Peter Keenan

Resident of Australia. Former Chartered Accountant. Fellow CPA. Former Registered Liquidator (25 years). Experienced in corporate and personal insolvency law and practice; forensic accounting; writing; research; taxation law and practice; accounting and bookeeping.

Corporate insolvency laws: the shape of things to come

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Law reform proposals, Regulation, Standards  Comments Off on Corporate insolvency laws: the shape of things to come
Nov 282014
 

The exposure draft of Australia’s Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014  has, in its 240 pages dealing with corporate insolvency,  so many proposed changes in the form of amended, repealed, omitted, added and substituted words, items, definitions and sections, and so many additional parts, divisions, subdivisions, schedules and transitional provisions, that only an expert with tremendous devotion to the task would be able to understand what it all means and see what the new law governing corporate insolvencies is going to look like. The rest of us will probably have to wait until this Bill is passed and a compilation of the Corporations Act 2001 that takes into account all these changes is prepared.

Even then it appears we’ll see quite a mishmash of insolvency laws scattered throughout the Corporations Act and its Rules and Regulations. Perhaps our corporate insolvency laws need a real clean up, like gathering all existing provisions together and moving the lot (with amendments and additions) out of the Corporations Act and into a new, specific Act, such as a Corporate Insolvency Act. But that’s a discussion for another day.

However, one of the changes proposed by the Insolvency Law Reform Bill will take us a little in this direction. Several rules that are currently scattered throughout the Corporations Act will be encompassed in a new Division 4 – which is to be called the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations).  It will be added to Part 5.9 (Miscellaneous) of Chapter 5 (External Administration) of the Corporations Act 2001. The table below shows the layout of this new Division and points to the pages of the Bill’s Exposure Draft where the text of the laws is set out. I hope it’s of some help to those trying to understand the proposed changes.

 

Division 4—Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations)

Part

Division

Exposure Draft – pages

1-Introduction 1-Introduction 151 to 152
5-Definitions 153 to 158
2-Registering and disciplining practitioners 10-Introduction 158 to 159
15-Register of liquidators 159 to 160
20-Registering liquidators 160 to 168
25-Insurance 169
30-Annual liquidator returns 170
35-Notice requirements 171 to 172
40-Disciplinary and other action 172 to 189
45-Court oversight of registered liquidators 189 to 190
50-Committees under this Part 190 to 195
3-General rules relating to external administrations 55-Introduction 195
60-Remuneration and other benefits received by external administrators 196 to 208
65-Funds handling 208 to 215
70-Information 216 to 234
75-Meetings 235 to 244
80-Committees of inspection 244 to 256
85-Directions by creditors 256 to 257
90-Review of the external administration of a company 257 to 269
4-Other matters 95-Introduction 270
100-Other matters 270 to 271
105-The Insolvency Practice Rules *** 271 to 272. (Note: To be made by the Minister.)

*** The Bill’s Exposure Draft mentions  the Insolvency Practice Rules many times, stating how and where they may be used to clarify, interpret, amplify, refine and flesh out the insolvency laws. A separate document – a 27 page Proposals Paper for Insolvency Practice Rules – has been released for comment (closing date 19/12/2014). The part of the Paper that applies to Corporate Insolvency is pages 16 to 27.

Note:  There is an official Explanatory Material to the exposure draft of the Bill. It is 228 pages long, but only 115 pages concern  changes to corporate insolvency laws!

________________________ END OF POST ____________________________

2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Law, Personal Bankruptcy, Regulation  Comments Off on 2014 version of Bill to amend corporate and personal insolvency laws
Nov 172014
 

On 7 November 2014  an exposure draft of the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (ILRB 2014) was released by the Australian Treasury for comment.

The Treasury Crest

Summaries:

The Treasury’s summary/promotion of the legislation is as follows:

“The draft Bill comprises a package of proposals to amend and streamline the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and the Corporations Act 2001. The proposed amendments will:

•remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
•enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
•promote market competition on price and quality;
•boost confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners; and
•remove unnecessary costs from the insolvency industry resulting in around $55.4 million per annum in compliance cost savings.”

The Explanatory Material issued with the Bill opens with this outline:

“The Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (Bill) amends the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Bankruptcy Act) to create common rules that would:
• remove unnecessary costs and increase efficiency in insolvency administrations;
• align and modernise the registration and disciplinary frameworks that apply to registered liquidators and registered trustees;
• align and modernise a range of specific rules relating to the handling of personal bankruptcies and corporate external administrations;
• enhance communication and transparency between stakeholders;
• promote market competition on price and quality;
• improve the powers available to the corporate regulator to regulate the corporate insolvency market and the ability for both regulators to communicate in relation to insolvency practitioners operating in both the personal and corporate insolvency markets; and
• improve overall confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners.”

