table and you have to say, ‘That’s great. That looks like a very good offer but I cannot accept it because I have to go through a process to make sure that is the right value.’

CHAIR:   Does due process in realising the value of the assets necessarily involve a public process and competition and tenders? If not, should it?

Mr Lombe: It does and it should.

CHAIR:  I received complaints that business that have been wound up and the assets flogged off for way, way below market price was done by some fix where there was no tender process, and all of a sudden the new owner had it.

Mr Lombe:  That is wrong.

Mr McCann:  In the case of receivership that is clearly wrong.

CHAIR:  Is it also illegal?

Mr Lombe:  It is in breach of the law.

Mr McCann:  However, in a case of liquidation there are circumstances where a liquidator with no funds has an asset and has no ability to trade or continue the business to allow an opportunity to achieve a higher value, if that is possible, and may need to act to close down the business and sell the assets, because there is no way that they can pay employees the next week or the next day because there are no funds available. In that case you will see a more rapid fire-sale type of situation.

Mr Lombe:  It again goes to that issue of a liquidation versus a receivership.

14.  ACCESS TO INFORMATION HELD BY ASIC

CHAIR:   Yes, I get that  point. You noted that ASIC receives and  stores prescribed information under legislation and some of this information can be made public. But you argue that anonymous and aggregate statistics can be made public if ASIC so chooses. Can you put some more meat on those bones about why and how information should be made public?

Mr Murray:  I think we are making the point there that Mr Harris made earlier about access to statistics. We feel frustrated—along with Mr Harris and other academics—about the lack of statistics, particularly in the insolvency area.  We  compare  that  very  much,  for  example,  to  AFSA—the  Australian  Financial  Security Authority, which is the bankruptcy regulator. They produce good statistics which inform the law reform process in bankruptcy. We do not have that sort of information in corporate insolvency. We were able to attend the previous session with Mr Harris, where you made a suggestion to him that he formulate some areas where ASIC might better produce information.

CHAIR:  Could you take the question that I gave to Mr Harris and provide us, with some degree of urgency, a written note advising the type of information that ASIC has that should be made publicly available and that would be of use?

Mr Murray: Yes.

Mr Lombe:  I would make you aware of a situation. ARITA gives a research prize so that someone can do research. One of our prize-winners was looking at deeds of company arrangement. When you go into voluntary administration, there is a decision about whether you go into liquidation or a deed of company arrangement. He was trying to work out how many companies go into deeds of company arrangement and how successful those deeds of company arrangements are. He wanted to get access to information from ASIC to be able to do that very important research. It would have cost thousands of dollars and ASIC just said, ‘We can’t give that information to you.’

CHAIR: Can’t or won’t?

Mr Lombe:  Won’t.

CHAIR: Did they offer a reason?

Mr Murray:  I think they said that they cannot—and I think this was referred to earlier—because they are legislatively prevented from waiving fees or giving out information.

CHAIR: Can you take that request on notice and provide us a written response?

Mr Lombe:  Within the month?

CHAIR: Yes.

Mr Murray: Yes.

CHAIR:  And also advise us if there are legislative prohibitions in the act that we need to have a look at as well in formulating our recommendations. If ASIC are prohibited under the law to provide the information, unless the act is changed, they cannot. So we need to be aware of that as well.

15.  LIQUIDATORS LICENCES AND STOP ORDERS (AGAIN)

Mr Murray:   I would like to make a final comment, please. Senator Williams, you mentioned earlier the issues about practitioner regulation and the cost of, for example, removing Mr Ariff from CarLovers and the cost to creditors, and also the idea of regulating a practitioner by way of ASIC immediately terminating their licence. I just wanted to point out—and I am sure you are aware—

Senator WILLIAMS: A stop order; not terminate their licence—put their licence on hold.

Mr Murray:  I just wanted to point out that, following on from this report that we were involved in before, we have the bill and there is quite a regime in the bill giving powers to ASIC and also its counterpart AFSA in relation to those sorts of circumstances that you described. Also, in respect of removal of a practitioner, you do not have to go to court under the bill; the creditors can make that decision by—

Senator WILLIAMS: Has that bill has been introduced to the House?

Mr Murray:  It is not in the House; it is what is called—

Senator WILLIAMS:  It is being planned.

Mr Murray:   It is an exposure draft and we have been working closely with Treasury with respect to refinements of its draft.

Senator WILLIAMS:  I have looked over it piece by piece, the proposals, and have kept a close eye on it. Are you pretty happy with the proposals?