 Links to government material:

The draft Bill (ILRB 2014) in PDF format

The Explanatory Material in PDF format

The Insolvency Practice Rules – Proposals Paper in PDF format

Coversheet for a submission by post

The Treasury website page

Previous Bill and background material:

The first version of ILRB 2014 appeared on 19/12/2012 as Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2012, but it never became law. However, the 2012 Explanatory Memorandum and  the 2012 Exposure Draft  contains valuable background information related to the current Bill. (Sixteen submissions were made for this 2012 consultation.)

Further background information regarding ILRB 2014 is available in the June 2011 Treasury Options Paper titled “A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia”. (Thirty three submissions were made for this consultation.)

The 2011 options paper was followed in December 2011 by a Proposals Paper with the same title. (Twenty nine submissions were made for this consultation.)

Submissions regarding ILRB 2014:

Closing date for submissions: Friday, 19 December 2014.

Email submissions are to be done online at:

http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/Submission-Form?parent={34029467-07BE-46D9-AA9E-86DAC3715DFF}

Address for written submissions:

Manager
Corporations and Scheme Unit
Financial System and Services Division
The Treasury
Langton Crescent
PARKES ACT 2600

 For enquiries call Peter Levy at The Treasury on (02) 6263 3976.

Further posts on this site:

Further posts will be made on this blog site in the coming days with details of some of the proposed changes to corporate insolvency laws.

 


 

Oct 222014
 

” Working at the coal face of insolvency and restructuring, our members have a unique view of the effectiveness of our legislative framework in restoring the economic value of underperforming businesses. For the optimum operation of markets, it’s vital that their expertise is utilised to ensure our legislative framework is the best that it can be.”

This statement from the Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association (ARITA) – the professional body to which most insolvency practitioners belong – accompanies publication (14-10-2014) of its discussion paper on dealing with corporate financial distress in Australia.

ARITA says that its discussion paper – “A Platform for Recovery” – identifies seven current issues in the insolvency regime and proposes law and practice reforms to remedy them.  The paper’s Executive Summary is as follows:

ARITA executive summary

The following are further statements made by ARITA on the launch its plans:

“As Australia’s insolvency and recovery professional body, we must have a clear and well-articulated policy position across the full gambit of issues that we cover, that all key stakeholders are aware of.  Our new discussion paper … identifies seven current issues in the insolvency regime and proposes law and practice reforms to remedy them.  The discussion paper does not go into the detail of specific legislative change, but concentrates on concepts and their merits …. The goal of the discussion paper is to stimulate active and informed discussion of the issues that are raised. This will inform ARITA’s final policy position …. A foundation of our thinking is that the current “one size fits all” approach to dealing with companies in financial distress is flawed.”

A copy of  A Platform for Recovery may be viewed and obtained at this location on the ARITA website.

ARITA is inviting contributions to the debate. To go to their discussion forum, go to ….   www.arita-forums.com.au

Oct 102014
 

The Federal Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal by the Australian Taxation Office against a court ruling that where a tax assessment has not been issued liquidators have no obligation under s 254(1)(d) of the Income Tax Assessment Act to retain from the proceeds of sale an amount sufficient to pay an apparent Capital Gains Tax liability . (Judgment dated 8/10/2014, Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCAFC 133.)

The liquidators of Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd entered into a contract of sale of real property in Creastmead, Qld. The ATO argued that a tax liability for the capital gain arising from the sale arose when the sale occurred, and, accordingly, on receipt of the proceeds of sale, the liquidators were obliged under s 254(1)(d) to retain from the proceeds of sale an amount sufficient to pay that tax liability regardless of whether a tax assessment had been issued.

ATO-logoARITA logo

A couple of years ago the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) (then the IPAA) and the ATO decided to run a test case on the obligations of liquidators upon the occurrence of a CGT event.

Justice-Blind-Scales

 

The decision in the first instance by Justice Logan of the Federal Court (in March 2013) has been confirmed by Justices  Edmonds, Collier and Davies.  Davies J summed up the decision as follows (paragraphs 34 and 35):

“Section 254(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“ITAA36”) applies to liquidators because liquidators are deemed to be “trustees” for the purposes of the taxation laws: see definition of “trustee” in s 6(1) of the ITAA36. As the consequence, a liquidator is “answerable as taxpayer” in respect of income, profits or capital gains derived by the liquidator in his or her representative capacity (s 254(1)(a)), and is required to lodge returns of such income, profits or capital gains and liable to “be assessed thereon”, but in his or her representative capacity only (s 254(1)(b)). Section 254(1)(d) then requires the liquidator to retain “out of any money” which comes to the liquidator in his or her representative capacity, sufficient money to pay tax that “is or will become due” in respect of such “income, profits or gains”, and s 254(1)(e) makes the liquidator personally liable for the tax payable to the extent of the amount retained, or which “should have been retained”. On its proper construction, it seems to me that the section contemplates that in the circumstances where the section is engaged, a post appointment tax liability, if any, will be assessed to the liquidator in his or her representative capacity, rather than to the company. That said, the analysis serves in my view to confirm that any personal liability falling upon the liquidator arises only if, and where, an assessment has issued, and there is an amount of tax that “is or will become due” in the sense of “assessed as owing”. For the reasons expressed by Edmonds J, the Commissioner’s construction of the phrase “is or will become due” as it is used in s 254(1)(d) is to be rejected. In my view the primary judge was correct to hold that the reasoning in Bluebottle UK Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] HCA 54; (2007) 232 CLR 598 in respect of the proper construction of s 255 of the ITAA36 applies equally to the proper construction of s 254, and that s 254(1)(d) is to be read as referring to an amount of tax that has been assessed. “

Interestingly, the appeal judges did not comment on Justice Logan’s cautionary advice to liquidators at the first hearing, which was:

“… Even though, for the reasons given, s 254 does not require retention upon the mere happening of a CGT event, that does not mean that a liquidator is obliged immediately to distribute the resultant gain or part thereof as a dividend to creditors in the course of the winding up. A prudent liquidator, like a prudent trustee of a trust estate or executor of a will, would be entitled to retain the gain for a time against other expenses which might arise in the course of the administration. Further, in relation to income tax, the liquidator would at the very least be entitled to retain the gain until the income tax position in respect of the tax year in which the CGT event had occurred had become certain by the issuing of an assessment or other advice from the Commissioner that, for example, no tax was payable in respect of that income year….” __________________________________________________________________________________

For my other posts on this topic see: “Post-appointment income tax debts of liquidator” 10 October 2010 “Decision only partly resolves tax puzzle for liquidators” 7 March 2014 “ATO appeals against decision in Australian Building Sysytems case” 19 March 2014

ASIC publishes an overview of statistics and offences reported by liquidators

 ASIC, Corporate Insolvency, Insolvency Statistics, Offences, Regulation  Comments Off on ASIC publishes an overview of statistics and offences reported by liquidators
Sep 302014
 

In the 2013–14 financial year, 7,218 reports alleging misconduct were lodged with ASIC by external administrators.

That’s one statistic contained in “Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports (July 2013 to June 2014)”, a report by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The report (Report 412) is the latest data from ASIC on liquidations and other forms of external administrations.

ASIC Media Release

The following is from ASIC’s media release of 29 September 2014:

Report 412 Insolvency statistics: External administrators’ reports (July 2013 to June 2014) (REP 412) is ASIC’s sixth report and provides information on the nature of corporate insolvencies, supplementing the monthly and quarterly statistics that ASIC publishes on its website.

The report summarises information from 10,073 reports received during the 2013–14 financial year and includes ASIC’s response to reports of alleged misconduct from external administrators.

Commissioner John Price acknowledged the work of external administrators in carrying out their investigations and reporting to ASIC.

‘External administrators’ reports are a critical source of intelligence for ASIC. In addition to providing more detailed qualitative data, the information obtained from reports helps ASIC focus its regulatory efforts. It also helps us assess whether enforcement action is warranted, or if a director banning action should be pursued.

‘We encourage external administrators to provide these reports and any allegations of misconduct in a timely manner to assist in our supervision of insolvency and corporate governance issues,’ Mr Price said.

Profile of insolvent companies

REP 412 includes information about the profile of companies placed into external administration, including:
•industry types
•employee numbers
•causes of company failure
•estimated number and value of a company’s unsecured creditor debts, and
•estimated dividends to unsecured creditors.

Table 1 summarises key data from the report.

REP 412 shows small to medium size corporate insolvencies again dominated external administrators’ reports. Of note, 86% had assets of $100,000 or less, 81% had less than 20 employees and 43% had liabilities of $250,000 (or less).

97% of creditors in this group received between 0–11 cents in the dollar, reflecting the asset/liability profile of small to medium size corporate insolvencies.

Allegations of misconduct

REP 412 details how often external administrators report alleged misconduct by company officers and the types of alleged misconduct most frequently reported.

In the 2013–14 financial year, 7,218 reports alleging misconduct were lodged with ASIC by external administrators.

ASIC asked external administrators to prepare 802 supplementary reports where external administrators alleged company officer misconduct. This accounted for 11.1% of all reports, which alleged misconduct, lodged in the financial year.