Mr Murray:  We are—yes. We would like to think we have had a fair degree of input into it and we would encourage its further progress into parliament.

Senator WILLIAMS: Good. I have been briefed and I am very happy with what has been proposed.

Mr Murray: Thank you.

CHAIR: Thank you very much for your assistance today and for your involvement.

Mr Murray: Thank you.

______________________________________________________________________________

 END OF POST

Jan 142014
 

On the Insolvency Interface blog site menu

I have created a directory facility for insolvency practitioners, lawyers and other consultants that provide specialist insolvency and recovery services (corporate and personal) to list their names and contact details.  This facility is available free of charge and obligation free until 30 June 2014.

Just click on the menu item “Insolvency & Recovery Services Directory” (above).

Then on “Submit a Listing”, and follow the prompts.  You will be asked to enter your category of service, business name, location, phone number, and a description of your services.  You can also supply certain other information if you like, such as your web site address.

Visitors will be able search the directory by business name, category of service, location, etc.

Peter Keenan 14/1/2014

Oct 292013
 

The Australian Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA) today released the third edition of its Code of Professional Practice, together with a new Explanatory Memorandum, a document showing all changes, and four templates for insolvency practitioners to use as guides when preparing such documents for creditors.

IPA announcement

From IPA website, www.ipaa.com.au

Oct 162013
 

Before accepting an appointment as liquidator or administrator of an insolvent company the insolvency practitioner (IP) must evaluate his or her relationships with the company and with those who are involved or have an interest in its affairs. In the following decision chart and accompanying notes I suggest that there are three main steps in the evaluation process.

Step 1 is fairly simple: the task is to ensure that the IP is not prohibited or disqualified from acting by the express laws on disqualification for reason of a specific connection that are contained in the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act), i.e., sections 448C and 532.

Step 2 may be far more difficult. It involves looking out for other relationships which the Act deems to be, prima facie, of interest to creditors of the company (sections 60, 436DA, 449CA and 506A). If such a relationship exists, the IP must evaluate whether the relationship is “relevant”. Unless such a relationship is “trivial”, it will be “relevant”.

If the IP is of the view that there are no relevant relationship, he or she may accept appointment. (His or her view that there are no relevant relationships must be declared in writing in the Declaration of Relevant Relationships presented to creditors (section 60)).

Step 3 in the evaluation process is required if the IP considers that there is a relevant relationship. Relevant relationships need to be evaluated to see whether they give rise to, or are likely to give rise to, a conflict of interest or a conflict of duty for the IP in the performance of his or her obligations. This is a complex issue, which is expanded upon in Note 3.

If the IP forms the view that because of a relevant relationship he or she has or is likely to have a conflict of interest or a conflict of duty, he or she must decline to take the appointment.

On the other hand, if the IP’s view is that there is no such conflict, the IP must – in the written Declaration of Relevant Relationships – give details of the relationship and explain why he or she believes that it does not and will not give rise to a conflict of interest or a conflict of duty.

ThreatsToIndependence_Evaluation Chart_samll

ThreatsToIndependence_Notes_resized

Insolvency practitioners cleared to provide tax and BAS agent services

 BAS, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency practices, Personal Bankruptcy, Returns, Taxation Issues  Comments Off on Insolvency practitioners cleared to provide tax and BAS agent services
Jul 202012
 

Liquidators who provide a tax agent or BAS service to the company they are administering do not have to be registered as tax agents or BAS agents.

That is the ruling issued by the Tax Practitioners Board on 26 June 2012 in its Information Sheet TPB(1) 12/2012.

The same rule applies to most other types of insolvency practitioners appointed under the Corporations Act or the Bankruptcy Act.

CONDITIONS APPLY:

But the rule, or exemption, only applies to work done for the client after the insolvency practitioner’s appointment.  During the pre-appointment period the ban on unregistered persons providing a tax agent service or a BAS service for a fee or reward will apply.

The insolvency practitioners exempted under the ruling are liquidators, provisional liquidators, company administrators, administrators of deeds of company arrangement, receivers, receivers and managers, and bankruptcy trustees.

But the exemption might not apply to insolvency practitioners who act as agents for mortgagees in possession.  On one reading of the Information Sheet it seems that because such insolvency practitioners are not agents of the company (as are liquidators, administrators and receivers) then they might not be performing the tax/BAS agent services “in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of the insolvency practitioner under the terms of the relevant legislation” in a situation “analogous to that of a self-preparing entity”.  (See paras. 20 and 21.)