Supplementary reports are typically detailed, free-format reports, which set out the results of the external administrator’s inquiries and the evidence they have to support alleged offences. Generally, ASIC can determine whether to commence a formal investigation on the basis of a supplementary report. While only a portion of the offences reported may result in a formal investigation or surveillance, ASIC uses the information for broader intelligence and targeting purposes.
In both the 2012–13 and 2013–14 financial years, after assessment, ASIC referred 25% and 19% of these cases respectively for investigation or surveillance.

ASIC considers a range of factors when deciding to investigate and take enforcement action and this is detailed in Information Sheet 151 ASIC’s approach to enforcement (INFO 151).

Future improvements: Reporting of alleged insolvent trading and other offences

To assist external administrators in their reporting obligations, ASIC anticipates releasing an amended report template for external administrators (Form EX01) in early-2015.

The amendments aim to capture more accurate information on alleged insolvent trading offences which might provide greater insight into the extent of insolvent trading and enable ASIC to focus our resources on matters that warrant further investigation.

The revised form is a further ASIC initiative to collect better information on corporate insolvencies in Australia. It complements recent enhancements to other forms to capture data in electronic format such as:
•industry statistics for external administration appointments from Form 505 (notice of appointment)
•key information from deeds of company arrangement from an enhanced Form 5047, and
•key financial data from Form 524 (presentation of accounts and statement).

ASIC expects to continue our work with industry to improve reporting including on other offences, such as alleged breaches of director duties.

The full Report 412 is available for download in PDF format from ASIC.

Sep 032014
 

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association (ARITA) has released its second-round submission (26/8/2014) to the government’s Financial System Inquiry (FSI). ARITA has more than 2,200 members practising in, or interested in, the insolvency and restructuring industry. It’s full 32 page submission can be seen HERE. The Executive Summary from the submission appears below:

ARITA submission Part 1

ARITA-exec-summary-part2

ARITA-exec-summary-part3

 

Aug 292014
 

Background

In the brief External Administration section of its Interim Report in July 2014 the Financial Systems Inquiry (FSI) aired criticisms of Australia’s external administration regime as it applies to small and medium companies (SMEs), and sought views from interested parties. (See my previous blog on this subject.) Specifically it asked for views on “the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the following policy options or other alternatives: 1. No change to current arrangements. 2. Implement the 2012 proposals to reduce the complexity and cost of external administration for SMEs.” Also, the FSI sought more information in response to the question, “Is there evidence that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail and, if so, what could be done to address this?” The following is ASIC’s response to these questions, taken from it’s second submission to the FSI  on 26/8/2014:


ASIC logo

 Response by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)

(Note: Headings added by author)

CLICK HERE to see copy of full ASIC second-round submission

The anticipated benefits of the 2012 insolvency law reform proposals

(Author’s note: These proposal are in the Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2013 )

Para.468     ASIC welcomes the anticipated benefits of the Australian Government’s 2012 insolvency law reform proposals, which largely aim to harmonise and align the systems of corporate and personal insolvency by introducing: (a) a streamlined model for winding up or restructuring small- and medium-sized enterprises; and (b) a review of current external administration options for restructuring large and complex, financially distressed companies to consider whether Australia could adopt attributes of external administration processes in other jurisdictions to achieve better outcomes.

Para.469     However, we note that these proposals do not fully address the issue of perceived complexity in Australia’s insolvency regime, or the issue of the costs of the regime. The law reform proposals arose out of the 2010 Senate inquiry into the conduct of insolvency practitioners and ASIC’s involvement. The 2010 Senate Inquiry’s terms of reference reflected concerns about registered liquidator conduct and ASIC’s supervision of registered liquidators, rather than more fundamental policy issues.

Para.470      The vast majority of external administrations occur in the small- and medium-sized enterprise market. For these companies, the opportunity exists to consider how the winding up and restructuring processes might be further streamlined to reduce complexity and costs. Initiatives to reduce costs while appropriately remunerating registered liquidators for their work, increasing competition and ensuring consistency in external administration processes would also help maximise the potential return to creditors and help build confidence in the insolvency regime.

Alternative funding models and professional standards

Para.471     ASIC suggests that in considering how the external administration process can be streamlined for small- and medium-sized enterprises, consideration should be given to: (a) alternative funding models, as discussed in ASIC’s main submission to this inquiry and which are the subject of recommendations made by the Senate inquiry into the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The funding model affects, among other things, the supervision of registered liquidators and, potentially, their remuneration; and (b) professional standards and regulation, including those relating to investigation and reporting to creditors and to ASIC.

External administration regime and business failure

Para.472     ASIC is not aware of empirical evidence supporting the view that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail. If empirical evidence supporting the contention that viable companies unnecessarily enter external administration does exist, ASIC believes the Australian Government could consider legislative change that would address this, and that would achieve better outcomes for creditors.

Damage to entity value

Para.473     We are aware, however, of concerns in the market that unnecessary external administrations, which destroy entity value and result in significant cost, are the result of: (a) a lack of a ‘safe harbour’ from what are said to be stringent insolvent trading laws (which can make a director personally liable for a company’s debts); and (b) the positive obligation/duty on directors to appoint an external administrator if their company is insolvent, or might become insolvent.

Para.474     We acknowledge the possibility that the formal appointment of an external administrator can also reduce the value of a company’s business, and note that there is anecdotal evidence to support this view.

Voluntary administration as a ‘quasi liquidation’

Para.475     ASIC’s statistics on voluntary administration and deeds of company arrangement suggest that, for small companies, there is often not a viable business worth saving as many companies that enter voluntary administration end up in liquidation. This is supported by a recent review of 72 sample deeds of company arrangement (85% of which related to what might be described as small company insolvencies). The review found that 72% of these deeds were compromises akin to liquidation and involved no, or very limited, trading on of the business under the deed (although the dividend return paid to creditors was greater than that estimated if an immediate winding up of the company had occurred). In other words, the statistics show that companies often use the restructuring option of voluntary administration as a ‘quasi liquidation’.

Continuation of viable businesses

Para.476      The current insolvency legislation provides for the continuation of a viable business. Where there is a viable business of a company in liquidation, the liquidator has the ability to sell that business. Alternatively, the liquidator can appoint a voluntary administrator to facilitate the company’s restructuring with a view to its continued operation.

Reasons often cited as inhibiting corporate restructuring

Para.477     We note that four main reasons are often cited as inhibiting corporate restructuring in Australia: (a) the perceived stringency of our insolvent trading laws; (b) destruction of value by ipso facto clauses in contracts, which enable creditors to pursue enforcement action or enforce their contractual rights. This issue impacts on the extent of any moratorium on creditor claims during the period of a company’s restructuring; (c) a lack of formal ‘pre-pack sale’ regulation, which allows a sale of the business, or some company assets, to be negotiated prior to the appointment of an external administrator; and (d) the inability to bind third parties.

Para.478      In principle, we consider these matters worthy of further discussion and consultation noting they have proved contentious in the past.

US Chapter 11 style regime

Para.479     In terms of any legislative change, ASIC does not advocate a wholesale adoption of a US Chapter 11 style regime or other processes. However, we note that the US Chapter 11 regime, along with the administration regimes in the United Kingdom and Canada, might be worth examining to identify elements that could address the issues claimed to inhibit effective corporate restructuring in Australia.

Consider different laws for large and small companies

Para.480      We consider that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to the external administration or reorganisation of failed and distressed entities may not be appropriate. The framework for external administration needs to take account of the fact that issues affecting large proprietary and public companies differ from those affecting small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Para.481     Legislative changes to facilitate corporate rehabilitation might therefore consider the different characteristics of large and small companies, and policy settings may need to be specifically tailored for these sectors, in order to promote deregulation, facilitate efficient reallocation of resources and improve competition.


Jul 212014
 

 

In a recent decision concerning liquidators of the Walton Construction group, Justice Robertson of the Full Court of the Australian Federal Court has determined that it would be inappropriate and against the law to take into account the insolvency practitioners’ Code of Professional Conduct.

In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Franklin (liquidator), in the matter of Walton Constructions Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 85 (judgment 18 July 2014), His Honour said:

“I should add that I do not regard the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia’s guide entitled Code of Professional Practice for Insolvency Practitioners, on which ASIC relied, as extrinsic material appropriate or permitted to be taken into account in construing ss 60 and 436DA of the Corporations Act. To my mind, the general law would not permit that guide to be taken into account in construing those provisions and that guide is outside the scope of s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). For example, the relevant parts of that guide were not reproduced or referred to in the explanatory memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Bill 2007 (Cth). ”           (Judgment paragraph 38.)

what-how-when-why

Conflict of interest

At the heart of the main decision in this case is the issue of conflict of interest and duty. I will analyse this part of the decision in a separate post. But here I want to discuss issues concerning compliance with and enforcement of the association’s Code of Professional Conduct.

An interesting predicament for ARITA

Justice Robertson’s comments are likely to cause something of a predicament for the association of insolvency practitioners, the Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association (ARITA). Naturally its Code of Professional Conduct (the Code) is binding on its members. So, it will probably review and amend this particular rule to bring it into line with the comments by Justice Robertson. Otherwise it would be imposing a requirement that the law does not acknowledge.