The Information Sheet also addresses the situation where, during the post-appointment period, an insolvency practitioner “bring(s) in outside consultants such as accountants or bookkeepers to deal with the entity’s tax or BAS issues”.  The Tax Practitioners Board says that such consultants would need to be registered.

In other words, the exemption only applies where the insolvency practitioners or his or her employees carry out the tax work.

To see the TPB Information Sheet CLICK HERE.

Laws governing insolvency practitioners to change

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Regulation  Comments Off on Laws governing insolvency practitioners to change
Dec 152011
 

On 14 December 2011 a new paper proposing changes to laws governing Australia’s insolvency practitioners was released by the departments of the Treasurer and the Attorney-General.  The paper’s introduction describes the intention and aims of the changes:

“The reforms are intended to improve value for money for recipients of insolvency services and to address cases of misconduct in the insolvency profession …. The reforms are aimed at ensuring the framework for insolvency practitioners promotes a high level of professionalism and competence by practitioners; promotes market competition on price and quality; provides for increased efficiency in insolvency administration; and enhances communication and transparency between stakeholders.”

The paper provides the following overview of the proposals:

  1. Reforms to the standards of entry into the insolvency profession are proposed to improve the balance between the need to protect consumers of insolvency services with the need for a competitive market that provides the best opportunity for maximising returns to creditors. 

  2. The qualification and experience requirements for insolvency practitioners would be aligned across the personal and corporate regimes. The requirements would include a prescribed level of formal studies in insolvency administration, adequate insurance cover, a fit and proper person test, and the requirement that the person has not been convicted of an offence involving fraud and dishonesty in the past 10 years.

  3. The framework for standards of entry would also be adjusted to allow conditions to be placed upon insolvency practitioners. This would include conditions on the registration of a particular practitioner and industry‑wide conditions. Standard conditions would be able to be imposed in relation to continuing education, quality assurance or review programs, insurance, complaint handling, residency, and inactive practice.

  4. The registration of practitioners would be aligned in a manner similar to the current personal insolvency process. Applications for registration would be determined by Committees composed of a regulator representative, an industry representative and a third person selected from a panel appointed by the Minister. Practitioners would be required to renew their registration every three years. 

  5. Reforms to remuneration arrangements are also proposed, including mandated caps on prospective fee approvals; restrictions on payments of disbursements to related entities; amendments to minimum fee entitlements; and the introduction of mechanisms for independent investigations into costs for corporate insolvency. Given recent substantial changes to remuneration arrangements in personal insolvency, there would be limited amendments to the rules regarding practitioner remuneration as part of this package.

  6. Significant communication and monitoring reforms are proposed to better empower creditors to monitor administrations and obtain information from practitioners. The laws governing committees of inspection would be aligned and consolidated, with committees of inspection being given expanded functions and rights. Creditors would have improved abilities to make reasonable requests for information; to set reporting requirements and to require meetings to be convened. Changes would also be made to allow resolutions to be passed without meetings in order to streamline the operation of administrations and reduce costs.

  7. Funds handling and record keeping rules would be aligned and made more efficient. Rules regarding the audit of accounts would be reformed and the ability of the regulators to appoint a person to audit the financial statements of an insolvency administration would be aligned. Mechanisms to enable third party reviews by insolvency practitioners of corporate administrations would also be introduced.

  8. Insurance rules would be revised and penalties for not taking out appropriate cover significantly increased. A practitioner would be required to take all reasonable steps to maintain adequate and appropriate professional indemnity insurance and adequate and appropriate fidelity insurance, with an increase in the offence from 5 penalty units ($550) to up to 1000 penalty units ($110,000) for a breach of this duty.

  9. There would be significant reforms to discipline and deregistration mechanisms. The regulators would be empowered to take direct action in relation to certain breaches. Liquidators would no longer be subject to the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board’s (CALDB’s) jurisdiction. Personal and corporate insolvency practitioners would be subject to Committees modelled on the current personal insolvency disciplinary mechanisms, with an expansion in Committees’ powers. Recognised professional bodies would be able to make referrals to the Committee in the same way as regulators.

  10. Reforms are also proposed to provide creditors with powers regarding the removal and replacement of insolvency practitioners. Creditors would be given the power to remove practitioners by resolution, subject to protections against actions that amount to an improper use of the power. Amendments would provide for the efficient transfer of records from outgoing to incoming practitioners.