But, theoretically, it is not essential that ARITA bring its rules into line. If it thinks it necessary to have ethical rules that impose on its members duties greater than those imposed by the insolvency laws, it is entitled to do so. And it is entitled to take disciplinary action against members who breach such rules. Any member who doesn’t want to be bound by these extra duties can choose to resign from the association.

However it appears that enforcement of those rules by ARITA would be problematic. At the moment ARITA appears to enforce its rules only after a law enforcement agency (e.g. the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board) has made an unfavourable decision.

Apart from ARITA’s Code containing guidance as to what is meant by sections 60 and 436DA of the Corporations Act, ARITA has rules that impose greater duties and obligations than those imposed by the law. In constructing these extra duties and rules ARITA hopes that the courts will recognise them as a proper standard for judging the behaviour of insolvency practitioners and, by doing so, raise the standard of practice in the profession.

Until the comments by Justice Robertson in the Walton Constructions appeal case, it was widely believed that the statements and rules in ARITA’s Code applied not only to members of the association but effectively applied to all liquidators, because the courts would look to the Code when assessing whether the behaviour of a liquidator complied with his or her duties.

ARITA could suffer financially if this belief, based as it is on previous judgments by the courts, has been thrown into doubt by Justice Robertson. ARITA says that around 83% of all registered insolvency practitioners in Australia are ARITA members. But if its Code continues to impose standards that are more onerous than those imposed by the Corporations Act, and if the courts don’t continue to support its Code, more practitioners may choose not to join ARITA.

Comment by ARITA

Writing on behalf of the authors of the Code – the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) – Michael Murray, Legal Director of ARITA,  says:

“Interestingly, Justice Robertson said that he did not regard the ARITA Code of Professional Practice for Insolvency Practitioners, on which ASIC relied, as extrinsic material appropriate or permitted to be taken into account in construing ss 60 and 436DA of the Corporations Act. This was the case as a matter of law under the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).  As a matter of interpretation of the sections that comment is no doubt correct.  But it continues to be the case that the Code is relied upon by the courts in assessing standards of practitioners’ conduct: Dean-Willcocks v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board [2006] FCA 1438.”


END OF POST

Jul 172014
 

Is there evidence that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail and, if so, what could be done to address this?

This is the question being asked about external administrations in the Interim Report of the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) (July 2014). The FSI says it would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the following policy options or other alternatives:

  • No change to current arrangements.
  • Implement the 2012 proposals to reduce the complexity and cost of external administration for SMEs. [See below for details of these proposals.]

The brief section of the FSI’s report dealing with external administration may be viewed HERE.  (The full report in pdf format is available HERE.)

David Murray

David Murray, FSI chairman. Artwork from bluenotes.anz.com

US Chapter 11 regime?

Adoption by Australia of a US Chapter 11 style form of external administration could still be an option, although the FSI has already given it the thumbs down, as this extract from its interim report shows:

“The Inquiry considers adopting such a regime would be costly and could leave control in the hands of those who are often the cause of a company’s financial distress. Capital would be maintained in a business that is likely to fail, which would restrict or defer the capital from being channelled to more viable and productive enterprises. Adopting such a regime would also create more uncertainty for creditors by limiting their rights. The Inquiry notes that Chapter 11 has rarely enabled businesses to continue as going concerns in the long term. There is little empirical evidence that Australia’s voluntary administration process is causing otherwise viable businesses to fail. The Inquiry would like stakeholders to provide any empirical evidence that supports that view.”

Second round of submissions to FSI

Submissions in response to the Interim Report are due by 26 August 2014. Submissions can be lodged online using the Financial System Inquiry special facility,  or may be lodged by email or post: fsi@fsi.gov.au or Financial System Inquiry,  GPO Box 89,  Sydney NSW 2001.

Insolvency reform proposals of 2012

The 2012 insolvency reform proposals to which the FSI specifically refers in its request for second round submissions concern:

  1. Registration and discipline of insolvency practitioners (See note 1 at end of post for more information).
  2. Specific rules relating to external administrations (note 2).
  3. Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments (note 3).

The Explanatory Material issued with the Insolvency Law Reform Bill  on 19 December 2012 can be viewed HERE.

“Thought leadership”

The Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) (previously known as the Insolvency Practitioners Association) says it has embarked on “a major project to drive thought leadership around our insolvency regime”.  It is asking insolvency practitioners who want to make a submission to FSI to work with the professional association:

“ARITA has embarked on a major project to drive thought leadership around our insolvency regime.  Along with some of ARITA’s excellent previous work, significant new work has already been completed and ARITA members will soon be asked for comment on key aspects of our policy positions. This work is, obviously, well timed to support the FSI request for submissions. ARITA will actively work to represent the views of its membership and the profession to the FSI. We would urge all members and their firms to work with ARITA on providing strong and consistent representation to the FSI. If you or your firm is looking at making its own submission, please let ARITA know so that we can collaborate with you.”  ARITA Press Release 15/7/2014



NOTES re Proposals in December 2012 Insolvency Reform Bill:

Note 1: Registration and discipline of insolvency practitioners

Common rules regarding:   the physical registers of insolvency practitioners;  registration and disciplinary Committees.

Note 2: Specific rules relating to external administrations

Common rules regarding: •

  • Remuneration and other benefits received by the insolvency  practitioner;
  • The handling of administration or estate funds;
  • The provision of information by insolvency practitioners during an external administration or bankruptcy;
  • The meetings of creditors during an external administration or bankruptcy;
  • Committee of inspection formed as part of an external administration or bankruptcy; and
  • The external review of the administration of an estate or insolvency.

Note 3, part (a): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

Provide ASIC with further powers to assist it in its oversight of the regulation of registered liquidators. In particular, the Bill amends the ASIC Act to:

  • enable ASIC to require the provision of information and books as part of an ASIC proactive surveillance program;
  • enable ASIC to provide administration information to a person with a material interest in the information; and
  • improve the transparency of ASIC oversight of the corporate insolvency industry.

Note 3, part (b): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

Amend the Bankruptcy Act to enable ITSA to provide information relevant to the administration of the corporate law to ASIC.

Note 3, part (c): Regulator powers and miscellaneous amendments

A range of miscellaneous amendments, including:

  • amending the Acts to strengthen the penalties for breach of a bankrupt’s or directors’ obligations to provide a report as to affairs (RATA), or the books of the company, to an insolvency practitioner;
  • amend the Corporations Act to provide a process for the automatic disqualification of directors that have failed to provide a RATA, or the books of the company, to a registered liquidator until they have complied with those obligations; and
  • amend the Acts to enable the assignment of an insolvency practitioner’s statutory rights of actions.

Jun 272014
 

Recommendation 17 of the Senate Economics References Committee final report (26/6/2014) on the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is:

“… that  ASIC,  in  collaboration  with  the Australian  Restructuring  Insolvency  and  Turnaround  Association  and accounting  bodies,  develop  a  self-rating  system,  or  similar  mechanism,  for statutory  reports  lodged  by  insolvency  practitioners  and  auditors  under  the Corporations  Act  2001  to  assist  ASIC  identify  reports  that  require  the  most urgent attention and investigation.” (Page 244, para. 15.66)

Source: Final report of Senate Economics References Committee on Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 26/6/2014 

Committee’s comments preceding this recommendation

Before making recommendation 17 the Senate Committee’s Report looks at “Reports from industry professionals”  including external administrators. It states as follows (note: I’ve removed its footnotes):

 

External administrators

15.55  The  Corporations  Act  also  places an obligation on liquidators, receivers and voluntary  administrators  (external  administrators)  to  report  suspected  breaches  of the  Corporations  Act  to  ASIC….

15.56  Reports  made  pursuant  to  these  sections  are  referred  to  as  statutory  reports and  are  an  important  source  of  information  about  possible  breaches  of  the  law….

15.57  Liquidators  also  have  the  discretion  to  lodge  further  reports  if,  in  their opinion, it is desirable to draw the matter to ASIC’s attention.

15.58  In 2012–13, external administrators lodged 9,788 reports with ASIC. Of this number,  initial  external  administrators  accounted  for  95  per  cent  or  9,254  reports. ASIC recorded  that 81 per cent of the initial reports  involved  companies with fewer than  20  employees.  The  construction  industry  was  subject  to  the  highest  number  of reports  accounting  for  just  over  24  per  cent.  Of  the  initial  external  administrators’ reports, receivers lodged one per cent under section 422; administrators lodged 3.8 per cent under section 438D; and 95 per cent of the reports were submitted by liquidators under section 533.

15.59  Importantly,  external  administrators  alleged  misconduct  in  more  than two-thirds of reports  (6,761)  involving an overall possible 16,562 breaches. Although this  number  accounts  for  an  average  of  between  two  and  three  breaches  per  report, almost  30  per  cent  of  reports  or  2,493  recorded  no  misconduct. ASIC  asked  the external administrator to prepare a supplementary section 422, section 438D or section 533  report  for  677  of  the  6,761  reports  that  identified  possible  misconduct. In its analysis of the statistics, ASIC explained  that its request for an additional report is  a  function  of  its  assessment  of  risk  based  on  a  number  of  factors,  including,  but not limited to:
*   the nature of the possible misconduct reported;
*   the amount of liabilities;
*   the deficiency suffered;
*   the availability of evidence;
*   prior misconduct; and
*   the advice of the external administrator that the reported possible misconduct warranted further investigation.