  11. Regulators’ powers would be amended in relation to information gathering, information provision to stakeholders, and their ability to require meetings to be called. The ability of the regulators to gather information would be clarified and enhanced. The reforms would facilitate cooperative arrangements between the personal insolvency regulator and corporate insolvency regulator. Mechanisms would be introduced to ensure transparency in relation to regulator resourcing, the levels of complaints and referrals, regulator activity and regulatory outcomes.

  12. Specific reforms are also proposed to ensure that the insolvency framework works for small businesses. It is proposed that reforms would be introduced to ensure compliance by directors with filing and record provision obligations; allow practitioners to assign causes of action; facilitate greater co‑operation between the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (ITSA) on connected insolvencies; and improve the utilisation of the existing Assetless Administration Fund (AA Fund).

  13. The Government’s 2010 Corporate Insolvency Reform Package has also been revised to ensure it is consistent and complements the proposed reforms set out in the Proposals Paper.

 The paper – titled ‘A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia’ –  may be viewed and downloaded from the following links

Interested parties have been invited to comment on the paper by 3 February 2012.  Written submissions are to be sent to:

The Manager
Governance and Insolvency Unit
Corporations and Capital Markets Division
The Treasury
Langton Crescent
PARKES ACT 2600
Email: insolvency@treasury.gov.au

Phone enquiries may be made by calling Alix Gallo on (02) 6263 2870.

Aug 102011
 

The Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (IPA) has suggested that solvent companies pay a fee to fund the liquidation of small assetless companies.  The proposal is that this new pool of funds be used to pay a set fee to liquidators who are willing to do the work.

The IPA’s proposal is made in its July 2011 submission to the Treasury, in response to an Options Paper on regulation of insolvency practitioners. 

This fund would be in addition to the existing Assetless Administrations Fund (AAF).  The problem with the AAF is that it is not open to liquidators of assetless companies unless and until they have conducted preliminary investigations and made preliminary reports to the Australian Securities and Investments commission (ASIC), and then only for the purpose of paying for additional investigations and reports by liquidators where it appears that directors ought to be banned or prosecuted.

 The IPA is the professional body covering over 85% of registered insolvency practitioners in Australia.  In its submission, forwarded this week to members, it says:

 “Currently there is no process for an assetless insolvent corporation to be wound up in the absence of a director or creditor able and prepared to indemnify the practitioner’s remuneration. In the case of a court liquidation, practitioners are required to conduct the administration with no prospect of remuneration.

 We recommend the establishment of a fund to have practitioners wind up small assetless corporations, on the basis of a set fee available either to all providers, or to a panel of willing providers **, and with the ability for the practitioner to apply to the current assetless administration fund if their work identifies the likelihood of offences. (** As an example, under the regime operating in Hong Kong, practitioners bid for work of this kind quoting a fixed fee for the administrations they would undertake.)

 This scheme could be funded via a levy imposed at the time of initial company registration, or by a small annual fee charged on every corporation. The large number of corporations at any  time means that the annual fee could be very low and still provide adequate funds for the operation of the scheme.

 There are very low barriers to the formation of a corporation inAustralia, and every corporation in the economy benefits from the health and reliability of the insolvency regime. While the frequency of insolvent administration is very low, any corporation has the potential to enter the insolvency regime at some future point. It is therefore reasonable that the costs of administering assetless insolvent corporations be born equally by corporations across the economy.   

 An alternative approach would be for ASIC to administratively deregister such companies without a formal insolvency process. (But) In our opinion, this option would encourage poor corporate behaviour.  By ensuring that a company is left with no assets in the event of insolvency, a director might seek to avoid any investigation into the failure of the company and any possible breach of duties.

 The recommended approach ensures that a minimum level of investigation is done which can lead to further applications for funding in the event that offences or recoverable transactions are identified. 

 Such initial funding to wind up these companies would also:

 •   Ensure protection of employees’ rights by allowing employees to access the GEERS scheme (or any such replacement arrangement); (GEERS is the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme, administered by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations)

 •   Provide a deterrent to poor corporate behaviour by directors, though this needs to be supported by a proactive corporate regulator; and

 •   Assist ASIC to identify directors who should be banned from continuing in such a role. “

 _____________________________________________________________________

The IPA submission – which is 36 pages long and seems to respond to all the issues and questions raised in the Options Paper – will be published, along with all other public submissions, in a few weeks.