15.60  In  a 2007 report, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)  observed that given  the  large  number  of  statutory  reports  received  by  ASIC  each  year  that  allege offences  against  the  Corporations  Act,  it  was  appropriate  that  ASIC  had  systems  in place  to  prioritise  its  regulatory  action,  through  risk  scoring.  It  found  that  ASIC’s recording of statutory report information was accurate to  a high degree. The ANAO recognised  that  ASIC  could  use  a  wide  variety  of  possible  remedies  to  deal  with offences identified in statutory reports or other deficiencies that warranted some sort  of regulatory action. They ranged from warning letters to directors for the less serious offences  to  prosecution  and  potentially  imprisonment  for  more  serious  offences. It noted that where ASIC identified  that a statutory report raised  issues of regulatory significance,  it  sought  further  information  about  the  matter  from  the  external administrator.

15.61  According to  the ANAO  report, ASIC  did  not always obtain that additional information.  Based on its sample, it found that in 40 per cent of instances,  ASIC did not obtain additional information that it had requested. The ANAO concluded:

… the  small  number  of  statutory  reports  subject  to  regulatory  action  by ASIC  each  year  indicates  that  there  is  opportunity  for  greater  regulatory action on these reports.

15.62  Mr  David  Lombe,  President  of  the  Australian  Restructuring  Insolvency  and Turnaround Association  (ARITA)  was of the view that  ANAO’s  2007  findings  were still  relevant  and  applicable. He  noted  the  thousands  of  reports  lodged  with  ASIC each  year  but  not  acted  upon.  In  Mr  Lombe’s  view,  there  was  a  ‘general  perception within  the business community that, if you do certain things at a certain level, there will be no effective review’. He explained further:

“The difficulty that we have as official liquidators is that you get a matter off the  court  list  and  often  that  matter  has  no  funds  in  it,  so  there  are  no available assets. Often that is a process by which directors have deliberately done that—it has been a deliberate course of action. If you report the matter to ASIC and there is no assistance from that space, there is not much  you can do. If you felt really aggrieved by it or you felt that it was a matter that was  of  sufficient  importance,  you  may  be  able  to  persuade  a  firm  of solicitors to act on a pro bono basis, but that is very difficult. I found myself in  that  sort  of  situation  with  Babcock  &  Brown,  where  I  had  inadequate funds to be able to pursue a proper investigation. The only thing that was available to me was to ask creditors to fund me, which they did, which then allowed me to do a public examination, which brought out the conduct of directors and other stakeholders in that company. If you do not have funds in a matter, the courses are very limited.”

15.63  By  way  of  example,  Mr  Lombe  expanded  on  his  concerns  citing  the requirement  to  lodge  a  section  533  report,  which  deals  with  offences  committed  by directors.  He explained that for the liquidator to understand what has happened,  he or she  needs  to

  ‘review the books and records, determine the transactions, try to find out what assets are there, look at insolvent trading and look at preference payments and all those sorts of things’.

  The liquidator is  required to file that report,  which  takes  time. So, according to Mr Lombe,  the reports involve both  time and money, and often  with official liquidations there are no assets at all and, if there are, creditors are effectively paying for the report.  He noted that thousands of  such reports  are lodged  with ASIC but  most  of  them  come  back  ‘no  further  action’.  In  his  view,  it  is  frustrating  for liquidators because they feel, ‘Why am I bothering to do it?’ Mr Lombe concluded that ‘you  can  understand  someone’s  frustration,  where  they  have  reported  offences  and nothing happens’.

15.64  When asked whether liquidators, in their  statutory  reports,  could assist ASIC to  distinguish  the  very  serious  breaches  from  the  less  so,  ARITA  indicated  that  it ‘might be a useful reform’. After considering the matter further, ARITA informed the committee that if it were consulted, it could assist ASIC to determine a risk scoring profile. It explained further, however:

“But we consider that the decision on how the information required by s533 is ‘risk-scored’ for action is ultimately one for the regulator and its decision and  methods  should  not  be  publicly  disclosed.  For  one  thing,  this  would appear to give the  ‘green light’ to the  commission of certain offences that are deemed not serious enough to warrant action by ASIC.”

15.65  ARITA  also  stated  that  ‘a  more  co-operative  approach  between  ASIC  and liquidators  should  also  be  pursued’.  The  committee  believes  that  ASIC  and  ARITA should  work  closely  together  to  develop  a  more  effective  and  efficient  reporting mechanism that would assist ASIC to identify the alleged  serious  breaches from the less so.”